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Preface

I have high hopes for this book. First, it should fill a conspicuous
gap in the Hegel literature, for the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit is—
unjustly—second only to the Philosophy of Nature in the lack of
attention it receives.
The book should also help stir up a bit more interest in Hegel in
Anglo-American philosophical circles, where the philosophy of
mind is currently one of the most active and exciting fields. It is in
the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit that Hegel confronts the questions
about the nature of human understanding and thought so central to
the British tradition after Locke. I think I show here that Hegel's
appreciation of the complexity of our minds and the peculiarities of
our discourse about them is quite sophisticated—more so than that
of his major contemporary rivals.
My own philosophical language is that of the Anglo-American
tradition, but few of my comrades have devoted enough time to
Hegel's works to appreciate him. There is surely no excuse for
Hegel's writing style; it is simply abominable. But the stylistic difficulties of Aristotle's Metaphysics or Wittgenstein's Tractatus have not
prevented them from being read carefully and often. Hegel's technical language cannot be the only way to express his insights, so I
have tried to make Hegel speak Anglo-American here (I say "Anglo-American" rather than "English" because I am not just translating into my native language). No doubt my efforts will distress
many readers, both because I have made Hegel too Anglo-Ameri-
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can and because I have not done the job thoroughly enough. If
opinion on this matter is roughly split, I will be content.
Third, I hope that the book is controversial. A fight has been
brewing among Hegel scholars, one that has been kept relatively
quiet because the field is small. It is not quite.the old battle between
left and right Hegelians, which centered on religious and social
issues, but a new (though related) battle centered on the correct
Hegelian treatment of the empirical sciences. Everyone has to admit
that Hegel paid close attention to the empirical sciences. The disagreement is over whether philosophy itself emerges out of them
and depends on them in some real sense (this would be the position
of the Hegelian left, I suppose) or comes to the empirical sciences
from outside, with a fund of knowledge both independent of and
superior to that of the empirical sciences (the position of the right).
Neither extreme position is correct (of course), but on the whole
readers will find this book constantly straining toward the left,
despite the many right-wing pronouncements of Hegel himself.
The Hegelian system can be equally consistently developed toward
the left—and it is so much more vital and interesting when it is.
Thus I read Hegel as a great naturalist, as one who saw man as
arising out of and continuous with nature and capable of being
understood only in this natural context. He was certainly not a total
naturalist, but no ultimate break is to be found between nature and
spirit in Hegel's system. In his dislike of absolute dichotomies
Hegel shares an important trait with his (to me most congenial)
successors, the pragmatists.
I must point out right away that this is not a book about the
Phenomenology of Spirit. There are plenty of those (new ones, too)
already. I have focused almost exclusively on Hegel's mature system as it is found in his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. This
work, supplemented by his lecture notes, constitutes his considered
and final opinions in the philosophy of mind. The early Phenomenology, as fascinating as it is, is by Hegel's own admission a "peculiar
early work." In particular, as even a cursory glance shows, it lacks
precisely those parts of the system which are most important for the
philosophy of mind, the Anthropology and the Psychology. The
attention lavished on the early Phenomenology has probably been the
major reason the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit has been slighted. It
would be easy to think that the early Phenomenology, like the greater
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Logic, contains the full version of something that the Encyclopedia
has only in outline. I think such a view is simply wrong; Hegel did a
great deal of rethinking while he was in Nurnberg, but I cannot
argue that point here. I hope that this book will spur a greater
interest in the relation between the early Phenomenology and the
Encyclopedia.
One more word of caution. I have often used material from the
Zusatze in the Encyclopedia, the additions based on Hegel's and his
students' lecture notes inserted as clarificatory material by Hegel's
posthumous editors. Because this material does not always stem
directly from Hegel's hand and because some of the original sources
have disappeared and cannot be checked, the Zusatze arouse suspicion among many Hegel scholars, especially now that, thanks to the
editors of the new critical edition of the corpus, we are finally
becoming accustomed to reliable texts. In the case of the Philosophy
of Subjective Spirit, however, where no complete collateral texts are
available, and where the Zusatze comprise the bulk of what material
we have, using these notes is almost unavoidable if the interpretation is going to have any real meat on its bones. To think that the
Encyclopedia could be interpreted adequately without the Zusatze is
simply to ignore the fact that our background understanding of
Hegel and his project—a background on which any further or new
interpretation must draw—has already been deeply affected by the
Zusatze, which have been part of the corpus since Hegel's death.
Our understanding of Hegel has already been influenced by this
material; we probably cannot extirpate its influence, so it is best
to make it explicit. Sufficient amounts of the annotation can be
traced to independent sources (especially the Kehler and Griesheim
manuscripts) to attest to its pedigree. Judicious use of this material
is possible, justifiable, and certainly helpful. I have been careful,
though, to indicate whenever a quotation comes from a Zusatz.
The first chapter of the book is an account of Hegel's most important systematic commitments that bear on the philosophy of mind.
It is quite general and should help orient the reader who has had
little contact with Hegel's texts. The second chapter narrows the
view to Hegel's philosophy of mind, emphasizing its relations to its
well-known predecessors. Again, no familiarity with Hegel's texts
should be necessary. In the opening chapters I have sought to avoid
"front-loading" the book with explanations of Hegelian terminol-
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ogy. People very familiar with Hegel will find that a bit frustrating,
for they are used to discussing Hegel in Hegel's terms. I can only
ask that such readers bear with me. Several non-Hegelian readers
have told me that these chapters do a good job of getting Hegel
across precisely because they do not try first to get the terminology
across and only later to fill in the position.
In the third chapter the view widens again temporarily in order to
make the Hegelian distinction between Nature and Spirit clearer. I
argue that this distinction is not an absolute dichotomy, that there is
a vague gray area between the two polar concepts. I also propose an
interpretation of the relation between the natural (bodily) and spiritual (mental) aspect of a person that, if correct, shows Hegel's
sophistication as a philosopher. Although no detailed knowledge of
Hegel's texts is required in this chapter, without a general familiarity with the system the larger picture I am trying to make sense of
will not be clear.
From the fourth chapter onward we are in the thick of Hegel's
philosophy of mind. At this point real textual exegesis is unavoidable. I have cited much of the relevant material, which is often quite
skimpy, since the Encyclopedia is only an outline of the system, and
have tried to make the essential points as clear as possible in my
interpretations. The order of the chapters basically follows Hegel's
own ordering of the topics: sensation, feeling/ the I, intuition, the
varieties of representation, and, finally, thought. Chapter 6, on the
I, serves as a timely centerpiece, recapitulating the previous chapters and foreshadowing what follows. Chapter 11, on the distinction between representation and thought, sets off the last chapter,
on thinking, by showing how this most Hegelian part of Hegel's
system relates to a long-standing, fundamental disagreement in the
philosophy of mind; it is really only at this point that the full scope
of Hegel's philosophy of mind comes into view.
In many ways this book is only an introduction to Hegel's philosophy of mind. The issues are extremely complex; questions of
textual interpretation are very thorny. But work on this important
part of Hegel's system has to begin somewhere; the reading of his
philosophy offered here will have served well if it prompts others to
challenge it, rebut it, and dig still deeper into Hegel's philosophy of
mind.
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As I near the end of this project, I realize humbly how much help I
have received. I have been fortunate to have been generously supported by the German Fulbright Commission; without their support I could not have attempted to write about Hegel. Chapter 6 was
written while I attended an NEH Summer Seminar for College
Teachers given at Cornell University by Sidney Shoemaker; I am
grateful to everyone involved, especially Professor Shoemaker.
Amherst College provided funds for research expenses, and the
final revisions of the manuscript were undertaken while I enjoyed
an Andrew W. Mellon Faculty Fellowship at Harvard University.
Though financial support was a sine qua non for this project, the
people who helped me were its lifeblood. Starting with my work on
Hegel in graduate school at the University of Pittsburgh, a setting
not known for cultivating Hegel scholars, I have received helpful
advice and searching criticism from Wilfrid Sellars, Paul Guyer,
Annette Baier, and Nicholas Rescher. The time I spent at the Hegel
Archive of the Ruhr University in Bochum was crucial to this enterprise, and I am beholden to Walter Jaeschke, Hans-Christian Lucas,
Kurt Meist, Friedrich Hogemann, Manfred Baum, Wolfgang Bonsiepen, Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, and Klaus Diising for their
assistance. A special word of thanks is due to Frau Exner, who
/made extra efforts to make both research and life in Germany easier.
I My former colleagues at Amherst College were sometimes
amused by my interest in Hegel but always supportive; William E.
Kennick, however, went beyond the call of duty to read and comment on the entire manuscript in an earlier draft. His constant
encouragement was very important to me. Contacts among a small
but growing group of "young Hegelians" also provided needed
comment and support. Harold Kincaid, Crawford Elder, R. C. Solomon, and Kenneth Westphal all deserve my thanks. Michael
Hardimon is another brave soul who dared a large chunk of the
manuscript and thereby made it better.
My final scholarly thanks also go well beyond the scholarly. The
philosophical discussion group I participated in for six years in the
Pioneer Valley, the infamous Prepositional Attitudes Task Force,
has been a constant source of philosophical and personal support.
What philosophy of mind I know I owe to them. My thanks and
more to the PATF and the visitors who have joined us: Murray
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Kiteley, John Connelly, Thomas Tymoczko, Janice Moulton,
Thomas Wartenburg, Meredith Michaels, Lee Bowie, Herbert
Heidelberger, Bruce Aune, William Lycan, Lynne Baker, Christopher Witherspoon, Steven Weisler, and an extra thanks to Jay
Garfield, a colleague in graduate school and in the Valley, perhaps
the closest member of my philosophical family. An honorary member of the PATF and a Mellon fellow at Harvard, Daniel Lloyd, has
endured the entire manuscript and yet become a close friend. I spent
a wonderful year at Tufts University while the manuscript was
being turned into a book. I'd like to thank my colleagues there, as
well as my student Daniel Mullen, who scoured page proofs for me.
Cornell University Press has been a pleasure to work with. At
every turn the press has proved itself efficient and gracious; I could
not have dreamed of more. My thanks to John Ackerman, Barbara
Salazar, John Thomas, and all the others who have made this
manuscript into a book.
I am grateful to Kluwer Academic Publishers for permission to
quote from M. J. Petry's translation of The Philosophy of Subjective
Spirit (copyright © 1978 Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht,
Holland), and to Idealistic Studies for permission to use segments of
my article "Hegel on Representation and Thought," published in
vol. 15 (May 1987).
Finally, to thank my family—both the greatest inspiration and (as
we all know) the greatest impediment to work—seems fatuous:
how can one presume to thank a raison d'etre? My wife, Dianne,
has the uncanny ability to make me write clearer, better prose, even
though she claims to understand Hegel neither before nor afterward. My respect for her intellect and my reliance on her love have
never stopped growing. I hope my children look at the book someday; I am not sure I wish that fate on the rest of my family, but I
thank them for their unfailing support. My mother, Dr. Jenny B.
deVries, helped as both a supportive parent and an expert in the
German language; I owe her too much to catalog.
WlLLEM A. DEVRIES

Ashland, Massachusetts

A Note on the Texts

Readers who are new to Hegel often find the references to his
works confusing. There is no standard citation format for his books,
and it is not even clear from the titles to the translations just how
they correspond to the German editions. Let me take a moment to
review the status of the texts for the neophyte Hegelian. Hegel
published only four books in his life: The Phenomenology of Spirit,
published in 1807; The Science of Logic, in three volumes, published
in 1811, 1812, and 1816; Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences,
which was originally published in 1816 and revised in 1827 and
1830; and The Philosophy of Right, published in 1822. He also published some articles early in his career and during his Berlin period
in the 18203. After Hegel died, his students and admirers (they
called themselves the "society of the friends of the eternalized")
decided to publish a collected edition of his works. Besides collecting the pieces Hegel had published himself, they assigned various
members of the group to collect and edit texts of Hegel's lectures on
art, religion, the history of philosophy, and the philosophy of history. The editors used Hegel's own lecture notes (often several sets
from different years) and student notes as well in reconstructing a
single text for each topic. This posthumous edition became the basis
for all subsequent editions of Hegel; only now, with the new critical
edition being assembled in Germany, is a serious effort being made
to reconstruct the Hegelian corpus on the basis of the original texts.
Of particular interest to us is the fate of Hegel's Encyclopedia of the
Philosophical Sciences. This is not quite (though almost) the hubristic

xviii

A Note on the Texts

adventure that its title makes it seem; it was written to be a lecture
guide for Hegel's students. By the time Hegel wrote the Encyclopedia, he thought he had developed a unitary, coherent system within
which each philosophical topic, from logic through political theory
to aesthetics and beyond, could be treated. The Encyclopedia is the
outline of this system, made available primarily so that his students
could locate his lectures in their broader context. The sections of the
Encyclopedia offer mere summaries of what sometimes took Hegel
several lectures to get across. (For readers unfamiliar with the overall structure of the Hegelian system, W. T. Stace's book The Philosophy of Hegel contains a fold-out synopsis of the ordering and subordination of all the concepts in the system. It is, in fact, a properly
laid-out table of contents for the Encyclopedia. For Hegel even more
than for Kant, the architectonic of his system is a major element of
the system, perhaps even the single most important aspect of it. I
have included an outline of the part of Hegel's system dealt with
here—the structure of subjective spirit—following this note.)
When the Encyclopedia was included in the posthumous edition of
Hegel's works, the editors, cognizant of the fact that its extreme
compression makes for very obscure and difficult reading, added
supplementary material taken from Hegel's lectures (both Hegel's
notes and his students') to the relevant sections. This procedure
undoubtedly made the Encyclopedia easier to read, but it has raised
numerous worries about the authenticity of the supplementary
texts—called Zusatze in German. I have defended in the Preface my
use of the Zusatze.
The Encyclopedia is divided into three major sections—Logic, Philosophy of Nature, and Philosophy of Spirit—and German publishers usually issue them as separate volumes of the Encyclopedia
(the one-volume Poggeler-Nicolin edition omits the Zusatze). The
English translations have been published as separate titles—The
Logic of Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, and Hegel's Philosophy of
Mind—with no indication that they are parts of a larger work. The
Encyclopedia consists of consecutively numbered paragraphs (demarcated by the symbol §), and the English translations preserve
the paragraph numbers. Because the paragraphs are generally quite
short, even with the Zusatze, I have used them as my citation
markers in all references to the Encyclopedia; thus readers may use
any edition, English or German, to track the references.
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Recently Michael J. Perry, noting the shameful lack of attention
that the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit has received, published a very
scholarly bilingual edition of this portion of the Encyclopedia. Appearing under the title Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, this is
not a separate book but simply a new and scholarly edition of the
first third of the last third (the philosophy of spirit) of Hegel's
Encyclopedia. Perry does, however, include new material beyond
that included in the original posthumous edition: he traces some of
the Zusatze back to the two remaining sets of lecture notes available,
and he also includes an unfinished work in which Hegel hoped to
expand this part of the Encyclopedia. Hegel's Philosophy of Right is an
i expansion of the material contained in the philosophy of objective
spirit, the part of the Encyclopedia that follows the philosophy of
subjective spirit. After publishing the Philosophy of Right, Hegel
started work on a similar expansion of the earlier part of the Encyclopedia, but he never finished it.
I have put citations in the text whenever possible. Standardized
citations have been used when they were available. Full bibliographic details are given in the bibliography. To keep the Hegel
citations in the text short, I have indicated their sources by the
following abbreviations:
PhG

G. W. F. Hegel. Phiinomenologie des Geistes. Edited by J. Hoffmeister.
6th ed. Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1952.
PhS G. W. F. Hegel. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V.
Miller. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.
SL
G. W. F. Hegel. Hegel's Science of Logic. Translated by A. V. Miller.
London: George Alien & Unwin, 1969.
WdL G. W. F. Hegel. Wissenschaft der Logik. Edited by G. Lasson. Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1934.

All references to the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences are by
section numbers (§). If the citation is to textual material added by
the editors of the posthumous edition of Hegel's works, I indicate it
as a Zusatz. The current standard edition of the Encyclopedia in
German (Enzyklopedie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, edited by F.
Nicolin and O. Poggeler [Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1959]) does not
contain the Zusatze, so I have worked principally with the Suhrkamp Theorie Werkausgabe (G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopedie der phi-
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losophischen Wissenschaften, vols. 8-10 of G. W. F. Hegel, Werke,
edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel [Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1970]). When the provenance is not clear from the
context, I distinguish references to sections in the Encyclopedia Logic
and the Philosophy of Nature by marking them EL and PN, respectively. Most references are to the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit (PSS).
I have worked largely with the available English translations of the
Encyclopedia, especially Petry's, but I have not hesitated to supply
my own translations for greater accuracy. Unless I have noted
otherwise, translations of substantial quotations are Petry's. The
English editions are:
Hegel's Philosophy of Mind. Translated by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. Translated by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.
Hegel's Philosophy of Nature. 3 vols. Translated and edited by M. J. Petty.
London: George Alien & Unwin, 1970.
Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. 3 vols. Edited and translated by M. J.
Petry. Boston: D. Reidel, 1978.
The Logic of Hegel. Translated by W. Wallace. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1892.

The Structure of
Subjective Spirit

I. Anthropology—The Soul
A. The Natural Soul
1. Natural Qualities
2. Natural Changes
3. Sensibility
B. The Feeling Soul
1. The Feeling Soul in Its Immediacy
2. Self-feeling
3. Habit
C. The Actual Soul
II. The Phenomenology of Spirit—Consciousness
A. Consciousness as Such
1. Sensuous Consciousness
2. Perception
3. Understanding
B. Self-consciousness
1. Desire
2. Recognitive Self-consciousness
3. Universal Self-consciousness
C. Reason
„
III. Psychology—Spirit
A. Theoretical Spirit
i. Intuition
a. Feeling
b. Attention
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c. Intuition Proper

2. Representation
a. Recollection
i. The Image
ii. The Unconsciously Preserved Image
iii. Recollection Proper
b. Imagination
i. Associative, Reproductive Imagination
ii. Symbolic Imagination
iii. Sign-Making Imagination
c. Memory
i. Name-Retaining Memory
ii. Reproductive Memory
iii. Mechanical Memory
3. Thinking
a. Understanding
b. Judgment
c. Formal Reason
B. Practical Spirit
1. Practical Feeling
2. Impulses and Willfulness
3. Happiness
C. Free Spirit

HEGEL'S THEORY
OF MENTAL ACTIVITY

Science, Teleology,
and .Interpretation

PHYSICALISM AND CAUSALISM
A philosophy of mind is supposed to tell us, among other things,
the nature of the concepts we use in our descriptions and explanations of mental phenomena. Behaviorism, as a philosophy of mind,
tells us that concepts of the mental are really concepts of complicated complexes of dispositions to overt behavior. Functionalism
maintains that concepts of the mental are functionally defined concepts of states of the individual differentiated by their typical causal
role in the overall (internal and external) behavior of that individual. Both of these modern philosophies of mind tell us that mental
concepts are not concepts of occurrent properties of mental substances but concepts of complex causal properties.1 Fundamental to
both philosophies is a commitment to the priority of the causal,
physical order; our concepts of the mental are to be made sense of
by showing how the mental fits into the causal order of nature.
The associationist psychology of the Enlightenment that Hegel
was so familiar with is a bit harder to specify exactly, since mental
states tended to be reified into entity-like ideas. Nonetheless, it is
clear that the associationists share the commitment to the priority of
the causal with their present-day counterparts. This is clearly confessed at the very inception of associationism, when Hume comi. Functionalism itself is actually mute about whether the functionally defined
concepts of the mental are instantiated in a mental or a material substance—but they
are not, in any case, concepts of purely occurrent states.
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pares his own project with Newton's and his principles of association with Newton's law of gravitation.
In this chapter I argue that Hegel offers us a significantly different
understanding of the basic nature of our concepts of the mental and
that, unless we recognize this, his entire project will remain opaque
to us. Hegel's disagreement with the standard reading of our concepts is not confined to our concepts of the mental, however; Hegel
gives us a thorough reinterpretation of the systematic interrelations
among all our concepts, though we confine our argument here to
his view of the mental.
Since Descartes (certainly at least since Newton), the natural
sciences (especially physics) have provided the model of empirical
knowledge that has dominated philosophical reflection. But the
natural sciences have served as a model in different ways. Some
philosophers have tried to mimic in their own philosophies of mind
what they took the structure of physics to be. Thus the resemblance
Hume apparently saw between his philosophy and Newtonian
mechanics was the postulation of elementary atoms with the primitive property of attracting other atoms and complexes thereof.
Other philosophers have taken physics to be the sole exemplar of
empirical knowledge and have therefore sought to reduce the mental
to the physical. For many philosophers, though, physics and the
natural sciences provided a model, not through the particular
claims physics makes, but as an example of proper scientific methodology. To such philosophers physics is exemplary because of the
clearly intersubjecrive, repeatable nature of the evidence employed,
the rigorous formulation and generality of its laws, and so forth. If
there is a science of the mind, according to this group of philosophers, it must be consistent with physics and the other natural
sciences and like them, in these general, methodological respects,
even if it does not ultimately reduce to physics or physiology. And if
our present concepts of the mental cannot find a place in such a
science of the mind—well, so much the worse for them.
We could try to understand Hegel's project in the philosophy of
subjective spirit, indeed in the Encyclopedia as a whole, along these
lines, but with little hope of success. In some sense, surely, Hegel is
committed to psychology's being consistent with physics, for they
are both aspects of one world; but "naturalizing" psychology is not
the way to understand their consistency, according to Hegel.

Science, Teleology, and Interpretation
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The scientistic philosophers share the assumptions that all objects and events arise within one causal order and that physics is the
most general and complete description of that causal order. The
principle of these philosophical physicalists is that to understand
something fully (i.e., scientifically) is to locate it within the causal
order, showing how it depends on the objects and events physics
deals with. These assumptions are not shared by Hegel; he offers us
a very different picture of how the world hangs together. It is not
that Hegel denies that there is a sense in which all the other objects
and events of the world depend on those dealt with in physics—the
existence of the physical is a necessary condition of the existence of
biological and spiritual phenomena in his system as well. But this
dependency relation is not the right one to be concerned with;
that is, Hegel denies the conceptual and ontological priority of the
causal, physical order. In particular, truly understanding something is not, according to Hegel, a matter of locating it within the
causal order, but a matter of locating it within the self-realization of
the Absolute, a teleological structure that transcends the physical.
The teleological order, not the causal order of efficient causes, is the
ultimate touchstone. This change (which leaves untouched a great
deal of the hierarchical ordering of disciplines on which both Hegel
and the physicalist can agree) means that Hegel's philosophical
enterprise is quite different from that of the philosophical physicalist.
Philosophical physicalism is very familiar, perhaps even the
dominant view in contemporary philosophy. Its most venerable
opponent is straightforward dualism—the claim that some of our
concepts (usually our concepts of the mental) have nothing in particular to do with the causal, physical order but are about a disjoint
order of things. The mental order is usually conceived to be itself a
causal order, but mental and physical causation are held to be
different species of the same genus. Cartesian dualism is thus as
committed to the priority of the causal order as philosophical physicalism; unable to fit everything into the physical order, it accepts
the existence of another, disjoint causal order to account for the
leftovers.
Hegel does not want to accept either position, so he rejects their
common assumption, the priority of the causal. What he proposes
in its place is the priority of the teleological. To support this position
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Hegel breaks with his predecessors in proposing a different analysis
of the concept of teleology and a different approach to legitimating
the concepts we use.

OUR RELATIONSHIP TO NATURE
Two Approaches to Nature
Hegel's strategy for arguing the priority of the teleological order
set forth in his system is basically straightforward: he claims that the
approach of the physicalistic philosopher is really a one-sided abstraction from a more adequate, integrated, teleological approach.
Since the physicalistic approach is only an abstraction from this
more adequate approach, it must also be thought of as posterior to
it.
Hegel differentiates two relationships we can have to nature, the
practical and the theoretical. Neither is adequate in isolation; both
point beyond themselves to an integrated view of nature which
sublates them (that is, preserves in a unified view what is true and
valuable in both while abandoning their individual weak points).
In our practical relationship to nature we behave as individual
beings for whom nature is a means, an instrument for our purposes. Natural things themselves are (correctly) treated by us as
devoid of intrinsic purpose, but we (incorrectly) treat them as if we
can impose our purposes on them without resistance, as if their
purpose is to serve us. In this practical relationship to nature we are
concerned, not with the universal characteristics of things, but with
turning the individual things immediately at hand to our own
individual purposes:
Two further determinations are immediately apparent here, (a) The
practical approach is only concerned with the individual products of
nature, or with certain aspects of these products. . . . Nature itself, as
it is in its universality, cannot be mastered in this manner however,
nor bent to the purposes of man. (b) The other aspect of the practical
approach is that our purpose overrides the objects of nature, so that
they become means, the determination of which lies not in themselves
but in us. (PN §245, Zusatz)
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The practical relationship to nature affords us only a thoroughly
subjective, highly limited point of view which, when generalized,
quickly leads to absurdity. To believe, for instance, that cork trees
exist in order to provide us with bottle stoppers is just "silly" (PN
§245, Zusatz).
The second relationship to nature we commonly adopt, the theoretical relationship, is equally inadequate.
In the theoretical approach (a) the initial factor is our withdrawing
from natural things, leaving them as they are, and adjusting to them.
In doing this we start from our sense-knowledge of nature. If physics
were based only on perception however, and perceptions were nothing but the evidence of the senses, the activity of a natural scientist
would consist only of seeing, smelling, hearing, etc., so that animals
would also be physicists. . . . (b) In the second relation of things to us,
they either acquire the determination of universality for us, or we
transform them into something universal. The more thought predominates in ordinary perceptiveness, so much the more does the
naturalness, individuality, and immediacy of things vanish away. As
thoughts invade the limitless multiformity of nature, its richness is
impoverished, its springtimes die, and there is a fading in the play of
its colours. That which in nature was noisy with life, falls silent in the
quietude of thought; its warm abundance, which shaped itself in a
thousand intriguing wonders, withers into arid forms and shapeless
generalities, which resemble a dull northern fog. (PN §246, Zusatz)

The theoretical approach to nature is intended to capture nature as
it is in itself, but it can grasp nature only by transforming it into an
abstract structure of forces, laws, and genera (see PN §246, as well
as EL §2off.). The theoretical approach to nature therefore cannot
fully succeed in its intention to grasp nature as it is.
The practical approach to nature is concerned only with the immediate individuality confronting it, and the theoretical approach is
concerned only with the abstract universality of nature. Neither
approach is adequate for understanding our actual intercourse with
nature or for understanding nature itself. We act within nature understandingly, rationally. We do not normally combine the practical
and theoretical approaches by alternating between them; rather,
they are more properly conceived of as abstractions from a total and
fundamentally sound relation that we normally bear to nature.
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Constructing a balanced and adequate approach to nature is a
problem, a problem contemporary philosophers must face as well. I
shall bow to contemporary practice and put the point in a linguistic
mode. The pure language of science contains no practical vocabulary; it is not a language in which one can deliberate and formulate
intentions. The language of science can be used within such deliberations to formulate some of the premises of our practical reasoning,
but it is not itself sufficient for deliberation. It is, as well, a thoroughly objectifying language, without resources for the expression
of the subjective. Theory aims, apparently, at a thoroughly objective, impersonal comprehension of the world; practice, however,
seems essentially tied to the subjective, personal agent. The language of science cannot, therefore, be the sole language we use in
confronting the world unless we abandon our humanity and subjectivity.
The language of practice, however, is not complete either. Practical reasoning and the proper formulation of intentions require an
understanding of the world's independence of us, of its universal
patterns. Our subjective intentions make sense only against an
independent, objective world. But this means that a language of
pure practice is impossible; it must be conjoined with a theoretical
language. A language of pure theory may seem to be still a viable
possibility—but it is not hard to see that it must also be conjoined
with a language of practice if it is to function in the practice of
science.
As I have already intimated, this distinction between the theoretical and the practical is connected to the equally important distinction between the objective and the subjective. Statements from the
theoretical point of view are in the objective mode: "Unsupported
bodies near the surface of the earth fall at 2gt2." Although there can
be no theories without theorizers, the theorist per se never shows
up within the theory (at least outside quantum mechanics). The fact
that the objectivity of the theory emerges from the subjectivity of
the theorist is an extratheoretical fact. The theoretical and the objective approaches to the world go hand in hand.
Statements from the practical point of view usually wear their
subjective origin on their sleeve, for they point to human purposes,
often explicitly. Even the "objective practice" enjoined by ethics has
to root in our personal motivational structures in order to be real-
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ized. Unlike theory, practice cannot even superficially ignore the
subjectivity of the agent without obvious incoherence.
This general conflict between subjective and objective, theoretical
and practical approaches to the world has been addressed in different shapes by various present-day philosophers. Thomas Nagel
has spent a great deal of time exploring the conflict between the
subjective and the objective points of view.2 Wilfrid Sellars has
noted the distinction between the theoretical and the practical languages with which we engage the world and has suggested that
they must be conjoined into a "synoptic vision" of the world.3
Hegel, however, would strongly disagree with the idea that the two
can be simply conjoined—a deeper synthesis must be reached, one
in which the two approaches or languages do not simply coexist
alongside each other but inform each other and meld into a complete and unified vision of the world.
Objective Purpose
According to Hegel's diagnosis of the tension between the practical and theoretical approaches to nature, the proper resolution of
that tension calls for a concept of objective purpose. The practical
approach to nature is overly subjective, considering nature only in
relation to practical, subjective purposes. Any attempt to adapt the
subjective, practical approach to the universality and objectivity of
nature must involve a significant revision of the concept of purpose,
however; simply extending the concept of purpose applicable to
individual subjectivities to cover the whole world (say, by taking
nature to be God's instrument) cannot prove satisfactory. An objective purpose cannot be just a very big subjective purpose.
Hegel has provided us with a relatively detailed analysis of the
concept of purpose in his two Logics. I summarize his analysis here.4
In Hegel's time, purposes were standardly treated as arising from
the beliefs and desires of some subjectivity. Knives are sharp in
order to cut (or knives are for cutting) because someone has created
2. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere.
3. Wilfnd Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in Science, Perception, and Reality, pp. 1-40.
4 For details see, W. deVries, "The Dialectic of Teleology," Proceedings of the
Hegel Society of America, 1980.
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them with the intention that they serve as cutting devices. A subjectivity suffuses its own purposes into a distinct and often recalcitrant
objectivity in all such cases. Such a conception of teleology, however, can account for the purposiveness of natural things only with
difficulty. If the heart beats in order to pump blood (or the heart is
for pumping blood), then there must be someone who created
hearts with the intention that they serve as pumps. But that someone is clearly not any particular, finite subjectivity. There must be
some subjectivity that stands outside the finite and objective realm
and works its will upon it, namely God. Hegel thinks that this line
of thought presupposes a completely unsupportable conception of
a transcendent God. If there is natural teleology, Hegel realizes that
it cannot be understood by any extension of the subjective model.
Indeed, reflection on the subjective or intentional model of teleology is sufficient to demonstrate the need for a concept of natural or
objective teleology, Hegel believes, for intentional teleology actually presupposes natural teleology. In the intentional model of teleology a subjectivity works its will upon a distinct objectivity; normally
it does so by employing an instrument, a means for its end. But
since the instrument is itself^ in the objective order, how is the
subjectivity to work its will upon it? There must be something that
bridges the gap between the subjective and objective realms, normally the body. The possession of a body, a single, unified entity
with both subjective and objective aspects, is the necessary presupposition of intentional teleology. But the body itself is ideologically
saturated: the heart beats in order to pump blood; the body moves
in order to nourish itself. Intentional or subjective teleology is built
on the natural, objective teleology of the organism.
In all teleology there is at least implicit reference to the good. In
intentional teleology this reference is itself intentional; intentional
action aims at a subjectively valued end. In natural, objective teleology activity aims at the objective good of the organism. But Hegel
does not conceive of the natural good of an organism as a matter of
its mere survival or even the survival of its species; rather, Hegel
believes that for each thing-kind there is an ideal paradigm of that
thing-kind of which all the individuals of the kind can be seen as
approximations. Natural organisms (unlike artifacts) seek to realize
their ideal on their own, with more or less success in individual
cases. All natural teleology, including the beating of the heart in
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order to pump blood, is subordinate to the striving of the individual
to realize as best it can its ideal type. According to Hegel's analysis,
all natural teleology is at heart self-realization.
Hegel accepts Kant's second criterion for a Naturzweck, namely,
"that its parts should so combine in the unity of the whole that they
are reciprocally cause and effect of each other's form" (Kant, Critique of Judgment §65, Bernard p. 219, Ak. p. 291). But while Kant
admits that the whole is there because of its parts and the parts there
because of the whole, Kant also believes that these two "becauses"
are radically different. The first is objective, capable of dear justification; the second "because" is at best subjective, regulative, useful
in spurring further scientific research. But in Hegel's view both
"becauses" are equally objective. Teleological explanations appeal
to the paradigm of the relevant thing-kind, but this ideal is not
subjective, it is what defines that thing-kind. (Think of the Aristotelian dictum that to know something as it is "by nature" is to know
it at its best.) It is not something we dream up; it is there, objectively
present and explanatorily unavoidable. To say that such an ideal is
merely subjective is to subjectivize the world entirely, to make the
ontological structure of the world an artifact of our point of view
alone. Hegel refuses to do this.
The ontological structure of the world, its articulation into natural
kinds, is intrinsically teleological, according to Hegel. The behavior
of organisms must be understood as a striving to realize the organism's ideal and thereby to realize itself fully. And even the articulation of the inorganic realm, as devoid of internally active purpose as
the inorganic is, must still be viewed as a structure contributing to
the realization of a higher end, the self-realization of the Absolute.
But even if we grant Hegel's argument that intentional teleology
presupposes natural teleology, and thus grant that there are some
objective purposes aimed at by organisms capable of intentional
action, it certainly does not follow that there must be an objective
purpose for the whole world. Hegel's analysis of teleology might
establish the possibility of objective purpose and even the reality of
some objective purposes, given the reality of subjective purposes,
but it cannot justify belief in the existence of one universal objective
purpose for the whole of nature. Hegel was, I believe, cognizant of
this shortcoming and argued for the existence of an ultimate objective purpose from a different angle, namely, from the inadequacy of
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the theoretical approach to nature. In other words, the inadequacy
of the practical approach to nature justifies employment of the
concept of objective purpose, and, as we shall see, the inadequacy
of the theoretical approach justifies belief in the existence of a
universal objective purpose.
Universal Purpose
Like most post-Cartesian philosophers, Hegel recognizes the importance and generality of physics. Nevertheless, he believes that it
does not even potentially provide a complete understanding of the
world. "The inadequacy of the thought determinations used in
physics may be traced to two very closely connected points, (a) The
universal of physics is abstract or simply formal; its determination is
not immanent within it, and does not pass over into particularity,
(b) This is precisely the reason why its determinate content is external to the universal, and is therefore split up, dismembered, particularized, separated and lacking in any necessary connection
within itself; why it is in fact merely finite" (PN §246, Zusatz).
Hegel's complaint against the concepts used in theoretical physics is not very clear in any of his writings, partly because it is a
complaint quite foreign to our modern scientistic consciousness.
But the basic thrust of his objection can be made sufficiently clear.
The "universal" of physics is, first of all, some explanatory posit,
such as a force or a law. Part of its being abstract has surely to do
with the fact that it is supposedly reached by abstraction from the
rich world of ordinary experience, but that is not all that is carried
by the term "abstract." It is also abstract in that the various forces
and laws governing the behavior of things are all independent of
each other, without any intrinsic connection; whatever the ultimate
laws are, they are simply primitive givens, each independent of the
others. This is supposed to be a further fault with the abstract
universals of the theoretical approach, but it is not immediately
obvious why.
I think that Hegel is worried about two different things when he
complains about the way the theoretical approach (or what he calls
"the attitude of the understanding," which comes to much the
same thing) divides and analyzes things into disparate and unconnected elements. First, Hegel is bothered by the idea that the ulti-
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mate structure of the world might not have a unitary principle, that
we might have to accept a plurality of principles as ultimate. Such a
situation would always leave questions about why just those principles were ultimate givens and whether they in turn depended on
some unitary and still more fundamental principle. The desire for
unity and completeness seems overwhelming in Hegel, although I
can see no irrefutable argument that the world ultimately must be
unitary. Second, Hegel often complains that the analytic approach
of the theoretical attitude loses the inner unity of the things it
dissects, killing them: "Take a flower for example. The understanding can note its particular qualities, and chemistry can break it down
and analyse it. Its color, the shape of its leaves, citric acid, volatile
oil, carbon, hydrogen etc., can be distinguished; and we then say
that the flower is made up of all these parts" (PN §246, Zusatz). He
goes on to agree with Goethe that such an analysis "holds the parts
within its hand,/But lacks, alas, the spiritual band." But Hegel does
not want to suggest that philosophy is necessary because it can find
something else, something above and beyond the elements isolated
by the1 sciences, namely, the spiritual band; rather, Hegel's complaint, I believe, must be read as a complaint about the inability of
the sciences to supply adequate analyses of our concepts of natural
kinds.' A proper understanding of the nature of a thing-kind, which
is more 'than a mere assemblage of parts, shows that the "spiritual
band" is immanent within the thing, the ideal toward which the
thing strives.
The scientific, empirical analysis of a flower can show us how the
flower works, how its elements interact, but it does not by itself
show us why those elements together constitute a natural kind.
Natural, as opposed to artificial or artifactual, kinds, are natural
(and therefore, Hegel believes, nonarbitrary) unities. Natural kind
concepts play 'an extremely important explanatory role for Hegel,
because every chain of explanations must ultimately come to a
close, and explanations end in proper classifications. Every explanatory enterprise presupposes some basic set of entities with certain
primitive powers; when an explanation has been pursued down to
this basic level, any further questions about the basic entities or
primitive powers can only be answered by saying that they are that
kind of thing. Every explanatory enterprise takes certain kinds to be
natural; seeking further explanation of those natural kinds opts out
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of that explanatory enterprise in favor of another, perhaps more
general form of explanation. The natural kinds articulate the primitive structures of the world.
The paradigmatic natural kinds for Hegel, biological genera, consist of self-developing, self-maintaining organisms with common
structures and behaviors and, most important, a common ideal type
toward which the individuals strive. But the theoretical attitude
analyzes the natural kinds of our world away, Hegel believes,
decomposing them into an ungainly conglomeration of properties
with no clear unity to them. The theoretical attitude thus constructs
a world bled of all internal structure into which any organization is
introduced by us—which contradicts the essential goal of the theoretical attitude, namely, the grasping of the world as it really is. The
only remedy, as Hegel sees it, is to admit the insufficiency of the
analytic tendencies of theory and, indeed, to counter them by taking nature, the world itself, to be a natural kind—that is, to be
determined by an objective ideal.
This is a large mouthful to swallow. It is unclear that the inner
cohesion of a natural kind must be sold short by analysis. True, in
Hegel's time the organic realm did still seem quite separate from the
inorganic, and impervious to chemical or physical analysis, but this
barrier was initially overcome in Hegel's own lifetime and has been
totally done away with in the modern development of biology,
through both evolutionary theory and molecular biology. Yet even
in the progress of the biological sciences the conception of teleology
has not completely vanished. There are properties of organs and
organisms that are still best explained by reference to the larger
organic or environmental context. According to Hegel, this would
signal defeat for the strictly analytic strategy of the understanding.
The notion of a natural kind is perhaps no clearer now than it was
in Hegel's day, but it is certainly not evident that all natural kinds
must be like biological kinds. It may be the case that through
scientific research certain natural kinds, or what were taken to be
such, are indeed analyzed away, but it is more important to realize
that science is really offering us a new and even more powerful set
of natural kinds with much broader and better defined explanatory
powers. Hegel's instrumental interpretation of the empirical sciences is not by any means the only one possible.
Hegel strains the boundaries of the concept of a natural kind
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when he, in effect, takes the world-whole to be a natural kind with
the structure appropriate to his paradigmatic natural kinds. Perhaps the strongest thing that can be said in favor of this assimilation
is that the nature of the world-whole is the ultimate explanatory
dead end. If natural kinds are explanatory resting places, then,
since the nature of the world-whole is the final and ultimate resting
place, it must be the highest natural kind. But totalizing concepts
are notoriously dangerous: the totality of finite numbers is not a
finite number; the set of all sets is impossible. We have to be
extremely suspicious of Hegel's rather dogmatic belief that the
world-whole does form a unitary totality.

THE NEED FOR PHILOSOPHY
We are now in a position to say why, according to Hegel, the
empirical sciences cannot deliver a complete understanding of the
world, why philosophy itself must rework the results of the empirical sciences in order to complete the task. Even if Hegel's arguments
were sufficient to justify our use of the concept of objective purpose, why would this be a matter for philosophy, rather than for a
slightly revised empirical science? It is surely the case that we
discover empirically what the purpose of the heart or brain is; why
not believe that particular teleological connections, like particular
causal connections, must be discovered by observation and experiment?
It is undoubtedly right that particular teleological connections
must be ascertained experientially. Such particular connections,
however, are not the ones that the Hegelian philosopher claims to
be able to supply. His concern, rather, is with the ultimate end, the
self-realization of the Absolute, the world-whole's fulfillment of its
potential. As we have seen, Hegel believes that the world-whole,
like every natural kind, has an ideal to live up to. But there are
certain peculiarities about the world-whole kind: there can be only
one world-whole according to Hegel, so it can in principle have only
one instance; because the universal and ideal is what is substantial
about the world, according to Hegel, the world-whole cannot in the
long run fall short of the ideal, as every finite being does; because
there is nothing else it could depend on, the world-whole must be
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absolutely independent and self-contained, even to the point of
being self-explanatory. We have questioned Hegel's right to this
concept of the world-whole, but he undeniably employs it, and a
full examination of his arguments to justify it would be a complete
examination of virtually his entire philosophical system. Since our
primary purpose here is to understand Hegel's philosophy of mind,
I do not question this assumption further. Let us rather examine its
role in the system.
Hegel easily grants that particular teleological connections are
available to empirical discovery and confirmation, but the case is
not the same with the ultimate goal. Because there are strong constraints on an ultimate goal, Hegel thinks that the nature of such a
telos is not merely de facto but can be established a priori and
shown to be necessary.5 Absolute teleology, then, is not an empirical matter. But if the world as a whole must be seen as a unity
striving to realize its own particular intrinsic end, then this must
affect the way we understand the empirical detail of the world as
well. There is then an added dimension to the finite things of the
world, for we must understand whether and how they contribute to
the realization of the Absolute.
5
Hegel is not committed to being able to say of any individual
finite thing how it contributes to the realization of the Absolute, any
more than a thorough comprehension of any natural kind by itself
gives one knowledge of any particular member of that kind, Hegel,
as he claimed, cannot deduce Krug's pen.6 But there are a priori
constraints on the totality, the Absolute, simply by virtue of the fact
5. For convenience I write as if the a priori-a posteriori distinction were unproblematic. In fact, though, Hegel does not believe that there is a clear distinction
between the a priori and the a posteriori—not because the distinction itself is
unclear, but because it is really a matter of degree. In order to do Hegel full justice,
we need to abandon the a priori-a posteriori dichotomy and employ instead the
notion of degrees of empirical sensitivity. I develop this notion in more detail in
Chapters 2 and 3.
6. Wilhelm Traugott Krug attacked the grand systems of German idealism—
Fichte was his particular target—by demanding that they deduce even something
minor, such as his pen, from the system. Hegel first attacked Krug in a review article
in the Critical Journal of Philosophy, which he edited with Schelling in Jena in 1802-5;
G. W. F. Hegel, Jenaer Schriften, 1801-07: Werke in 20 Banden, pp. 188-207. He
returned to the problem of Krug's pen in a footnote to Encyclopedia (PN) §250. Hegel's
answers to Krug are not consistently satisfying. A classic modern essay is D. Henrich, "Hegels Theorie uber den Zufall," in Hegel im Context, pp. 157^86.
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that it is the ultimate totality. It must be self-sufficient and independent (since there is nothing else it could depend on), capable of
encompassing the variety and the conflicts of the world, unifying
them without nullifying them. Perhaps most important, in Hegel's
view the Absolute must also be explanatorily closed. This means,
essentially, that philosophical explanations must form a neat curve
in which nothing is accepted as a brute primitive. Although explanation in some of the world's dimensions may run off into infinity
(this is notably the case for causal explanation), philosophical, that
is, teleological explanation does not proceed into infinity. Philosophical reflection exposes the world to be a self-developing, selfrealizing structure, and no further demands can be made for explanation when we have seen what kind of thing the world is. The only
further demands that can be made are for further detail and deeper
insight into the structure thus realizing itself. Since the concept of
the world-whole as the highest kind can be constrained a priori, and
since in this instance alone concept and reality, kind and instance
must fully coincide, we do have considerable a priori knowledge of
the structure of the world.
Hegel's argument that philosophy is an essential element in our
knowledge of the world has two parallel forms, one to the effect that
the sort of thing philosophy can tell us is metaphysically fundamental, the other to the effect that it is also epistemologically fundamental. These arguments can be summarized as follows:
1. Individuation and classification are both metaphysically and epistemologically fundamental. From the metaphysical point of view, there
is no.entity without identity, and crucial to anything's identity is what
kind' of thing it is. Epistemologically, one knows nothing about a
thing unless one can subsume it under some thing-kind, and the most
important piece of knowledge one can normally have about something is what kind of thing it is.7
2. Natural kinds are ideologically determined and must be understood
teleologically as ideals, objective purposes of natural things.
3. Purposes can be subordinated to each other; for example, the objective purpose of the heart is to pump blood, but its pumping blood
7- Hegel still thinks of knowledge as primarily of "objects" rather than of facts or
propositions. Some of the complex reasons for this tendency are explored in Chapter
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subserves the purpose of keeping the organism alive, which itself
might subserve the purpose of keeping the species alive.
4. What something is, its kind, is determined not only by its immediate
objective purpose but by its superordinate purposes as well. Similarly, understanding (completely) what something is entails understanding all the objective purposes defining it.
5. The world-whole is a kind, the ultimate kind; it is the universal
objective purpose. Because it is the universal objective purpose, all
other purposes are subordinated to it.
6. What anything really is depends on how it subserves the universal
objective purpose, the self-realization of the Absolute. Understanding anything completely entails understanding how it helps realize
the Absolute.

Given the role philosophy plays in Hegel's understanding of our
world, we can see that philosophy must accordingly be essentially
interpretive. We have to be a little careful with the notion of "interpretation," for the word is often used quite broadly and in such uses
does not have the special meaning I reserve for it here. As I use the
term, an interpretation is an attempt to understand a set of complex
relations among a group of items, including part-whole relations
and means-ends relations. This much is common to all uses of
"interpretation," including a statistician's interpretation of a set of
data. Interpretation in my special sense, however, is singled out by
being explicitly holistic and making sense of the individuals and the
relations in the group in terms of a projected whole with certain
normative characteristics to which they are assumed to belong. The
whole to which they belong must impose some real constraints on
the interpretation, constraints derivative from the fact that the projected whole is assumed to have certain valuable traits. Interpretation has an essential axiological component. Furthermore, the value
to be realized in the whole must in some sense have a constitutive
tie to the individuals within the whole, as truth does to meaning.
I believe that this characterization separates linguistic or literary
interpretation from statistical interpretation, because the statistician
does not (on my purified picture of statistical endeavors) rely on an
antecedent (much less a priori) projection of an axiologically characterized whole. (To the extent that statisticians do do something like
that, e.g., assume that their populations have certain valuable
traits, they are involved in interpretation in my sense.) Linguistic
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interpretation is constrained by the principle of charity, for instance, which projects an essentially truthful belief set for each
speaker or community. The whole projected in literary interpretation is much vaguer and harder to characterize, but the literary
work must be interpreted, for example, as having some thematic
structure and as portraying a not fully determinate but still coherent
world. (Note that on this reading much of the actual procedure even
in the sciences could be taken to be interpretive, if principles of
conservation or least action or theoretical desiderata such as economy and simplicity were considered axiological.)
A complete understanding of the world, according to Hegel,
involves comprehending a projected whole—the Absolute—and
then constraining one's understanding of the particularities of the
world in the light of that projected whole. Furthermore, the true
character of the individuals depends on their connection to the
whole; their potential contribution to the realization of the ultimate
value is what makes them what they really are. Such an interpretive
methodology is quite different from either a deductive or an (enumerative) inductive strategy. Yet these latter were still the dominant
paradigms in Hegel's era. Kant realized the necessity of employing
an interpretive strategy but relegated it to a merely regulative role in
our construction of knowledge. Hegel insists that an interpretive
approach to the world is an unavoidable and essential feature of a
proper relation to the world.

Hegel's Reconception of
the Philosophy of Mind

PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY: HEGEL'S PREDECESSORS
Many histories of philosophy attempt to classify Hegel as a latterday rationalist. While there is much to be said for such a classification, in the philosophy of mind1 it can be misleading. For however
much Hegel may share with his rationalist predecessors, his philosophy of mind is dominated by very different concerns.
The central questions in the rationalist philosophy of mind concern the substantiality, simplicity, immortality, immateriality, and
freedom of the soul. The doctrines of concept acquisition, judgment, the nature of sensation and perception, and so forth are
developed to support the metaphysical positions at the center of
rationalist concern. Despite their interest in concept acquisition, the
empiricists, in their reaction against rationalism, retain a strong,
though critical, interest in the search for the attributes of the soul.
Even in Kant we find that, alongside his revolutionary doctrines of
concept acquisition, judgment, and the nature of sensation and
perception, the attributes of the soul receive careful attention in the
first Critique.2 But virtually all of these questions simply disappear
N

1. I am using "philosophy of mind" in its contemporary sense, where "mind" is
not a translation of the Hegelian term Geist. In extension, the contemporary "philosophy of mind" is closer to Hegel's "subjective spirit."
2. Karl Ameriks, in Kant's Theory of Mind, has recently argued that Kant is not
simply critical of rational psychology but also holds positive doctrines about the
attributes of the soul.
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when we turn to Hegel. He gives the term "soul" a quite restricted
meaning and place in his system and claims that his predecessors
asked the wrong questions about the soul. McTaggart remarks, for
instance, that Hegel just does not seem interested in the immortality of the soul.3 In Encyclopedia §389 Hegel claims immateriality
for the soul but then turns right around and says that this is of no
real interest unless one makes some faulty presuppositions (we
analyze this passage more closely below). The attributes of the soul
posed a central philosophical tangle for his predecessors; in Hegel's
philosophy this tangle has dissolved, leaving but few residual questions scattered around the system.
Against Rational Psychology

In his introduction to the Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel makes it quite
clear that he thinks that both the rationalists and empiricists had the
wrong approach to philosophical thinking about spirit and the
mental (§378). He gives Kant credit for having freed all subsequent
philosophers from the need to do rational psychology (§47). But on
a closer look at §47, it is not clear why Hegel lauds Kant for freeing
us from rational psychology, for he claims both that Kant's criticisms! are not essentially different from the criticims of the empiricists, in particular Hume's, and that they are faulty. Why, then,
should the destruction of rational psychology be credited to Kant?
Perhaps the answer is simply that the power of the Kantian system
and its greater acceptance (at least in Germany) made rational psychology impossible in a way that Hume's philosophy did not. The
destruction of rational psychology would then be attributed to Kant
as a matter of historical fact.
In any case, Hegel disagrees with Kant's (and therefore Hume's)
reasons for rejecting rational psychology. In both cases, according
to Hegel, their objection amounts to pointing out that the properties
that rational psychology seeks to attribute to the soul are not sensible, cannot be found in sense experience. For both Hume and Kant
this entails that we do not have and cannot employ any meaningful
concept of them. But this objection does not bother Hegel in the
least; he replies that the whole point of thinking, of theorizing, is
3. J. M. E. McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, p. 5.
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the construction or development of concepts that go beyond what
can be found in sense experience, so that the use of such concepts
cannot be what is wrong with rational psychology.4
When he intimates what is wrong with rational psychology,
Hegel criticizes the rationalists for having treated the soul as a thing;
for having used abstract categories of the understanding which are,
properly speaking, too lowly to grasp the nature of spirit; and, last
but not least, for having misconceived the very nature of philosophical truth and the nature of predication. These charges are all connected, each cutting a little deeper than the preceding one.
In accusing rationalists of treating the soul as a thing, Hegel
argues that they use "merely abstract categories of the understanding":
The old metaphysics considers the soul as a thing. "Thing" is, however, a very ambiguous expression. As a thing we primarily understand something immediately existing, something we represent sensibly, and this is the sense in which the soul has to be spoken of. It has
accordingly been asked where the soul has its seat. As possessing a
seat the soul is in space and is represented sensibly. Similarly it is
appropriate to the conception of the soul as a thing to ask whether it is
simple or composite. The question is particularly interesting in relation to the soul's immortality, insofar as this is thought to be conditioned by the soul's simplicity. But in fact abstract simplicity is a
determination which corresponds to the essence of the soul as little as
composition does. (§34, Zusatz, my tr.)

It is dear in this passage that Hegel is charging the rationalists with
something like a category mistake. Their notion of the soul mislocates the heart of the matter, and when one sees this, many of the
earlier troublesome questions about the soul's attributes simply fall
away. Yet Hegel's critique is more radical than the mere accusation
of a category mistake about the soul, for he believes that a similar
confusion occurs in other central concepts:
4. Hegel does not think that concepts can be simply divided into the sensible and
the nonsensible. While some concepts—e.g., red or sweet—are clearly sensible,
there is a wide range of progressively less sensible concepts, from such as fragility
through such as electromagnetic radiation to even the concept of spirit itself. Concepts vary in their degree of empirical sensitivity.
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The question of the immateriality of the soul can still be of interest only
if a distinction is drawn in which matter is presented as true and spirit
as a thing. Even in the hand of the physicists, however, matter has
become subtler in more recent times, for they have hit upon imponderable materials such as heat, light, etc., to which they have found no
difficulty in adding space and time. Although these imponderables
have lost not only gravity, the property peculiar to matter, but also to a
certain extent the capacity of offering resistance, they still have a
sensuous determinate being, a self-externality. Vital matter however,
which can also be found included among them, lacks not only gravity
but every other determinate being which might justify its being regarded as material. (§389)

Here Hegel dismisses the question of the immateriality of the soul,
not as senseless, but as simply uninteresting. What interest it may
have is founded on a set of confusions. Noteworthy in this passage
is that Hegel does not attack the confusion of treating the soul as a
thing but rather points to the difficulties and confusion surrounding
the concept of matter. The scientists of his day were busy extending
Newtonian physics, or trying to, by discovering new forms of "matter" which were successively more divorced from their original
model. The notion of "vital matter" takes this development to a
ridiculous extreme, for it would share none of the essential properties of matter. The soul is clearly not a Newtonian particle, but if we
let the notion of matter wander too far from this paradigm, Hegel
believes, the question of the immateriality of the soul becomes
empty and loses interest. Those who ask about the immateriality of
the soul, then, are subject to a double confusion. They commit a
category mistake in treating the soul as a thing and exhibit as well a
lack of real understanding of the notion of matter. They are, as it
were, in the wrong categorial ballpark.
A standing fault of rationalistic dogmatism, according to Hegel,
is the tendency to elevate commonsense, everyday concepts abstracted from sense experience into universal and necessary metaphysical principles or categories. But the kind of concepts we use in
our everyday encounters with the finite world are quite insufficient
to express the universal and necessary truths that are the content of
metaphysics:
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The thinking of the old metaphysics was finite thinking, for it moved
along thought determinations, the limits of which were supposed to
be fixed and not further negatable. It was asked, for example, does
God exist? [Hat Gott Dasein?] And existence is considered something
purely positive, something final and excellent. We will see later that
existence is in no way a pure positive, but is rather a determination
which is too base for the Idea and not worthy of God. . . . In the same
way one asked whether the soul is simple or composite. Thus simplicity as well counted as a final determination, capable of grasping the
True. Simple is, however, as poor, abstract and one-sided a determination as existence, a determination which we will later see is, as untrue,
incapable of grasping the True. If the soul is treated as only simple, it is
determined by such an abstraction as one-sided and finite. (§28,
Zusatz, my tr.)

Rational psychology tries to capture the soul in simple and abstract
concepts that cannot do justice to the actuality of the soul, and it
proceeds by trying to assign these predicates in a thoroughly external fashion.5
Against Empiricist Psychology

Hegel is quite aware that there is a perfectly legitimate enterprise
called empirical psychology. This is as much a science as physics or
chemistry, although its practitioners, according to Hegel, tend not
to be very clearheaded about their enterprise. Insofar as it is purely
empirical, it is limited to gathering and classifying the empirical
phenomena of mind. But many psychologists also attempt to philosophize about the mind on this empirical basis, or worse, to claim
that empirical psychology is already philosophy—an idea Hegel
completely rejects. While philosophy can never let the empirical
realm out of its sight, empiricz'sm is a deadly antiphilosophical disease.
According to Hegel, empiricism is methodologically no better off
than rationalism, and perhaps worse. In both cases abstract con5. A discussion of Hegel's theory of predication, however central to his metaphysics, would take us too far afield. A good introduction to this topic is provided by
Richard Aquila, "Predication and Hegel's Metaphysics," in Hegel, ed. M. J. Inwood,
pp. 67-84.
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cepts are assigned externally to the subject; both have faulty views
of predication. But since empiricism restricts its view to the sensible, it is blinded entirely to the metaphysical and incapable of
dealing at all with the universal and necessary: "An empiricism that
is consistently carried out, insofar as it restricts its content to the
finite, rejects the supersensible in general, or at least the knowledge
and determination of it, and leaves to thought only abstraction and
formal universality and identity" (§38, my tr.). Hegel clearly has an
extreme "ideal type" of empiricism in mind here, one that allows
only the collection and classification of empirical data without permitting the essential theoretical move to nonsensible predicates or
modal qualifiers; as such, it makes science and philosophy impossible: "The fundamental deception in scientific empiricism is that it
uses the metaphysical categories of matter, force, and certainly also
of one, many, universality and infinitude, etc.; infers in accordance
with such categories, and thereby presupposes and applies the
forms of inference, all the while not knowing that it thus contains
and practices metaphysics itself; and uses these categories and their
connections in a completely uncritical and unconscious way" (§38,
my tr.).
Hegel also has a particular objection to the empiricist's practice of
"philosophical" psychology: "In empirical psychology, it is the
particularizations into which spirit is divided which are regarded as
being rigidly distinct, so that spirit is treated as a mere aggregate of
independent powers, each of which stands only in reciprocal and
therefore external relation to the other" (§378, Zusatz). The empiricist collects various phenomena and tries to sort them under different classifications. The different kinds of mental phenomena are
then attributed to various different mental faculties. But, Hegel
complains, there is no principle behind this division of faculties;
they are thought up ad hoc, and there is no way to show their
intrinsic unity. Only someone with an independent (philosophical)
conception of the whole can be proof against this danger. This
conception of the whole must be validated independently of the
particular empirical phenomena and must be capable of (at least
partially) justifying the classifications employed by the working
empirical psychologist. But the empiricist, who has no such conception, cannot but remain captured in empirical detail, unable to find
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the key to the underlying unity in the phenomena precisely because
it is underlying and supersensible. The empiricist is like a builder
with all the raw materials but no plans or idea of what is to be built.
The problem for both rationalism and empiricism, then, is that
they treat the soul as a supersensible.thing. Thinking.of.the soul as a
thing, rationalism tries to conceive of it using only the concepts that
are appropriate to finite objects and thus necessarily falls short of its_
goal. Empiricism, on the other hand, noting that the soul is supersensible, refuses to try to say anything interesting about it and
restricts itself to botanizing the empirical phenomena of mind un-_
critically. Empiricism is correct in holding that one cannot use concepts compounded from sense experience to describe or conceive
the supersensible; it is wrong in thinking that therefore the supersensible cannot be conceived. Rationalism is correct in trying to
conceive the supersensible; it is mistaken in attempting to do so by
simply assigning it predicates constructed from sense experience
uncritically.

PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY: HEGEL'S METHODOLOGY
Having seen what Hegel thinks is wrong with the philosophical
psychology of his predecessors, we now face the more difficult task
of figuring out what he believes to be the right way to do philosophy of mind. When Hegel attempts to state the proper method in
philosophy, he often describes it as being basically passive. One
needs merely to watch the appropriate concept (in our case the
concept of spirit) develop or unfold itself. Even more frequently
Hegel drops all reference to the philosopher and claims that philosophy deals only with the self-development of the concept. Today
we find such a description of philosophical method quite unilluminating, and to understand what Hegel means by such talk one has
to work out in some detail his theory of the nature of thought. By
the end of this book, Hegel's descriptions of a passive philosophical
method will make sense, but for now let us approach the task from
another angle. Let us try to reconstruct Hegel's intentions in his
philosophy of mind without relying explicitly on his own methodological pronouncements. How does the content and practice of
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, his philosophical psychology distinguish his enterprise from the
unsuccessful attempts of his predecessors?
From Soul to Spirit
The first difference between Hegel and his predecessors, one
notices immediately, is a shift from a focus on the soul to a focus on
spirit. The word "soul" is reserved by Hegel for the lowest level of
spirit: "Spirit is distinguished from the soul, which is both the
middle between corporeality and spirit and the tie between them.
Spirit as soul is sunken into corporeality and the soul is what
animates [das Belebende] the body" (§34, Zusatz, my tr.). Thus "soul"
acquires a restricted meaning, namely, spirit at its most thinglike
level—a meaning Hegel probably adopts because of his predecessors' predilection for treating soul asji thing. Its successor concept,
spirit, is not thinglike at all: rather,' spirit is thought to be a pure,
self-generating activity.6 Rather than being thought of as a particular kind of thing with specific properties and interactions with other
things, spirit has to be thought olas a particular pattern of activity, a
special kind of organization which interactions among things can
exhibit. Spirit cannot be adequately grasped through categories or
concepts abstracted from finite things, much less from sensible
things, because it is not a thing or even like a thing.
And "spirit" has a much broader use than "soul," for it denotes
the underlying activity informing^and accounting for not only the
mental activity of the individual but also the social and historical
activity of a community. .Hegel's shift from "soul" to "spirit" emphasizes the nonthingishness, the active nature of the human essence as well as its_communal or, social nature.v Hegel thereby emphasizes that he is investigating what is universal to us all, one and
the same in us all, something in which we each participate_rather
than an entity_we.each individually possess (or are) independently
of all others.
As comprehension of the nature of spirit, which informs not only
the intellectual and practical life of the individual biitbf the wKoTe'of
6 For a good introduction to the concept of spirit, see R. C. Solomon, "Hegel's
Concept of Geist," in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. Maclntyre, pp. 12549 The concept of spirit is treated again in more detail in Chapter 3.
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humanity as well, the philosophy of spirit must be seen as a much
broader discipline than the philosphy of soul. Describing something as a spiritual phenomenon presupposes for its individuation
as well as its explanation a certain set of explanatory principles not
applicable to the merely mechanical, chemical, or organic but pervasive throughout the psychological, anthropological, and sociological.
'
Hegel characterizes the spiritual as the internal, in contrast to the
externality of material objects (see, for example, §381). This contrast
between internal and external is best understood, I believe, in terms
of self- and other-determination. Spirit is what is self-determined;
that is, spiritual phenomena are to be construed as manifestations
of a self-productive activity. A .self-productive activity is a special
form of teleological activity, namely, one in which the telos is itself
such self-productive activity.7 To describe something as spiritual,
then, is to commit oneself to the notion that it can be adequately
explained only by showing how it is the manifestation of such a selfproducing activity.
This explanatory schema has a broad-ranging field of application.
Mechanical interactions, such as those studied by Newton, are not
themselves to be explained in terms of manifesting a self-producing
activity, but the very existence of mechanical interactions in the
world is to be explained in those terms, for their existence is itself
a spiritual phenomenon. .Virtually all forms of human activity—
whether individual or social—are to be understood as manifestations of a self-productive activity. The philosophy of spirit is
(devoted to showing how human activity embodies the defining
structure of spirit

Subjective Spirit
With this introductory understanding of Hegel's general conception of the philosophy of spirit8, we can also see what a philosophy
of subjective spirit—what we today call the philosophy of mind—
7. See Crawford Elder, Appropriating Hegel, for more discussion of this form of
teleology.
8. I return to a fuller description of spirit in Chapter 3.
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should be. A philosophy of subjective spirit is devoted to showing
how the psychology of individual humans embodies the defining,
structure of spirit. Particular explanations of particular human actions are not, of course, in the purview of the philosopher, but
discovering and explicating the form such explanations must take,
as well as relating these forms to their counterparts in other disciplines, including logic and philosophy, are. The philosopher has a
dual relation to empirical psychology; the philosophical under1
standing of the specifications of the general concept of spirit must
be tested against the empirical facts, and the results and methods of
empirical psychologists must be tested against the a priori analysis
of the concept of the spiritual.
We must think of Hegel as directing his efforts inter alia toward
the constitution of a more adequate empirical psychology. That this
is indeed the case has recently been heavily emphasized by M. J.
Petry's work in translating and editing the Philosophy of Nature and
the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. Hegel shows throughout his work
a good knowledge of the contemporary state of the sciences, and it
is constantly his concern to show how the empirical disciplines and
his own system coalesce. Perhaps the most convincing evidence
that his psychology was practiced with one eye on the state of the
empirical disciplines is that in his manuscript of 1822 the second
main factor said to contribute to the demise of the older philosophies of mind is itself an empirical one, namely, the discovery of
hypnotism (called in Hegel's time animal magnetism) (PSS, vol. i,
p. 99). Here, Hegel thinks, is an empirical phenomenon that resists
explanation by any of the old methods; it confounds the categories
of the understanding.
Hypnotism prompted an understandable fascination in Hegel's
time. Besides being good for parlor games, it was also seen to
provide a serious challenge to the psychological theories of the day.
Familiarity has perhaps bred contempt in contemporary psychological theorizing for the still amazing features of hypnotism. We have
today a fairly divided stance toward it: we regularly turn to it to help
in police work, psychotherapy, and self-development programs,
but we also regard its results skeptically, since no theory has yet
explained or accommodated it. Hypnotism attracted considerable
attention in early nineteenth-century Berlin, including special stud-
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ies by committees of the Berlin Akademie.9 Hegel's interest in the
phenomenon mirrors the importance it played in all psychological
speculation of the era.
Hegel does not cite the phenomenon of hypnotism as itself revealing a higher point of view; that is, he certainly does not believe
that the hypnotic subject or the hypnotist has special access to an
epistemologically privileged position—quite the contrary. Nor does
he claim that hypnotism is incomprehensible, miraculous, or mystical and therefore overcomes the philosophies of mind of the rationalists and empiricists. Rather, he claims that hypnotism presents us with a phenomenon that cannot be explained using the
abstract thing-based concepts common to rationalist and empiricist
philosophies of mind. If we go beyond these concepts, however,
we can understand hypnotic phenomena, and Hegel takes it as one
of the strong points of his philosophy of subjective spirit that it can
accommodate hypnotic phenomena, whereas its competitors cannot. Here, then, is a clear case in which Hegel calls on empirical
phenomena to support his philosophical doctrine, and in which he
shows a clear expectation that philosophical doctrine will make
contact with the empirical sphere.

Philosophy and Psychology
We can refine our idea of what Hegel thinks the relation between
philosophy and the empirical sciences ought to be from a remark in
his text of 1822 about Eschenmayer's psychology:10
The first part, psychology, as empirical, makes no claim to being
scientific; the second part, pure psychology, ought to have the determination of exposing the principles of this empirical material and of
discovering the structure of the schema simply presupposed thereby
and indicating its derivation. Eschenmayer, however, without further
9. For an account of the controversies surrounding hypnotism in nineteenthcentury Berlin, see Walter Artelt, Der Mesmerismus in Berlin.
10. A. C. A. Eschenmayer (1768-1852) was a practicing physician who in 1811
became professor extraordinarius of medicine and philosophy at Tubingen (Hegel's
alma mater), where later (1818) he also held the chair of practical philosophy. He was
influenced by Schelling in his early career and thus shared common roots with
Hegel. His fascination with hypnotism was often satirized, but his psychology
textbook is not particularly distinguished.
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ado simply puts the speculative knowledge that should come in here
into (i) reflections by means of concepts, judgments, and inferences,
and (2) ideal intuitions, (PSS, vol. i, p. 101, my tr.).

Hegel subsequently castigates Eschenmayer for the all-too-common
fault of discussing the material in an empirical and, in the end,
arbitrary fashion. And Hegel dismisses any possible call on ideal
intuition out of hand; intuition is a fickle lady on whom anyone can
call.
What emerges from this passage is a characterization of what a
pure psychology is supposed to accomplish and a warning about
how not to do it. A pure psychology is dedicated to "exposing the
principles of this empirical material and of discovering the structure
of the schema simply presupposed thereby and indicating its derivation" (PSS, vol. i, p. 101). This endeavor breaks down into a twopart task. The first part of the task, enunciating the principles of the
empirical material, is only vaguely stated. Could Hegel mean here
that the pure psychologist is responsible for all the work of the
theoretician, namely, stating laws and making empirical generalizations to be tested against empirical data? In this case the "pure"
psychologist would hardly differ from the normal empirical psychologist, for we could hardly expect the empirical psychologist to
be content with merely gathering data without reworking it into a
theory.11 By the "principles" of the empirical material, however,
Hegel does not mean the empirical generalizations covering that
material; rather, he has in mind the principles governing the organization and form of such first-level generalizations. The pure psychologist is a metatheorist clarifying the principles (and the concepts, we might add) that govern the construction of particular
descriptions and explanations in empirical psychology. Hegel engages in such reflections in his own philosophy of subjective spirit
when he attempts to clarify the concepts of imagination, feeling,
sensation, or thought and when he attacks associationist psychology in general as being built on faulty assumptions.
The second part of the pure psychologist's task is to discover the
construction and the derivation of the schema thereby presup11. In Hegel's terminology the empirical investigator, qua empirical, is confined
to gathering data—but such an investigator is not a scientist. Theorization is essential to science.
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posed. Again Hegel's description is far from clear, particularly because it is not clear whether it is the empirical material that presupposes the schema to be discovered or the enunciation of the
principles of the material which presupposes the sought-for schema. I think it is the latter that Hegel intends, that is, that the second
part of the pure psychologist's task is to put the set of principles he
promulgates in the first part of his task into a broader context and
onto a firm philosophical foundation. Thus Hegel says, a bit later in
the 1822 manuscript, "In each particular philosophical science,
what is logical is presupposed as the purely universal science, and
so as the scientific factor in all science" (PSS, vol. i, p. 103). The
pure psychologist who discovers a set of principles that will handily
deal with all the empirical material at hand is not yet finished, for an
explanation of why the principles take the form they do and how
they fulfill the conditions of science in general must also be given.
The philosophical psychologist must therefore operate on three
levels, developing both the empirical theory and the metatheory of
empirical psychology and putting them into a broader context.
These tasks cannot be performed serially, either; the pure psychologist cannot await the completion of either the empirical theory of
psychology or its metatheory before beginning to develop the
broader viewpoint. These distinguishable tasks must in fact be in
constant reciprocal contact, for the goal is the development of a
maximally coherent worldview.
We must ask, however, what would count as indicating the
derivation of the model with which One explains empirical material.
This task belongs to the third level of reflection isolated above.
There seem to be two alternatives: either the model is itself derived
from the empirical materials it is eventually used to explain, or it is
derived from a priori principles. Hegel insists that "all cognition
derives subjectively from perception and observations, and the
cognition of appearances is not only of the utmost importance, but
is completely indispensable" (PSS, vol. i, p. 97); thus he recognizes
the causal role perception plays in knowledge. Yet philosophy—
that is, the justification of philosophical truth—is also supposed to
be pure and (at least relatively) independent of experience. The
three different levels of psychological investigation cannot be independently practiced, for bottom-level observations play a necessary
causal role in spurring our thinking, whereas our observational and
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experimental techniques, as well as the categorial structures employed, all have aspects that are extremely empirically insensitive,
aspects deeply enough ingrained into our practices to be resistant,
though not necessarily impervious, to empirical counterexample.
Such solutions are never really neat, and this one leaves us with a
residual problem. The highest level of philosophical reflection is
apparently a priori, according to Hegel. The practice of empirical
psychology, though, is clearly empirical. How, then, do these entirely different enterprises mesh? All theorizing, and therefore all
science, involves the application of concepts that are empirically
insensitive, concepts that are, for all intents and purposes, a priori
(this much Hegel shares with Kant). The theorizer employs no
concepts that do not have an a priori basis, for even those concepts
that seem paradigmatically abstracted from sense experience alone
contain or implicate a categorial structure that could only have an a
priori justification.12 This is why Hegel accuses the empiricist of
operating with metaphysical concepts without appreciating that
fact. There can be no clear boundaries drawn between the philosophical and the empirical, for all attempts to describe or theorize
about even the simplest empirical phenomena involve philosophical commitments. The conscientious theoretician must therefore
also be a philosopher.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT
Let me attempt to summarize Hegel's understanding of the philosophy of mind. As he himself explicitly acknowledges, "the Philosophy of Spirit can be neither empirical nor metaphysical" (PSS,
vol. i, p. 103); that is, the philosophy of spirit is not an empirical
effort to systematize a certain set of phenomena, nor is it concerned
to elaborate an abstract concept of soul which has no contact at all
with empirical reality. The philosophy of spirit attempts to uncover
the universal and necessary structure inherent in the empirical
phenomena of spirit. Because it is concerned with the embodiment
of this structure in empirical, individual facts, it must answer to
12. The simplest and most straightforward example is Hegel's insistence that the
use of the copula, even predication itself, involves metaphysical concepts (see §38).
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them by being able to cast light on their nature. But the structures it
claims to find embodied in the world must themselves ultimately
prove themselves universal and necessary. It is to this degree a
pure, a priori science. Whether we accept Hegel's attempt to balance the empirical and the a priori, we can recognize several significant advances in his treatment of the philosophy of mind.
First, he wrenches the attention of philosophers away from the
fruitless, age-old questions of rational psychology. He does not try
to refute the rationalists' answers; if he says anything one way or
the other, he most likely agrees with the rationalists. But he breaks
the fascination of these questions all the more radically by simply
ignoring them and spending his time and energy in more fruitful
pursuits. After Descartes, the apparently central problem of the
philosophy of mind was the nature of mental substance and how it
differs from and is related to material substance. Hume and Kant
realized that there are other, more important questions about mind
to be answered, but only with Hegel is there recognition of the fact
that Descartes's whole line of thought is founded on a mistake.
Second, because he does not worry about the attributes of the
soul, Hegel focuses more on explicating the structure of spirit, that
is, the structure of the explanatory principles to which the use of the
concept commits us. We shall see that Hegel has a keen sense of the
nature and complexity of the concepts necessary to do justice to
human activity.
Finally, in his attempt to accommodate the wealth of empirical
phenomena as well as the transcendental aspects of our knowledge,
Hegel develops a nonreductive approach to mind, which we explore in more detail in Chapter 3. Such an approach is finding
increasing sympathy among contemporary philosophers. It offers
us a more sophisticated understanding of the relations between the
various sciences and promises deeper insight in particular within
the sciences of man. Contemporary philosophy of mind can now
reclaim Hegel as an ancestor.

Nature and Spirit

METAPHYSICS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE SCIENCES
Hegel's goal in his philosophy of subjective spirit is an empirically sensitive yet basically a priori science of mind. That sounds
oxymoronic: How can a discipline be at once a priori and empirically
sensitive? Here the elaborate structure of the Hegelian system
serves a clear purpose. We have, first of all, the logic—the a priori
element in all thought.1 The system's following two parts, the
philosophies of nature and of spirit, bring the a priori structures of
logic to bear on the empirical phenomena and thus are empirically
sensitive as well as containing an a priori element.
But empirical sensitivity is a matter of degree. What kinds of
empirical discoveries would persuade Hegel (or us) to abandon the
distinction between nature and spirit altogether? Certainly there are
cases in which the distinction is far from clear, just as the distinction
between the living and the non-living is unclear. But that there are
indeed such distinctions, and that they are highly immune to empirical potshots, seems apparent. Hegel's system offers him a way
i. Philosophy, according to Hegel, is a circle of circles. One of the consequences
of this doctrine, which I believe Hegel willingly accepts, is that even logic is not
absolutely a priori. The system is a closed curve: the achievement of the final stage of
the philosophy of spirit cycles one into the logic. Logic therefore also has roots in the
empirical, for it has emerged out of nature itself. Hegel denies any absolute distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori—the a priori is rather an element or
aspect of every truth in varying degrees (see §12).
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to represent the differing empirical sensitivities of the distinctions
and concepts used in the sciences. The more subordinate the concept is, the more sensitive it is to the empirical.2 Nature and spirit
are superordinate concepts and relatively immune to empirical considerations, as is the essential contrast between them. The more
subordinate concepts are more empirically sensitive. At least in the
Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, the placement or explanation of subordinate concepts (e.g., feeling) was more readily altered by Hegel in
apparent response to empirical developments, and further research
on the development of the Encyclopedia will probably show that to
be a pattern throughout.
The fundamental conceptual relations are worked out in the
Logic. Nature and spirit manifest the conceptual structures discussed in the Logic, and the general structures of nature and spirit
can be determined without much empirical input accordingly. This
means that within the realms of nature and spirit we can expect to
find structures that embody the distinctions between being, essence, and concept, and that the subordinate structures of these
divisions again roughly limn those of the Logic. But the further we
move from the general features of the realization of the conceptual
structures discussed in the Logic, the less able are we to describe a
priori the more particular features and the more vulnerable to empirical refutation is our attempt to organize the phenomena.3
We have not yet distinguished between the philosophy of nature "
and the philosophy of spirit. The methodological remarks of my
first two chapters hold equally for both. What is the difference
between nature and spirit? We need some account of the differences and the relations between various stages of the Encyclopedia.
z. I call more subordinate those concepts occurring within tertiary, fourth-level,
or deeper triads. Every philosophical concept occurs within some triad and most
concepts have further triads subordinated to them. Perhaps ideally every concept
governs some other concepts, but Hegel is not clear on this point. In a typical listing
of the system's determinations (such as the outline of subjective spirit included
here), simple indentation shows subordination. Thus the concepts of spirit and
nature are superordinate concepts, whereas those of imagination and galvanism are
subordinate concepts.
y. One might imagine Kant getting quite bothered trying to locate precisely the
synthetic a priori and the empirical elements in, say, physics. But Hegel would not
have thought such a project very sensible, for even the lowliest assertion presupposes and contains metaphysical categories. Seeking to draw a boundary between
the a priori and the empirical in our knowledge shows a thorough lack of comprehension of the absolute interpenetrarion of the two.
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And though we need to distinguish nature and spirit, we must also
distinguish subjective spirit from objective spirit and from absolute
spirit. Finally, we must be able to explain the relations between the
various levels within the philosophy of subjective spirit.
One noticeable feature of the progression in the Encyclopedia is
that at the higher levels the distinctions correspond fairly well with
the disciplinary boundaries between sciences (at least to the degree
they are still recognizable). It has been common in the twentieth
century to treat questions about relations between the various sciences in a linguistic mode; I follow suit here, for little is lost by such
a treatment, and it brings out with striking clarity the relevance of
Hegel's philosophy to present concerns.
The Languages of Nature and Spirit

Let us ask, then, what Hegel takes to be the differences between
the language by which we explain and describe nature and the
language by which we explain and describe spirit. It is certainly not
often easy to separate these two "languages,"4 but it is clear that
Hegel thinks that the concepts structuring these two different forms
of discourse are quite different from each other. Furthermore, in his
discussions of the differences between nature and spirit, Hegel
does not intend to summarize and condense an understanding of
their relation which is already common coin. We each possess the
beginnings of a fully adequate understanding of the differences and
relations between nature and spirit, but the common view is still
mired in the rigid and reifying distinctions characteristic of the
understanding. Hegel is therefore offering us a revised and improved understanding of nature and spirit, one that avoids the pitfalls plaguing the common understanding. In the linguistic mode,
4. Separating a language for describing and explaining the mental from the
language for describing and explaining the physical is a convenient mode of speech.
The two vocabularies are, of course, not separate languages at all, but parts of
unitary natural languages. They are not separable in anything like the way two
different natural languages are. With this warning, I adhere to present convention
and talk of two (or more) languages. Discussing philosophical issues in a linguistic
mode is not as foreign to Hegel as might be thought. It is not uncommon that he
makes use of linguistic facts in his own argumentation, but, more important, he
expressly affirms that "the forms of thought are, in the first instance, displayed and
stored in human language?' (SL p. 3, Miller tr.). Approaching philosophical problems
through a focus on language is entirely-consistent with Hegel's beliefs.
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Hegel is trying to reveal the ideal language pointed at by our present, imperfect, ordinary languages of the understanding.
But in Hegel's view there is no simple distinction between the,
language by which we describe and explain nature and the language by which we describe and explain spirit. Although he distinguishes nature and spirit, it would be a major mistake to think that
that is the end of the matter. Beginning in the seventeenth century,
a straightforward dichotomy between the two realms was common,
typified in Descartes's distinction between extended and thinking
substances. Descartes's distinction amounts to the claim that there
are two (and only two) vocabularies necessary for a complete description and explanation of the world—the geometric vocabulary
of physics and the mentalistic vocabulary of the soul. For Descartes,
all extended things are of a kind, with only accidental differences
between them; the animate body is just more complex than a stone,
not in any other way different from it. Similarly, in the realm of the
nonextended, all things are of a kind, namely, thinking substances'
and their modifications. Hegel, however, makes no such claims
about the homogeneity of nature or spirit. In his system there is no
one language of nature, nor any one language of spirit. We find,
rather, that the language of nature includes languages for describing and explaining the mechanical, the chemical, the organic, and
that none of these can be simply eliminated without loss. Both
nature and spirit have various stages, each of which builds on its
predecessors. To each of these stages corresponds a special science,
and thus we have to consider not only the relation of the Naturwissenschaften to the Geisteswissenschaften but also the relations
among the subdisciplines in each of these categories.
These relations have been a subject of much concern in contemporary philosophy of science, so we have several different models
for them. The classical reductionist model claims that each of the
predicates of a higher science is connected by some bridge law to (a
set of) predicates of the reducing science. Any law of the higher
science can then be rewritten, perhaps clumsily, but preserving its
nomological character, in the vocabulary of the reducing science.5
5. See John G. Kemeny and Paul Oppenheim, "On Reduction," in Readings in the
Philosophy of Science, ed. B. Brody, pp. 307-18; and Ernest Nagel, The Structure of
Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. See also Jerry A. Fodor, The
Language of Thought, and Hilary Putnam, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2: Mind, Language
and Reality.
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This would be a convenient and pretty picture of the relation among
the sciences, for then (supposedly) physics would be the only essential science, statements of any other science being mere abbreviations of much longer and more complex physical laws. But,
unfortunately or not, this picture of a unified science is just too
simple. There is no good reason to think that there are any such
bridge laws between the realms of nature and spirit. To use Fodor's
example, there is no good reason to believe that there is a bridge law
connecting "monetary exchange," a theoretical term in economic
theory, to any set of predicates from physics. Monetary exchanges
vary widely; they can be exchanges of metal, paper, or wampum, or
changes in binary data in a computer. There is simply no reason for
believing that monetary exchanges are connected in a lawlike fashion with any set, however, disjunctive, of physical predicates.6
Once the reductionist model of interscience relations has been
rejected, there are two different directions one can go. Those of
strong reductionist conviction make the radical move to eliminative
materialism, claiming that the reducing science, usually physics,
answers every worthwhile question. Even if some slight expressive
power is lost, it is argued, the language of higher theories, including psychology, can be simply eliminated without significant loss.
Because it is supposedly the inadequacies of the earlier stages
that drive the dialectic onward in the philosophies of nature and
spirit, it is clear that Hegel could not accept the eliminability of
higher sciences; the whole Encyclopedia is an argument for their
ineliminability. Eliminative materialism is not independently attractive either. One could at most claim that psychology and other
higher sciences are totally eliminable only in principle. That we
could never in practice eliminate them is clear. Second, to argue for
eliminative materialism one has to maintain that in eliminating the
vocabularies of the higher sciences nothing essential is lost. But
what exactly counts as essential? Is the usefulness of the vocabulary
essential? If so, the game is lost at the outset, for the vocabulary of
physics is unusable for describing and explaining psychological or
economic or many other kinds of events in any practical manner.
The eliminative materialist must write a promissory note on an
imperceivable future to claim plausibility for this doctrine.
A less radical and more attractive alternative to classical reduc6. See Fodor, Language of Thought, pp. 9-26.
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tionism is the token-identity version of noneliminative materialism.
According to this view, although the predicates of a higher science
cannot be either eliminated or redefined in favor of the predicates of
the reducing science, it is still the case that any instance of the
predicates of a higher science is also an instance of the predicates of
the lower science, and that the lower science (again, physics), as
more universal, retains priority.7 Thus, although there is no lawlike
relation between monetary exchanges and the predicates of physics, it is nonetheless the case that every monetary exchange is also a
physical event (albeit a complex one). Instance by instance, then,
there is an identity between the events described and explained by
the higher science and those described and explained by physics.
There are several things to be noted about this position. Phrased
as it often is as a thesis about objects, it says, for example, that one
and the same object can have the mental property of now wanting
to go sailing and the physical property of weighing 164 pounds—
mental and physical predicates pertain to the same subject of predication. But this account does not yet clarify the relation between the
mental and the physical. The token-identity thesis is that my wanting to go sailing is itself identical to some (complex) physical property I instantiate. The difference between type and token identity is
this: type identity would be correct if every desire to go sailing (or at
least all my desires to go sailing) were identical to one and the same
physical property, whereas token identity requires only that any
instance of a desire to go sailing be identical to some instance of
some physical property (but not necessarily always the same one).
Here is an analogy. The quarters of the 6th Battalion are the
quarters of Harry, Sammy, Ben. . . . But although this is an identity
statement, it does not express a type identity, only a token identity,
for when Harry is mustered out of the service, the quarters of the
6th Battalion are no longer the quarters of Harry, Sammy, Ben. . . .
Surely there is a different identity statement, namely, that the
quarters of the 6th Battalion are the quarters of Tommy, Sammy,
Ben . . ., which has taken its place. There is no one set of persons to
which the 6th Battalion is identical in every case, although in every
case it is identical to some set of persons.
This view has seemed quite promising, but it too has difficulties.
7. Ibid.
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The doctrine has often been framed in terms of events, with the
assertion that, although mental events are not type-identical to
physical events, they are token-identical to them. Let us assume for
the moment that events are exemplifications of properties by individuals at a time (so-called Kirn events); that is, we can identify an
event with the ordered triple of an individual, a property, and a
time. This is a simplification of our ordinary concept of an event, but
it will do nicely for now. Token-identity theorists claim that all
mental events are token-identical with physical events. This must
mean that every exemplification of a mental property at a time is
identical with some exemplification of a physical property at that
time. Assuming that the individuals and times involved are the
same, the ordered triples constituting the events can be identified
only if the properties involved are the same. This seems inevitably
to push us back toward type identity, for properties are types. It is
difficult to say what exactly constitutes identity between properties,
but it does seem clear that two properties could not be identical in
one instantiation but disparate otherwise. If the properties are not
identical, neither can we say that they are coextensive in one instance but not otherwise. We can at most say that they are coinstantiated in this instance but not otherwise. But coinstantiation is not
strong enough to please a token-identity partisan.
In discussions of token-identity theories, these points are often
i obscured by the treatment of the mental and physical events themselves as particulars that are identified, apparently, in virtue of their
properties. But we must not lose sight of the fact that it is one and
the same thing—a person—that has both mental and physical attributes. We need not explicate the unity of the person by identifying the two different kinds of attributes with each other.
An important question remains to be answered: Is there no relation at all between a person's mental and physical properties? Are
these so distinct that any set of mental properties can coexist with
any set of physical properties? Our immediate reaction is that this
cannot be the case; there is some important connection between
one's physical and mental properties. It has long been supposed
that there are at least causal connections between mental and physical states, but this is not the kind of relation we are looking for here.
The causal relation is a dynamic relation; we are looking for some
nondynamic, ontological relation between the mental and the phys-
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ical that captures our belief that my mental attributes depend, in
their very being, on my body and its attributes—that mental attributes require a physical substratum.
A new tack on this problem has received a great deal of attention
lately, namely, the claim that mental properties supervene upon
physical properties. The concept of supervenience was first introduced in discussions of the relations between moral properties and
natural (or physical) properties. The idea is that what physical
properties a person has determine that person's mental (or moral)
properties, so that anyone with just those physical properties (and
relations, of course) has the same mental (or moral) properties, and
a change in mental (or moral) properties means a change in physical
properties as well.8 This claim that mental or moral properties can
be determined by physical properties is then complemented by a
claim that this determination does not yield a reduction of the mental
or moral properties to the physical.
To avoid getting too technical for our purposes, I offer a metaphor. Philosophers often talk of properties or predicates as ways of
"cutting up" or sorting the world. Let us take this metaphor seriously for a moment; suppose that there is no privileged catalogue
of the entities in the world. It is possible that there are several
different, nonconflicting ways of sorting the world but no direct
way of getting from one way of sorting (or even the entities sorted)
to another, or of inferring from an item's place in one classification
to its place (or even its occurrence) in another. In this sense the two
sorting schemes are simply independent and no reduction is possible, although they sort "the same thing." Nonetheless, it could still
be the case that one sorting scheme is basic in the sense that a
complete inventory of the world in the basic scheme determines the
world sufficiently well that only one sorting in the other scheme is
possible, though not vice versa. This is particularly possible if the
second, supervenient scheme is in some way partial and simply
does not attempt a universal classification. This is the picture that
supervenience theorists propose of our world: there is no mapping
on an entity-by-entity, or property-by-property basis, even using
logical constructs of the entities or properties, between the mental
8. See D. Davidson, "Mental Events," in Experience and Theory, ed. L. Foster and
J. W. Swanson, p. 88. Davidson uses the notion of supervenience to defend the
token-identity thesis, but the two need not go together (see sources cited in note 10).
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and the physical, but a complete physical history of the world
suffices to fix the psychological history as well (and not vice versa).
My thinking that Cookie Rojas was a great ballplayer, although
not identical with any physical state I am in, may supervene upon
my physical states — that is, any person in an indistinguishable
physical state is also thinking that Cookie Rojas was a great ballplayer. This leaves open the possiblity that two persons have content-identical thoughts without being in physically indistinguishable states.
This notion has attracted attention because it seems to offer confirmation of our intuitions about the primacy of the material without the untoward consequences of identity theories. An interesting
further development of this new position is that there also seems
reason to(abandon individualism, the position that the mental properties a person instantiates supervene only upon the physical state
of that person's body. The relevant physical state upon which a
given mental state supervenes is certain to be very complex, and it
may include states of objects outside the person's body. The arguments against individualism are too complex to rehearse here, however.9
To recast the supervenience thesis in the linguistic mode, we can
say that the statements of a higher language S supervene upon
those of a lower language P if fixing all the truths of the lower
language also fixes the truths of the higher language. Alternatively,
we can also say that S supervenes upon P if two worlds indistinguishable with the resources of P are also indistinguishable with
those of S.10
Hegel as a Weak Monist
How does this modern speculation about intertheoretic relations
bear on Hegel? Does one of these patterns fit the subdisciplines in
9. Tyler Surge, "Individualism and the Mental," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4
(1979)73-121; "Other Bodies/' in Thought and Object, ed. A. Woodfield; Jay Garfield,
"Prepositional Attitudes and the Ontology of the Mental," Cognition and Brain Theory
10. Jaegwon Kim, "Supervenience and Nomological Incommensurables," American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (April 1978)1149-56; John Haugeland, "Weak Supervenience," American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (January I98z):93-io4; Garfield, "Prepositional Attitudes."
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Hegel's system? Most of these models of intertheoretic relations
were motivated by the unity-of-science doctrine, a doctrine with
which, in its positivistic, particularly physicalistic, guise, Hegel
would have had little patience. Hegel shows no interest in any form
of reductionism, so the classical pictures of theory reduction and
eliminative materialism are both nonstarters for capturing Hegel's
view.
One might wonder whether Hegel's idealism is not just materialist reductionism stood on its head, but I find no indication that
Hegel thinks he is reducing mechanics to psychology, nor any
indication that he intends to eliminate mechanics. He could not
eliminate, because he claims that each stage of the dialectic has a
certain truth that must be preserved, and I take it that that means it
makes some sort of ineliminable contribution to our ultimate understanding of the world. He never proposes that an earlier stage of the
philosophies of nature or spirit be simply abandoned in favor of a
later stage. Moreover, reductionism is not an open possiblity, because then the stages he discovers in nature and spirit—the whole
complex articulation of his system—would collapse into one basic
level.
It seems more plausible that Hegel might be a token-identity
theorist, for this position would at least preserve the specialness of
the individual sciences while also accounting for the overall monism of the system. But this characterization does not work either.
Hegel intimates that physical explanations are not applicable to
functioning organisms, nor physiological explanations to rational
agents.ll A token-identity theorist must claim that both explanatory
forms are applicable; any differences can be only pragmatic or
instrumental. Moreover, since identity is an equivalence relation,
this would commit Hegel to the identity of spiritual events with
natural (physical) events, and there is no indication that he would
accept that position.
There are, however, some powerful reasons for thinking that
Hegel has something like supervenience in mind as the relation
between adjacent special sciences. This interpretation would account for the relative independence of each level of nature and spirit
11. See Crawford Elder, Appropriating Hegel, and my review of this book in The
Owl of Minerva 14 (December ig82):^-S, and 14 (March 1983)14-8
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without losing sight of the unity of the world. It would also account
for Hegel's ability to order the special sciences serially, for each
would then supervene upon its immediate predecessor. It would
also account for the systole and diastole of the dialectic, the movement from immediacy through mediation to return to a higher
immediacy. At each stage of nature the vocabulary appropriate to
that stage picks out certain basic objects that are not further analyzable in that language. Complexes of these objects and complex
interactions among them can then be described and explained
within the language, but at some point there may occur complexes
that possess properties unanalyzable within the old vocabulary. A
new vocabulary must be introduced in which these complexes are
,now treated as basic, simple units. These new, higher simples
supervene upon the complexes of the old vocabulary. Most of all,
such an interpretation would allow us to grant the autonomy of the
spiritual without divorcing it entirely and irreparably from the natural.
Contemporary theories of supervenience are far from physicalistic positivism trumpeting the unity of science, yet they show their
dialiectical origin in such positivism by retaining a conviction that
physics is the foundation on which all others supervene. Surely,
one would think, this is counter to Hegelian idealism. We could,
however, invert the supervenience hierarchy and take natural facts
to supervene upon spiritual facts, but this is at best unconvincing.
First, we would have to sacrifice the stepwise fashion of the hierarchy to make it work, since there are natural events where there
are no biological or psychological events. Second, fixing the facts in
the highest theory (which would be what exactly? history? philosophy itself?) would be tantamount to fixing all the other facts of the
world. And while some of the things Hegel says point in this
direction, this view is ultimately irreconcilable with his doctrine of
the, contingency of nature. As a matter of fact, the retention of
matter as the basic set of objects/events upon which all others
supervene is thoroughly consistent with Hegel's idealism. Hegel in
general has no particular respect for beginning points; the result,
the end of a process, is usually what he is interested in.12
12. The end of a process need not be a final product. There are processes the end
of which is the process itself (for example, the performance of a piece of music).
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One might question whether a supervenience of spirit upon nature threatens the freedom of spirit, since supervenience is a form of
dependence. Here several answers are possible. First, the facts of
the spiritual realm are themselves a many-layered complex. The
"dependence" on the natural would be very distant—mediated
by the biological, the anthropological, the psychological, and so
forth—by the time the true freedom of philosophical speculation is
achieved. Second, supervenient dependence is definitely not a
form of causal dependence, and there is no question of its constituting a form of freedom-depriving compulsion. The freedom of the
spiritual is its self-determination, which essentially means that
truths about spirit have their ground in the necessary ends of spirit.
Given the global nature of the supervenience relation, there is no
dependence relation between individual spiritual and material phenomena, only one form of general dependence of the spiritual on
the material. The only real problem, then, is at the very beginning:
the spiritual depends on nature at least as the object in which it__
realizes itself. How, then, can it turn around and determine nature's own existence as well?_Hegel's answer is that spirit determines nature's own existence because spirit is nature's telos. Since
nature is the realm of efficient causation, looking for an efficient
cause of nature itself makes no sense. Thus, although supervenient
on nature, spirit is still entirely self-determined and therefore free.
We can understand this point better by observing the deep similarities between Hegel and Aristotle. Aristotle's metaphysics is
hylomorphic; every object is taken to be a certain form inhering in a
matter appropriate to it. A hierarchy of forms is thus generated, the
realization of each presupposing the availability of an appropriate
matter. How far down this hierarchy reaches and what its bottom
looks like has been the subject of much debate, which I can ignore.
Aristotle's natural philosophy can be seen as a kind of nonreductive
materialism, for matter is, in one sense, basic in his scheme.13 Yet
calling Aristotle's philosophy a materialism is also quite misleading,
for it plays down far too much the absolutely central role of form. It
is Aristotle's emphasis on the notion of form, what Hegel calls the
ideal element, that prompts Hegel to see Aristotle as an important
predecessor of idealism.
13. We get something like this in E. Hartmann, Body, Soul, and Substance.
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Hegel's philosophies of nature and spirit are very much Aristotelian, and it is profitable to think of Hegel's view of nature as
similar to Aristotle's hylomorphism; the objects of a lower stage
offer the material for the further mediation, the new structures and
forms of the higher stages.14 Even more important, Hegel also
adopts a teleological worldview like that we find in Aristotle. That
the lower stages of nature are material for the higher stages, are the
potentiality of the higher stages, entails that their own actuality is
achieved in the higher stage. Nature points toward and exists for
the sake of spirit, not because nature is someone's means for realizing an intention to create spirit, but because spirit is the force
dwelling within the differentiation of nature. It is the nature of
nature, its Concept, to provide the necessary conditions for the
realization of spirit and to be itself an essential part of that realization. But make no mistake—spirit, the formal and final cause,
retains metaphysical priority.
Hegel's teleologism, his discounting of the philosophical importance of such natural relations as generation or material constitution
(see PN §249), makes it possible to assert that he believes that
something like a supervenience relation holds between individual
stages of nature without violating his idealism, his conviction that
spirit is the true reality of the world, for his idealism is essentially
supported by his teleologism.15 What we today most commonly see
as a thoroughly contingent emergence of supervenient objects and
events on top of a complex of subvenient objects and events, Hegel
understands to be the embodiment of a goal-directed, self-actualizing process, the self-realization of the Idea, the Absolute. /
Let me summarize what I take Hegel's view to be. Nature is to be
understood as consisting of various stages or levels. These levels
form a hierarchy, one supervening upon another, and the whole
ultimately serves the self-realization of the Absolute. For each level
14. G. R. G. Mure has emphasized Hegel's indebtedness to Aristotle very heavily
in his works on Hegel. See also N. Hartmann, "Hegel und Aristoteles," Beitragen zur
Philosophic (1923).
15. One could say that, according to Hegel, the real mistake materialists make is in
thinking that what something consists of is the most important thing to know about
it. He would rather have us ask about its role in the realization of the Absolute,
without denying that questions of material constitution are also worthwhile. The
materialist does not usually pay Hegel similar respect; materialism denies that asking
about roles in the realization of the Absolute makes sense.
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there is a set of concepts in which the objects of that stage can be
described and explained; these concepts are neither eliminable nor
reducible. The empirical sciences are consequently also irreducible;
each develops and applies the concepts peculiar to a particular level
to describe and explain individual phenomena at that level. Inquiry
is not, however, exhausted by these empirical disciplines. We can
inquire further into the nature of the concepts employed by the
empirical disciplines and their interrelations (thus philosophies of
nature and spirit), into the nature of concepts in general (logic), and
finally into the self-realization of the Absolute (philosophy iiberhaupt). These philosophical inquiries are all highly nonempirical, of
course.

DISTINGUISHING NATURE AND SPIRT
Externality and Self-determination
Given Hegel's stepwise arrangement of empirical disciplines, we
must now ask more specifically what motivates the distinction between nature and spirit for Hegel. How can he draw any deeper
deft between the language of organisms and the language of anthropology than he draws between any two other adjacent disciplines? The answer is that Hegel perceives certain structural similarities within the sciences of nature and within the Geisteswissenschaften, along with some important differences between nature
and spirit, the first of which is a contrast between the external and
the internal.161 have already discussed this distinction briefly. Nature is self-external because it and natural objects are not selfdetermining. This means, first of all, that in explaining some natural phenomenon (the movement of a billiard ball, for instance), one
looks outside that phenomenon for an external cause, some other
natural phenomenon. Explanations continually lead into the thicket
of natural phenomena; natural facts are determined by other, distinct natural facts. In contrast, the Absolute is totally self-determining; there is nowhere else to turn. The stages of nature and spirit
leading up to the Absolute are stages of increasing self-determination.
16. PN §247ff; PSS §381, Zusatz; cf. PSS, vol. i, pp. io5ff.
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The externality of nature has another, deeper meaning in Hegel's
philosophy: "Nature's essential and distinctive characteristic is to
be the Idea in the form of otherness." (PN §247, Zusatz). It is not just
the case that understanding any natural phenomenon inevitably
leads one to other natural phenomena, but also that understanding
1
such phenomena as natural involves seeing them in contrast to the
spiritual. Spirit is self-explanatory, self-subsistent, total actuality. In
its contrast to spirit, nature is none of these. It must, according to
Hegel, be conceived of as pointing to spirit, working toward its own
fulfillment in the complete actuality of spirit. Nature as a whole is
itself a spiritual phenomenon; the existence and general structure of
1
nature cannot be understood solely on natural principles but must
be referred to spirit. In that the very being of nature is realized only
through spirit, nature is self-external.
These characteristics constitute the externality of nature in general, but riot all the levels of nature are self-external to the same
degree. In particular, in the final stage of nature, the animal organism, the first form of externality is almost completely overcome, for
the organism is a self-maintaining system: "An even more complete
triumph over externality is exhibited in the animal organism; in this
not only does each member generate the other, is its cause and
effect, its means and end, so that it is at the same time itself and its
Other, but the whole is so pervaded by its unity that nothing in it
appears as independent, every determinateness is at once ideal, the
animal remaining in every determinateness the same one universal,
so that in the animal body the complete untruth of asunderness is
revealed" (PN §381, Zusatz, Miller tr.). The story of nature is the
story of the increasing self-determination present in nature, a story
that continues with spirit, for it is not brought to an end with the
animal organism. Although the animal has acquired considerable
freedom within its environment, it is still bound to its natural
conditions. Any further step toward greater self-determination
would involve somehow transcending the animal's natural conditions. There is therefore no truly self-sustaining being in the natural
world. The closest thing to a self-sustaining being in nature is the
animal genus, which persists in and through the demise of its
members. But the genus is also self-external in that it has no existence apart from the manifold individuals, which have no consciousness of their species being. The genus is sh'll scattered in
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mutually external objects. In the realm of spirit, the universal is to
come into its own—to achieve an existence that is not merely scattered among different, mutually external individuals. How exactly
this occurs we discuss in detail later.
The distinction between nature and spirit, then, is not an absolute cleft; nature itself has successively more spiritual stages. In this
sense the break between nature and spirit is arbitrary; there is place
for a line here somewhere, but Hegel could have displaced it in
either direction without obviously upsetting the fine-grained structure of the whole. Sensation, for instance, occurs as a major topic of
consideration in both the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of
Subjective Spirit, and it offers us an interesting case study. In the
post-Cartesian tradition, sensation is clearly mental, not physical.17
Denying minds to animals entailed denying them sensations. In
Hegel's system, sensation is clearly a property of complex organisms, but it is also the immediate, simple, first reality of the spiritual. Sensation offers a pivot point, a phenomenon with one foot in
both the natural and the spiritual realms. The dualist would like to
force a decision one way or the other; sensation is either natural or
spiritual, but not both. Hegel rejects this simple disjunction. Sensation emerges as a property of complex organisms and is a form of
assimilation of the external object. It is correctly considered natural
because in sensation the animal organism is still largely determined
from the outside, not self-determined. On the other hand, as a form
of the assimilation of the external object, sensation is also spiritual
insofar as it is an internalization of the external object which allows
further, new relations to that external object to develop as forms of
self-determination on the part of the organism; that is, in organizing
its sensations in ever more complex ways, the organism also acquires new relations to the external object, but now through a
process that is self-determined and internal. Thus sensation has
two faces—and the point of view from which one looks at it becomes crucial. As a simple property of complex organisms, sensation is decidedly natural; as the nondestructive internalization of
the external object, it is the fundament of the spiritual.18
17. Descartes himself was not so straightforward.
18. In my discussion here it sounds as if sensation is the turning point between
nature and spirit—the last stage of nature and the first of spirit. This is not, however,
the case. The Philosophy of Nature ends with "the process of the genus" (that is, the

life cycle of the organism), and the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit begins with "the
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There is no clear break between nature and spirit; rather, these
are two poles between which there is a complex series of intermediate stages. Hegel draws the line between nature and spirit where he
does, not because there is some one clear mark of the spiritual that
suddenly appears on the scene, but because at that point a sufficient
number of the characteristics of the spiritual have appeared to
justify a distinction. From this point on, the spiritual makes itself
ever more evident.

The Nature of Spirit
I have so far talked of spirit as if the only feature distinguishing it
from nature were degree of self-determination. Hegel does, however, say quite a bit more than this, and we must now turn to his
fuller pronouncements about the nature of spirit to see how these
further illuminate the status of the individual mind in his theory.
Three principle characteristics emerge in his exposition of the
concept of spirit at the beginning of the Philosophy of Spirit—the
ideality of spirit, its freedom, and its existence as self-manifestation:
"We must designate as the distinctive determinateness of the concept of Spirit, ideality, that is, the overcoming of the Idea's otherness, the process of returning—and the accomplished return—into
itself of the Idea from its Other" (§381, Zusatz). Hegel probably
derives this use of "ideality" from the Kantian notion of the Ideal of
Reason, the unconditioned. Spirit overcomes its other in that that
other is the manifestation of spirit, its revelation. By overcoming its
other, making its other a moment within itself, spirit ceases to be
conditioned by anything external. It is as unconditioned that it is
ideal. Since spirit is precisely its self-revelation, nature—as one
form of this revelation of spirit—is no longer absolutely opposed to
spirit. Nonetheless, nature is not the complete or perfect revelation
of spirit, and insofar as spirit's essential nature is this self-revelation, nature is not yet spirit.
Spirit reveals itself in three forms (§383, Zusatz). The first and
natural soul" (including discussions of the ways the soul is attuned to large-scale
phenomena and situations, such as geographic location, climate, and cosmic influences). I have therefore oversimplified the complex relations between spirit and
nature to some extent, but without losing anything essential for our purposes.
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lowest form, the form we find in nature, is revelation of spirit only
to another, that is, some external observer. Second, the idea "creates for itself an existence conformable to its inwardness and universality" (§384, Zusatz), that is, it creates the human being. In the
human being, spirit not only reveals itself but, more important, it
reveals itself to itself. We know ourselves to be the revelation of
spirit. Yet, even so, as finite minds we are not yet the perfect
revelation of spirit, the revelation in which all otherness is overcome:
Spirit converts nature into an object confronting it, reflects upon it,
takes back the externality of nature into its own inwardness, idealizes
nature and thus in the object becomes for itself. But this first being-forself of spirit is itself still immediate, abstract, not absolute; the selfexternality of spirit is not absolutely overcome by it. The awakening
spirit does not yet discern here its unity with the spirit concealed and
implicit in nature, to which it stands, therefore, in an external relation.
(§384, Zusatz, Miller tr., adapted)

In the third and last form of spirit's self-revelation, spirit knows
nature as its own creation, and nature and finite spirit lose all
externality; they are but forms of spirit's self-revelation. We normally distinguish between what is manifested or revealed (the content of the revelation) and how it is revealed (the form). I may
manifest an inner insecurity either by withdrawing from responsibility or by seeking out ever new responsibilities with which to
prove myself, for example. But the self-revelation of spirit is not
subject to this distinction (§383, Zusatz); rather, spirit's self-revelation is precisely what is revealed.
So far we have connected two of the three important characteristics of spirit, its ideality and its self-revelation. Spirit is ideal, without an absolute other, because its apparent other—nature—is already a form of the self-manifestation that spirit is. Spirit is, further,
free. Hegel also calls this "absolute negativity." But freedom is
precisely the absence of dependence on an other (§382, Zusatz), selfdetermination. Spirit is only what it makes itself.
Hegel's concept of spirit is difficult and confusing. Even with the
above list of major characteristics, one cannot seem to put one's
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finger on the concept.19 But because I am concerned only with one
particular set of stages of finite spirit, I shall not try to do what I
think I cannot do—make all the aspects of Hegel's concept of Geist
perfectly clear. It is helpful to think of spirit as the ordering activity
operative within the universe, an activity that is capable of selfreflection in that it is in some sense capable of metaordering, ordering its own ordering activity. Such a conception of spirit fits the
three characteristics I have focused on here. The universal ordering
activity is the overcoming of its other, namely, the lack of order.
Even a lack of order is not absolutely opposed to such an activity,
for it is the presupposition of such activity, and it is far from clear
that the notion of an absolute lack of order makes real sense.20
Order makes itself manifest, it need not reveal something else. And
the ordering activity is free, for determination is a form of order, so
nothing else can determine it, bind it. Determination is a form of
order, so the source of all order can only be self-determined. This
account is still very general, but it is enough to give us a sense of the
direction of Hegel's thought. In later chapters more detail about the
way finite, subjective spirit is an ordering activity is added, piece by
piece, supporting this approach to spirit.
We must still specify the notion of spirit a bit further, so that we
can finally begin to deal with finite, subjective spirit, the subject of
the philosophy of mind. According to Hegel, the point of calling
anything finite is to assert a discrepancy between its concept and
the reality (§386) and, in particular, to claim that the reality falls
short of the concept. In finite mind (spirit is in itself infinite, although it contains finitude) we therefore have spirit that is not fully
manifest, nor fully ideal, nor fully free. Finite mind is, as it were,
spirit still struggling to gain control of itself, to free itself from
nature, which is something it simply finds over against it. Absolute
spirit finds itself everywhere; finite spirit "does not yet discern here
its unity with the spirit concealed and implicit in nature, to which it
19. But see Solomon, "Hegel's Concept of Geist"; and Charles Taylor, Hegel. I also
find Josiah Royce's Lectures on Modern Idealism, which seems to have been forgotten
lately, quite helpful.

20. In view of the fact that nature is spirif s other, and that nature itself is not a
complete lack of order, I think that we should conclude that the notion of a complete
lack of order cannot be made out according to Hegel any more than a concept of pure
nothing can.
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stands, therefore, in an external relation. . . . Here, consequently,
spirit still has in nature a limitation and just by this limitation is
finite spirit" (§384, Zusatz, my tr.).
But we are concerned in particular with subjective spirit, which is
a stage of finite spirit. How does it differ from objective spirit? "As
long as spirit stands related to itself as to an Other, it is only
subjective spirit, originating in Nature and at first itself natural spirit.
But the entire activity of subjective spirit is directed to grasping
itself as its own self, proving itself to be the ideality of its immediate
reality. When it has attained to a being-for-self, then it is no longer
merely subjective, but objective spirit" (§385, Zusatz, Miller tr.). The
distinction seems primarily to be that, in subjective spirit, spirit
finds ,itself revealed in a given material, whereas in objective spirit,
spirit is set on constructing its own revelation, making the world
over in its own image, as it were, by constructing a society and a
civil state. Subjective spirit is still essentially tinged with passivity; it
receives a given passively, as if from the outside, which it subsequently recognizes as being a manifestation of the spiritual. Equally
important, objective spirit is the realm of intersubjectivity. Subjective spirit is the treatment of the individual "I." Objective spirit
treats the "We," a no less essential phase in spirit's self-actualization. This leads to a peculiarity in the Hegelian system: theorization
and cognition seem already to be perfected in subjective spirit,
whereas practical being must still traverse all of objective and absolute spirit.21 This imbalance, I believe, can be overcome only if
absolute spirit is also the fulfillment of man's cognitive being as well
as his practical being.
21. This imbalance is tellingly pointed out in T. Litt, Hegel: Versuch einer kritischen
Erneuerung.

Sensation: Mind's Material

If the question of sensation or perception arises in a discussion of
Hegel, the focus of the discussion is likely to be the opening chapters of the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807.1 Such a focus is, however,
a mistake. The examination of sense certainty and perception in the
Phenomenology bears on the question of the proper categories to be
applied within experience, but there is no discussion there of the
actual nature of sensation or perception as states of organic and
spiritual beings within a natural world. To understand what Hegel
thinks sensation and perception themselves are we must turn to his
Anthropology and Psychology.
Hegel's theory of sensibility tries to do justice to the insights of
such predecessors as Aristotle, Hume, and Kant while also providing a framework within which the empirical research of the day can
be comprehended systematically. His theory does not answer all
the desiderata imposed on philosophical theories of perception by
analytic philosophers today, such as detailing a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions to distinguish veridical from nonveridical peri. D. W. Hamlyn, in his Sensation and Perception: A History of the Philosophy of
Perception, commits precisely this error and makes the mistakes such an error could
be expected to foster; he attributes to Hegel a "minimum of attention to the role of
sensation in perception" and the notion that "the only thing which is 'given' is
experience as a whole," and claims that "idealism makes it difficult for itself to justify
the claim that anything independent of ourselves exists" (pp. 144-45). Others
among English-speaking authors who emphasize the Phenomenology of Spirit too
heavily in this regard include Charles Taylor and R. C. Solomon.
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ception, or mere perceptual mistake from hallucination, but it does
show a sensitive consideration of problems in the ontology of sense
and the differentiation of various levels of perceptual experience.
Hegel's distinction between sensation and the higher mental
activities, like Kant's, is phrased in terms of a distinction between
active and passive. Although, as he repeatedly claims, spirit is
essentially active, Hegel does not believe that there is no passive,
receptive element in the individual, subjective spirit. His theory of
sensation and intuition is best seen as an attempt to explicate the
nature of the receptive element in spirit and its relation to the
spontaneous, rational essence. His most important theses are these:
1. Sensation, though clearly mental, is not itself cognitive; the intentionality of sensation is not the intentionality of thought.
2. Sensation is nonetheless basic to cognition and is the starting point of
all knowledge and experience.
<
3. The world of one's direct sensory experience is a phenomenal workP
in the sense that it is a construction by the mind out of its affections.
Given Hegel's metaphysics, however, this does not entail that we are
confined to knowledge of a merely phenomenal world.
4. There are different levels of spirit's emergence from the passivity of
pure sensation as spirit liberates itself from its dependence on the
body and its immediate physical environment.

We begin by discussing the nature of sensation in Hegel's theory.
Hegel makes several related attempts to differentiate the sentient
from the nonsentient; after looking at these, we discuss in greater
detail the nature of the relation between mind and object in sensation.

THE SENTIENT AND THE NONSENTIENT
Sensation is a property of animals as well as humans, but we
cannot recount the whole of the Philosophy of Nature here in order to
get the proper background for understanding the emergence of
sensation within the animal organism. In what follows I summarize
what I take to be the most important points.
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The Nature of the Animal Organism
The animal organism is a highly organized chunk of nature,
composed of the objects of the lower levels of nature, the physical
and the chemical. But it is not simply a conglomeration of such
objects (see §350, Zusatz). What, then, is the animal itself? The
animal is a unity in a way no inorganic conglomeration is. The
unifying telos is, in the case of the animal, internal, unlike the
inorganic, the telos of which is some external goal. Hegel expresses
this important difference, perhaps unfortunately, in terms of the
animal being its own universal over against its particular aspects:2
"An even more complete triumph over externality is exhibited in
the animal organism; in this not only does each member generate
the other, is its cause and effect, its means and end, so that it is at
the same time itself and its Other, but the whole is so pervaded by
its unity that nothing appears as independent, every determinateness is at once ideal, the animal remaining in every determinateness
the same one universal, so that in the animal body the complete
untruth of asunderness is revealed" (§381, Zusatz, Miller tr.).
Hegel wants to maintain that the mode of being of the animal
organism and even more so of the human involves a rather special
relation between universality and particularity. The relation of an
inanimate object to its genus is, according to Hegel, external. The
individual is merely subsumed under the genus, which just collects
a set of otherwise disparate individuals; there is no intrinsic uniting
power active in them. There is, for instance, no intrinsic, active
essence that all red things have in common.3 To this extent the
inanimate individual and its universal are both abstract. In the
animate object, on the contrary, its universal, its concept, is distinctly active within it, and the animate, organic individual actualizes and maintains itself from within.4 In the animal the externality
2. If one recalls here the Aristotelian doctrine of substantial forms and its applications in biology and psychology, these views do not seem as strange.
3. Not all properties of inanimate things are equally external. The natural kind to
which a thing belongs has a closer relation to the thing than do its other characteristics.
4. The self-organization Kant attributes to organisms (Naturzwecke) is, along with
Aristotle's concept of the organism, an important influence on this aspect of Hegel's
theory.
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of nature is overcome, for we can only explain and understand the
animal's structure and behavior, Hegel thinks, by thinking of its
structure and behavior as the expression of a unitary (though complex) concrete universal active within the animal.5
Botanical, animal, and human beings are self-organizing. The
animal, qua universal, is the principle that orders and gives coherence to its various elements and properties, but in contrast to a
desk or a rock it does so itself, from inside. A rock, for instance, is at
best only nominally organized; even in complex crystal structures
there is no need to refer to functions within a system to explain the
organization of the crystal. That a rock has the structure it has and
behaves as it does depends solely on the stuff it consists of and its
external situation. Artifacts are more highly organized. The properties and behavior of a desk are explained in large part by the
function it is intended to serve. It can be made of wood, metal,
plastic; we can even slowly replace wood with metal parts and
retain the same desk. The desk is free of strict dependence on its
material constitution. Nonetheless, its principle of organization or
essence is extrinsic, bestowed on it by some person. In an organism
the principle of organization is intrinsic—organisms are not designed by someone to fulfill a purpose but are themselves their own
purpose. The organism is an active universal because, although a
universal in relation to its parts, it must be mentioned in any adequate explanation of them. The organism is its own effect and
therefore must be active.

The Sentient Organism
Feeling occurs in the animal, according to Hegel, "as the individuality which in the determinateness6 is immediately universal to
itself, simply remains with and preserves itself: the existing ideality
5. Hegel makes the contrast between internal and external do a great deal of
work; it separates animal organisms from inanimate nature, but it is also used, as we
have seen, to separate spirit from nature. It has been suggested that there is a simple
ambiguity in Hegel's usage, there really being two different contrasts—one Aristotelian, which culminates in the internality of the organism, and the second Cartesian, which culminates in the internality of a subjectivity (E. Heintel, "Aristotelismus
und Transzendentalismus in 'Begriff' bei Hegel"). I prefer to think that there is one
univocal contrast with an articulated structure, but I am not yet sure of that.
6. "Determinateness" is Hegelian for a quality of something.
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of being determined" (PN, §351, Miller tr.). "Feeling is just this omnipresence of the unity of the animal in all its members which immediately communicate every impression to the one whole which,
in the animal, is an incipient being-for-self" (§381, Zusatz, Miller
tr.)- These are obscure passages, to say the least, but not unusually
so among passages in which Hegel tries to distinguish the sentient
from the nonsentient. The most complete statement Hegel makes
on the subject is in an only recently published unfinished manuscript of a projected, book-length version of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit:
If neutral water is coloured, for example, and so simply possesses this
quality, is simply in this condition, it would be sentient if it were not
only for us or as a matter of possibility that it differed from the
condition, but it were at the same time to distinguish itself from itself
as being so determined. Differently expressed: the genus color only
exists as blue, or as a certain specific color; in that it is blue, it remains
the genus color. But if the color as color, i.e., not as blue but at the same
time as color, persisted in opposition to itself as blue color—if the
difference between its universality and its particularity were not simply/or us but existed within itself, it would be sensation of blue. (PSS,
vol. i, p. 123)

These passages are confusing and obscure, but Hegel is trying to
describe something the evanescence of which has frustrated all
philosophers. He is trying to describe what it is in the nature of
certain beings that makes them sentient, that qualifies them for the
predicate "aware."
A nonsentient being, a stone, for example, can have a color
property, say gray. The distinction between the stone and its grayness is a simple modal distinction (to use the Cartesian terminology). An animal can be colored in precisely the same way. But if the
animal senses something gray, how is it then related to grayness? A
dualist might say that this is again a simple modal distinction between the mind (instead of the body) and one of its properties.
Being gray and sensing gray have two different subjects. In contrast
to this dualistic picture, Hegel wants to keep a unitary subject. The
same thing—the animal—can both be gray and sense gray. The
difference between being gray and sensing gray lies in the relation
the subject bears to the properties of its sense organs.
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The nonsentient subject is exhausted in its properties, Hegel
seems to be claiming; it makes no distinction between itself and its
properties, although we do. The sentient being, however, retains
for itself an identity over against its particular properties, it makes a
distinction between itself and its properties. This is all pretty mystifying, but I think some sense can be made of it.
Hegel insists that the sensible quality is now posited within the
soul as ideal. Hegel often uses "ideal" to characterize somethingcas
being unconditioned by anything external, and we would normally
think of sensation as a prime example of determination by the
external. "That the soul finds itself so determined, that is why the
determinateness is at the same time posited as ideal in the soul, and
is not a quality of it. In that the ideality of this determinateness is
not another determinateness, which takes its place and drives out
the first, but rather that the soul itself is the ideality of the determinateness and is reflected into itself, the finite, i.e., is infinite, the
determinateness is also not a mere state" (PSS, vol. i, p. 122; my tr.)
Hegel's notion seems to be that sensations are peculiar because,
although they are in one sense properties brought about by external
factors (by and large), what they are depends crucially on their
occurrence in the context of a complex organic whole. Hegel's point
is, I believe, that there is no simple connection between the physical
state of a sensory organ and the organism's sensory state. Particular
sensations—how the state of the sense organs affects the total
sensory state—are dependent on that total sensory state as well. To
the extent that each sensation is also dependent on the total state of
the organism, the sensation does not upset the self-determination
of the organism.
Perhaps an example can help. Thermostats are sensitive to temperature—but they do not sense heat or cold. Hegel would say, it
seems, something like this: "If the temperature as temperature, that
is, not as 78° but at the same time as temperature, persisted in
opposition to itself as 78°, it would sense 78°." In some ways our
sense organs are meters of our environment, capable of recording
its state with sometimes surprising accuracy. We might, then, try to
think of our possession of a certain sense as our possession of a
metering subsystem that feeds its output into some central processor where it can be calculated into our total behavior function. In
such a complex system, we might claim, the temperature as tern-
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perature, in the form of the special metering subsystem, persists in
opposition to any specific value it may output. But clearly there are
many such systems—for example, central heating systems—which
do not literally sense heat or cold.
What Hegel would find repugnant in the above example is not
the isolation of a particular metering system—this would correspond to a sense organ, and Hegel never doubts the existence of
those. Rather, he would object to the form of connection between
the metering system and the central processor. The meter is conceived of as fully independent of the central processor, adding its
isolable input without regard to the state of any other part of the
whole. In other words, the meter is fully modular. This is not an
organic unity. The input-output function of the meter would also at
least have to have a reciprocal dependence on the total state of the
whole system in order for this condition to be met. Only to a system
exhibiting strong reciprocity between the particular states of its
parts and the total state (for Hegel its universal) could we attribute
sensation.
Is Hegel's view of sensation and the mind itself therefore refuted
by the contemporary evidence that a number of our psychological
abilities are modular?7 Although he consistently rails against faculty
psychology, Hegel does make distinctions among sensation, feeling, intuition, and imagination. Modularity is not all or nothing,
and Hegel does not seem to require total nonmodularity in the
mind. We therefore cannot say that the apparent modularity presently attributed to a number of our psychological capacities is a
refutation of Hegel. But it certainly seems fair to say that the more
highly modular are our abilities, the less attractive is a Hegelian
theory of mind. In his emphasis on the rationality of spirit and
human nature, Hegel may well have gone too far in thinking that all
7. See Jerry Fodor, The Modularity of Mind, for a general discussion of modularity.
Fodor explains his terms as follows: "By saying that confirmation is isotropic, I mean
that the facts relevant to the confirmation of a scientific hypothesis may be drawn
from anywhere in the field of previously established empirical (or, of course, demonstrative) truths. Crudely: everything that the scientist knows is, in principle, relevant
to determining what else he ought to believe. . . . By saying that scientific confirmation is Qujnean, I mean that the degree of confirmation assigned to any given
hypothesis is sensitive to properties of the entire belief system; as it were, the shape
of our whole science bears on the epistemic status of each scientific hypothesis"
(pp. 105-7).

60

Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

our mental abilities have the Quinean, isotropic (that is, multidimensionally holistic) nature reasoning exhibits.
Hegel's confusing but tantalizing remarks about sentience and
nonsentience do not help us much in the end. Ultimately we are
only told that the sensible organism relates to some of its states in
very peculiar ways, ways that are understood by reference to the
holistic, organic context in which they occur. At best, Hegel is
insisting that there is a limit on the modularity of a sentient system.
A sentient being must be more tightly unified or more closely and
complexly self-related than a conglomeration of modular metering
systems attached to some central processing device. This may be
true, but without further specification of the relations involved it is
not very helpful.

THE OBJECT OF SENSATION
Hegel's attempt to distinguish the sentient from the nonsentient
does not succeed, but neither has anyone else's. There is more to be
found, however, when we consider the object or content of sensation
and the nature of the relation between the sensation and its object.
Hegel talks rather loosely of the content or object of sensation, and
it appears that there are three candidates for the position: (a) the
external object involved in the causal process that culminates in the
perceiver's having a certain sensation; (b) the proper sensible itself—a color, tone, taste; (c) the animal or human itself.
The first two candidates are familiar, but the third seems unlikely, so let me note some of the textual evidence that shows that
this alternative must be taken seriously. Hegel continually insists
that in sensation, feeling, and intuition the subject finds itself, and
that such mental activities are the immediate being-for-self of the
organism. As a metaphor, the self-directedness of sensation pervades Hegel's discussion. Furthermore, there are plenty of explicit
passages such as the following: "In that the animal senses, it
doesn't only sense itself, but itself as determined in a particular
wa
y" (§35/a> Zusatz).
The three objects of sensation—the external object, the proper
sensible, and the animal itself—are "objects" of sensation in different senses, and Hegel keeps the senses clearly separate. There
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are, however, extra complications arising because of Hegel's distinction between inner and outer sense.
Inner and Outer Sense
The distinction between inner and outer sense does not consist in
certain sensations being given as inner and others as outer, for as we
shall see, sensations are not given as anything at all. Neither does
this distinction have anything to do with the Kantian distinction
between the forms of inner and outer sense. Rather, in Hegel's
system, the distinction is founded on the etiology of the sensation
and its content. External sensations are those determined by causal
processes originating in some physical object and affecting the
sense organs: "One sphere of sentience distinguishes itself principally as the determination of corporeity (of the eye etc., of the
parts of the body in general) and becomes sensation in that it
is recollected, internalized within the being-for-self of the soul"
(§401). Internal sensations, on the other hand, are not the result of
the causal influence of a physical object on a sensory organ; they
arise instead through the agency of spirit acting on itself, embodying some higher mental state, for example, a thought, in order that
it may be sensed: "Another [sphere of sentience] distinguishes itself
as the determinatenesses which have originated in and pertain to
spirit, and which are embodied in order to be as if they had been
found, or sensed" (§401).
Hegel leaves it unclear whether internal sensation is something
that uses its own particular organ of sense.8 The examples he gives
lead one to believe that the actual sensing of an internal sensation is
accomplished by the organs of external sensation, for he gives the
feelings of anger and courage sensed in the breast and blood, the
flushing of the face in shame, the trembling and pallor of fear, and
the sensation of meditation in the head as examples, and these can
be considered to be sensibles proper to touch. They might, however, be considered sensibles proper to proprioception, the status of
8. Hegel does say this: "It is not to be denied however, that in accordance with
the variety of their content, the inner sensations have at the same time a particular
organ within which their primary and predominant embodiment takes place" (§401,
Zusatz), but this does not answer the question of how we sense such things.
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which is a bit muddy. Proprioception is not one of the standard five
senses, and it is peculiar in that one proprioceives only one's own
body, never an external object. Nonetheless, by inner sense Hegel
clearly does not mean proprioception, for he does not recognize
proprioception as a separate sense, and proprioception does not
have the proper etiology. Proprioceptive knowledge of the disposition of our limbs or of gastric distress does not rest on inner sensations in Hegel's sense. The etiology of the sensation is the most
important difference between the inner and the outer.
But inner and outer sensation are also distinguished with respect
to their content. In the Zusatz to §401 Hegel talks more specifically
about inner sensations, placing them into two categories. First,
"there are those which concern my immediate individuality in some
particular relationship or condition." His instances of this category
are all emotions. By treating emotions as inner sensahons Hegel can
account for both their purely occurrent felt quality and the often
complex intentional structure they contain, since they are the embodiment of and therefore are involved in higher spiritual activities.
The second kind of internal sensations consists of those "which
relate to that which, in and for itself, is a universal, to right, to the
ethical, to religion, to the beautiful and the true." Yet at other places
Hegel insists that the object of sensation is always something singular: "Now since what is unmediated is a singularization, everything
sensed has the form of singularity" (§400, Zusatz). Besides the specific list of universals he gives as objects of inner sensation, however, Hegel also claims that all the content of the mental sphere—
including the objects of thought itself—exists in sensation. How is
this conflict to be resolved?
What would count as a sensation of right? It seems to me that we
would talk of such a sensation (though we might prefer the phrase
"feeling of lightness") in a situation in which we are confronted
with a certain state of affairs to which we immediately react, "But
that's wrong!" or "That's right!" Hegel's point is that in their mental
structure those reactions, insofar as they have a purely felt, noncognitive, affective aspect (that "gut feeling"), are forms of sensation.
The pure occurrent felt quality is confined to a particular agent at a
particular rime in response to a particular situation. It has the "form
of singularity." Such sensations presuppose considerable sophisticated mental activity; they need to be learned. The ability to em-
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body sophisticated contents in the simple form of sensation is extremely important. Hegel insists that the ideas of right, of justice,
and so on are only truly and completely appropriated by spirit
when they are not merely the objects of thought but have become
internalized in this way. "Principles, religion etc. must be in the
heart, they must be sensed, it is not enough that they should be only
in the head. . . . One should not have to be reminded however,
that what is religious, ethical, true, just, etc. is not justified by the
form of sensation and of the heart, and that an appeal in this context
to the heart or to sensation is either simply meaningless or downright pernicious" (§400).
Hegel explicitly states that the content of inner sensation is itself
properly handled only in the Psychology, the last stage of subjective spirit. At the early stage of the Anthropology, where he introduces the distinction, the concern is the embodiment of inner sensations. Thus the sensation of sin, qua sensation, need not be
anything more than a peculiar sensation in the pit of one's stomach
or some such. What makes it an inner sensation is its etiology, the
fact that it is the embodiment of a higher spiritual act and the
capturing of the more complex act in the immediacy of sensation. In
making the distinction between inner and outer sensation, Hegel is
concerned to account for the fact that our higher mental activities
Can acquire a purely occurrent affective aspect. The occurrent inner
sensation has a content solely in virtue of its causal connection with
other states of the organism. One must take this functionalist trend
in Hegel's thought seriously.

i

Mediate and Immediate Objects of Sense
Let us now return to the problem of the object of sensation. The
point here is that such things as flashes of light, earthquakes, and
one's beloved are mediate objects of sensation; states of the sensory
organs are the immediate objects of sensation. The mediate object is
the thing that explains why the sense organ is in the sensation state
it is in. In the case of external sensation, this is the object at the other
end of the causal chain that accounts for that state of the sensory
organs are the immediate objects of sensation. The mediate object is
sioning object, the concept of right or justice. In this context Hegel
places sensation in the middle of a syllogism involving the thing
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and the organism:9 "Touch, for example, is the mediation between
me and the other, for although it is distinct from both sides of the
opposition, it at the same time unites them" (§399, Zusatz).
In sensation the animal stands in immediate relation to itself, in
particular to the body. The relation of the body to the external object
determines the properties of the body or sense organ, and this
property of the sense organ exists as ideal in the soul, and as such it is
the sensation.10 As I have tried to explain Hegel's position, the
animal itself is to be more or less identified with the total state of the
organism. When the external object acts on the sense organ, the
sense organ's change of state is reflected in the change of the total
state, although not in any neat way. The state of the sense organ, by
contributing in this complex way to the total state of the organism,
is a "moment" within it and in this sense exists as ideal in the
animal. This moment is the sensation.
To be able to assign a sensation the proper mediate determinate
object—indeed any mediate object—a complex diagnostic task
must be performed, a task beyond the ability of the sensitive soul as
such. Such diagnosis requires conceptual abilities that go well beyond sensibility. Thus the soul as such makes no such assignation.
An external object as such is present to spirit only at the higher
stage discussed in the Phenomenology.
We have now explained the sense in which the external thing is
the object of sensation and the sense in which the animal senses
itself in sensation. But what of the proper sensible? Where do the
sensible qualities such as color, texture, or tone fit in? In a discussion in the Encyclopedia that occurs in expanded form in the discussion of Aristotle's theory of sensation in the Lectures on the History of
Philosophy, Hegel says that when he senses red or hardness his
sensation is itself red or hard.11 And he says, "Heat, warmth, etc.
9. Hegel was familiar with the Aristotelian logic in which terms, not propositions, are the basic elements. He thought of a syllogism as a mediated relation
between terms. This is discussed in much detail in Chapter 12.
10. In this Hegel was probably influenced by Spinoza's view that the ideatum of
the lowest-order ideas of the mind is the body of which the mind is the idea. Spinoza
says accordingly that the human mind perceives the modifications of the body,
which means that the mind contains the ideas that are in the attribute of thought
those modifications the body has in the attribute of extension; see B. Spinoza, Ethics,

ed. J. Gutmann, pt. II, prop. 22..
11. G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen tiber die Geschichte der Philosophic, Bd. 2, pp. 205-
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are independent and outside, but they are just as much immediately transformed, made ideal, a determinateness of my feelings;
the content in me is the same as it is outside, only the form is
different" (§3573, Zusatz). Hegel is drawing here on the Aristotelian
account of sensation, according to which "the actuality of the sensible object and that of the sense are one and the same, though
differently definable" (De Anima, 425b26ff)12. As Aquinas says in
his commentary on this passage, "Color has two modes of being: a
material mode in the object, a spiritual mode in sensation."13
Wherever we run into a claim of shared content in different form
in Hegel it is helpful to think of the content as being determined by a
functional role in a larger system. There are, then, several ways two
things can have the same content but different form. They can have
the same content either by playing relevantly similar roles in two
different systems or by serving the same function (perhaps more or
less adequately) within a common system. Their forms differ insofar as the means by which the common role or function fulfilled
differs. Neither of these senses of "same content/different form"
seems to apply to the proper sensibles in their objective and subjective existences. Sensations of red play a role in my acquisition of
beliefs, in my directing my action, and so on, but the redness of
things themselves cannot be said to play that role, though sensations of red can play the role they do only in virtue of their connections to red things.
If having a content is playing a functional role, then many philosophers would object in principle to the idea that the proper
sensibles are contents. The sensation of red, it is claimed, cannot be
defined or explained in terms of its causal powers, for something
could be functionally equivalent to a sensation of red—that is, give
rise to the same beliefs, desires, behavior—and not be a sensation
of red. There are two ways to try to make this claim out: either the
organism (or machine) has some sensation that is functionally equivalent to a sensation of red but is not a sensation of red, or, alter12. In the first edition of the Encyclopedia we find the following remark: "Aristotle
also recognized the determination of sensation, in that while he recognized the
sentient subject and the sensed object into which it is divided by consciousness as
only the possibility of what sensing is, he said of sensation that the entekchy of the
sentiment being and what is sensed are one and the same" (PSS, vol. j, p. 121).
13. K. Foster and S. Humphries, trans., Aristotle's "De Anima" in the Version of
William ofMoerbeke and the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 362.
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natively, the thing has some state—but not a sensation at all—that
is functionally equivalent to a sensation of red.
The first formulation raises, in effect, the problem of the inverted
spectrum. I know of no discussion of this problem in Hegel, but I
think his Aristotelian theory of sensation would have led him to
deny the meaningful possibility of someone's phenomenal spectrum being the inverse of other people's. After all, it is the same
thing—red—that exists in the object and in the mind. But since
Hegel describes the sensation as ideal and as having a content, we
still might be able to preserve everything he says about sensations
while admitting the possibility of an inverted spectrum. In that case
the content of the sensation, Hegel would maintain, is unaffected,
for the sensation typically caused by red things would be a sensation of red, given that functional equivalence is maintained (where
functional equivalence includes preservation of the typical connections to emotional states, aesthetic properties, etc.) Otherwise,
Hegel would claim, we would be trapped in a subjective idealism.
I am less sure of Hegel's response to the notion of a complete, but
sensationless, imitation human. Such a notion is surely not a live
option for him. If such an imitation is supposed to do everything we
do but sense, that is, imagine, understand, and reason, Hegel
would declare it an impossibility, for sensation is a necessary condition of these higher activities. Hegel would also deny the possibility
of a complete behavioral imitation devoid of internal reasoning. But
how are we to take the impossibility of sensationless imitation?
Does it mean that any rational agent ipso facto senses (so that if we
succeed in building a rational agent, it will have sensations), or that
to build an imitation of us one must not only make it reason but also
make it sense? Surely Hegel would reject the latter alternative—it
destroys the unity of spirit, chopping it into separable, autonomous
units.
Hegel seems well on the way to denying the possibility of absent
qualia and thus sustaining the notion that sensations are specified
by content, by functional role. We need, then, to worry a bit more
about what role that is exactly, so that, for example, heat as an inner
and an outer state shares one content with different forms. The
point seems to be that, while nature and spirit constitute significantly different systems on their own, our sensation states do map
some of the natural properties of things, preserving their most
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important relations, and are the sensations they are because of
these ties to their typical causes. The content is primarily determined by the abstract relations within the sensory range and the
causal links to the object, although, as we have seen, it must be
open to other influences as well.

SENSATION AS NONCOGNITIVE
There is a more radical thesis about sensation lurking here which
it is now time to flush out: that sensation is, although mental,
noncognitive. The individual qua individual is, for Hegel, unknowable—another easily recognizable Aristotelian principle. Sensation
is entirely singular and devoid of universality and can therefore be
cognitive, conceptual, at best only potentially.
One criterion of cognitivity—a necessary but not sufficient condition—is that cognitive activities be subject to standards of correctness. But when considering sensation as a pure affection of the
subject, it makes no sense to ask whether the sensing was done
correctly or whether it is true. Hegel adopts the Kantian view that
knowledge requires the organization of experience under certain
Objective constraints. Although a state may be called a sensation
only when it participates in a complex, organically structured unity
in a certain way, calling it a sensation is still treating it as a simple,
without consideration of the specific role it may play in the cognitive life of the organism. Occupying a place in a cognitive system,
sensations are no longer considered merely the passive affections of
the animal and are no longer merely sensations; they have become
what Hegel calls feelings.14
Since concepts are that which organize our experience, the unorganized material of experience must itself be nonconceptual. In a
sense Hegel believes that there is a given element in our experience—he uses the metaphor that these elements are found by the
soul within itself rather than given to it—but it is not an epistemological given, and terms of epistemological appraisal are not appli14. Hegel uses "feeling" (Gefiihl) for both the sense of touch and a later stage of
subjective spirit beyond sensation; see Chapter 5.
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cable.15 It is true that all experience has its root in the sensations
found within the individual organism and taken up by spirit. But
the sense in which spirit is rooted in sensation must be properly
understood. Sensation is the genetic, causal root of the spiritual,
but no sensory episode plays a foundational epistemological role.
That Hegel's approach to the individual's epistemological situation is so Kantian is also seen in the following passages:
The subjectivity of sensation must be sought not indeterminately in
man's positing something within himself through sensing, for he also
does this in thinking, but more precisely in his positing something not
in his free, spiritual, universal subjectivity, but in his natural, immediate, singular subjectivity. This natural subjectivity is not yet a selfdetermining one, pursuing its own laws, activating itself in a necessary manner, but a subjectivity determined from without, bound to
this space and this time, dependent upon contingent circumstances.
(§400, Zusatz)
Mere sensation . . . has to do only with the singular and contingent,
the immediately given and present, and this content appears to the
sentient soul as its own concrete actuality. In that I raise myself to the
standpoint of consciousness, in contrast, I relate to a world external to
me, to an objective totality, to an internally connected circle of manifold and complex objects standing over against me. (§402, Zusatz; my
tr.)

Furthermore, one must take seriously the idea that Hegel believes
sensation to be the immediate material of mental activity. Over
against this stands the form-giving activity of spirit. Sensation can
at best only be considered such as is ripe for the agency of spirit; it is
potentially, but not actually, cognitive. How spirit's activity on this
raw material of sensation ultimately produces true knowledge is the
story of the remainder of the philosophy of subjective spirit. This
process begins with the next stage, feeling. But, although absolute
knowledge has its roots in man's sensory encounter with the world,
15. D. W. Hamlyn's criticism that only the whole of experience can be thought of
as given according to Hegel simply does not hold up against the texts beyond the
early Phenomenology of Spirit. The whole of experience is something that spirit constructs—it is a result of the activity of spirit. See Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception.
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Hegel claims that this beginning is ultimately overcome, that true
thought, free of any sensory admixture, is ultimately achieved.
Hegel's theory does not escape some of the problems that also
ensnare his predecessors. We can capture several of these problems
in our net by pointing out the slide that tempted so many philosophers: a sensation of pain is o/pain because it is a pain; the pain has
its proper existence in the mind. A sensation of blue is similarly
treated; it can be of blue because it is an actual case of blue in the
mind. But patches of color usually have an outline and shape. If
there is an actual case of blue in the mind, we then ask, is there also
an actual case of shape, say, triangularity? Here, of course, the
philosopher balks. The mind is traditionally treated as nonextended, shapes are certainly modes of extension, and therefore
there can be no shapes in the mind.
Are problems also generated for Hegel's system by this line of
reasoning? There is one immediate difference to be noticed. In
contrast to his predecessors, Hegel believes that shape is a proper
sensible, a proper sensible of touch: "Three dimensional shape also
falls to the lot of feeling, for feeling alone is concerned with general
mechanical determinateness" (§401, Zusatz). We can thus state the
problem in a very straightforward way. Hegel claims that, when he
sees something red, his sensation is itself red. Would he also agree
that when he touches something triangular, his sensation is triangular? This question is made still more complex by the fact that in
the system it is not until we reach the more sophisticated level of
intuition that space and time are explicitly introduced and constructed. Hegel has not really thought out the way spatiality enters
into our perceptual experience. Some remarks in the Encyclopedia
imply that our visual field is two-dimensional and that we infer the
third dimension. But then it would seem that we have separate
access to at least two-dimensional shapes through a sense other
than touch. Can it be possible for sensations to have dimensions
like this and yet not be spatial? A similar kind of problem is caused
by the universal objects of inner sensation. If in sensing red my
sensation is itself red, in sensing right or wrong is my sensation
itself right or wrong?
Our earlier analysis of the content of sensations, however, shows
that Hegel need not be smothered by these problems. If a sensation
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has a certain content in virtue of occupying a position in a (mental)
quality-space isomorphic in the essential respects to the qualityspace applicable to the object by which it is typically caused, then
some mental analogue of space suffices for us to be able to sense
shapes. Inner sensations are still a problem, but if we remember
that Hegel is after the "gut feeling" in such sensations, and that
justice and right are the mediate objects of the sensation and not the
proper sensibles, the problem evaporates.
Perhaps the major source of disquiet in Hegel's treatment of
sensation is the fact that he seemingly denies that sensations are
cognitive while still attributing them content. The notion of a contentful state seems already to invoke cognitive notions. We have
seen in what sense sensations have a content: preserving within the
mind a quality-space equally applicable to the outer objects causally
responsible for the sensations. The sense in which higher cognitive
states have a content is different, though not unrelated. The intentionality of sense is not the full intentionality of the higher cognitive
processes.

Feeling

In sensation mind is passive, receptive, unorganized, aimed at
the individual, dispersed in a manifold. Its content is merely found
within itself, not freely created by it. Feeling is the first step toward
the free, creative, thinking mind, but it is only the first step, the
introduction of the barest unity into the manifold of sensation. We
have several more levels to move through before we reach normal
perception.
The distinction between sensation and feeling is never given an
extremely clear formulation and is not to be found in Hegel's work
before the third edition of the Encyclopedia. I believe that this distinction was one that Hegel was led to in his later years in order to
preserve the pure immediacy, singularity, and lack of universality
of sensations themselves. In the earlier version of the Philosophy of
Subjective Spirit Hegel talks of sensation more loosely, allowing the
concept to stray from its defining relation to singularity. I argue
here that the distinction between a sensation and a feeling is simply
that a feeling is a sensation that has a place in a very low-level, basic,
organized system of sensations.1
The fuzziness of his early concept of sensation led Hegel to see
that he needed an intermediate stage at which sensations could
i. This might seem to conflict with the position I have taken on the nature of
sensation's content, for attributing content to a sensation presupposes its participation in a system sufficiently organized to map a quality-space. In feeling, however,
the relevant system must be of much greater scope than simply a mapped qualityspace; it is the total system of all the animal's sensations.

72

Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity

acquire some of the characteristics of the universal. This could be
accomplished if they were to occupy a place in a system and thereby
acquire a functional role within that system, because then the particular sensation loses importance in contrast to the role it plays—
and roles are universals and can be taken by many different role
players. Feeling, however, is still not explicitly cognitive, and the
sensations are not organized yet through the conceptual categories
that we meet in the Phenomenology:
The sensing of the universal seems to involve a contradiction, for as we
know, sensation as such has as its content only that which is single.
What we call the feeling soul does not involve this contradiction however, for it is neither confined to the immediate sensuousness of sensation
and dependent upon the immediate sensuousness of what is present, nor
does it relate itself to the wholly universal being which can be grasped
only through the mediation of pure thought. It has, on the contrary, a
content which has not yet developed into the separation of the universal and the singular, the subjective and the objective. . . . This content
still relates itself to the feeling soul as accidents do to substance; the
soul still appears as the subject and central point of all determinations
of content, as the power which dominates the world of feeling in an
immediate manner. (§402, Zusatz)

THE ROLE OF FEELING
Feeling is still clearly an animal function; it is not confined to
humans. As the mention of sense and feeling in the Philosophy of
Nature (§356ff.) makes clear, the functions of these powers of the
animal soul are directed toward enabling the animal organism to
maintain itself within, but also over against, its environment.
The medievals noticed that on the basis of mere sensation the
animal cannot be expected to succeed in its efforts to preserve itself,
and that we cannot explain animal behavior solely by reference to
the pure data of sense. As Aquinas says, "The sheep runs away
when it sees a wolf, not because of its color or shape, but as a natural
enemy" (Summa Theologica, q. 78, art. 4). There must be some synthetic activity of the animal beyond even that of the common sense
to account for the animal's behavior. Yet the medievals could not go
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so far as to attribute intellect to animals. They solved the puzzle by
postulating an estimative power, which apprehended nonsensible
properties of things. To explain similar unthinking behavior patterns in man, Aquinas postulates the same power, but calls it instead the cogitative power. This was also called particular reason, "for
it compares individual intentions [objects of mind], just as the
intellectual reason compares universal intentions." Gardeil says of
this ratio particularis that, "in general, its function consists in being a
sort of mediating faculty between sense on the one hand, which
grasps the material singular, and intellect on the other hand, which
is the faculty of the abstracted essence. Thus, it serves to prepare
the immediate phantasms for the consideration of the intellect."2
This vis aestimativa is grouped by Aquinas with common sense,
imagination, fantasy, and memory as an internal sense.
The feeling soul plays a role in Hegel's theory of mind similar to
that played by the estimative power in Aquinas's theory. The feeling soul is a nonintellectual, immediate synthesis of the sensory
material. Unlike Aquinas, Hegel takes imagination and memory to
be powers of the intellect and treats them in the Psychology. Yet,
although he deals with these powers or activities of the mind explicitly as operations of the intellect, it is clear that Hegel uses the
capacities of the feeling soul to account for some things we might
normally attribute to imagination or memory. In Feeling, Hegel
considers those powers of the soul which, to use Aquinas's phrase,
are "a preamble to the intellect."
Hegel's concept of feeling is one of the earliest modern attempts
we can find to work out a theory of our preconscious mental activity. But there is a constant danger in reading Hegel's texts and
thinking about his examples, for there is no purely preconscious
human behavior that has not been transformed by our consciousness and our thought. Hegel devotes much attention to pathological and abnormal phenomena in the Anthropology, where feeling
is discussed. This is certainly not because feeling is itself something
pathological or abnormal, but because it is in such cases that the
otherwise buried preconscious activities produce a noticeable ef2. H. P. Gardeil, Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 3: Psychology* PP- 75-76-
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feet. Inferring the existence and nature of unconscious psychological activities from the data of pathology is today a standard practice.
But when we read his discussion of a pathological phenomenon
with which he wants to illustrate some aspect of feeling and in turn
to explain the phenomenon with that concept, we must be careful
not to think that the person involved is operating solely at the level
of feeling. Perhaps there are some morons who, Hegel would say,
have not progressed beyond the animal stage of feeling, but normally humans are well beyond that stage, and the phenomena
peculiar to feeling make their appearance only in abnormal circumstances—in cases where, due to a breakdown in these lower, preconscious functions of mind, the higher, truer being of the spiritual
is not achieved. It is sometimes hard to know which aspects of the
case belong to feeling.
For observation the concrete nature of spirit carries with it the peculiar
difficulty that the particular stages and determinations of the development of its concept do not remain behind as particular existences over
against its deeper forms. . . . The determinations and stages of spirit,
in contrast, remain essentially as only moments, states, or determinations at the higher stages of development. It thereby happens that the
higher shows itself empirically present in a lower, more abstract determination. (§380, my tr.)

Although it [the feeling soul] is therefore entirely formal, it is of
particular interest insofar as it has being as form, and so appears as a
state (§380) into which the development of the soul may relapse after
having advanced to the determination of consciousness and understanding. (§404)

FEELING AND THE SELF
The notion of the self enters Hegel's discussions of feeling in two
different ways. First, he claims that the notion of a self is intimately
bound up with the notion of the feeling soul: "Sensation involves
sensitivity, and there is reason for maintaining therefore, that while
sensation puts more emphasis upon the passive aspect of feeling,

Feeling

75

upon finding, i.e., upon the immediacy of feeling's determinateness, feeling refers more to the self-hood involved here" (§402).
That the concept of the self is emphasized in feeling as opposed to
sensation is quite clear, given my interpretation of feeling. Sensations considered as such exhibit no organization; organization first
appears in feeling. But until some at least rudimentary organization
appears among the sensations, there is no sense in talking of a self.
Sensations, furthermore, do not simply fall into organized patterns;
they have to be organized into them. Spirit, in this case as soul, is
the organizer.
Feeling is therefore the other side, the active side, of sensation
and is as much animal as human, for the animal soul must also
bring the sensations into a unitary self to be said to have sensation
at all. Nonetheless, there are considerable differences between the
nature of the connectedness an animal can give its sensations and
that given by humans to their sensations, both because humans can
do more than feel and because, due to their higher capacities that
need to be embodied in feeling, they have feelings of which animals
are not capable. Feeling is the preconscious organization of sensation, a "blind but indispensible function of the soul," which is the
presupposition, but not the actuality, of having a concept of the
subjective and the objective, and a presupposition of having the
concept of self.
In the later stages of the dialectic in the Phenomenology and
Intuition there are categorial requirements on the way sensation is
organized, but this is not the case here. There are, however, some
pragmatic requirements on the organization—namely, that it by
and large suffice to enable the animal to manuever successfully in
its environment. But this does not require the animal to organize its
sensations through concepts. Only certain success-promoting patterns of response to the environment are called for. In feeling, the
soul does not construct a spatio temporally extended, law-governed, physical world of experience over against itself on the basis
of the material provided by sensation—such a construction would
involve making use of those categories, universal rules of construction, which characterize the higher stages of consciousness
and intuition.

Although we can, from the third-person perspective, already
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start applying the notion of a self to the feeling soul, without the
feeling soul's having any such concept itself, Hegel does attribute a
minimal, nonobjective awareness of self to the feeling soul, which
he calls self-feeling [Selbstgefuhl]:3
As individuality, the feeling totality is essentially an internal division
of itself and an awakening to the Urtheil [the judgment, the basic
division] within itself in accordance with which it has particular feelings and as a subject stands in relation to these its determinations. The
subject as such posits these within itself as its feelings. It is sunken
into the particularity of these sensations, and at the same time it unites
with itself therein as a subjective unity through the ideality of the
particular. In this way it is self-feeling—and it is at the same time only
in the particular feeling. (§407, my tr.)

Self-feeling is a problematic concept, for how can a being have a
concept of self without having the concept of the non-self, and in
particular the concept of an external world, which we know the
feeling soul does not have? But this question itself is misleading in
that it presupposes that in self-feeling we are concerned with a
concept of self. Such, I want to argue, is not the case.» '
i
The only contrast available to the feeling soul on the basis of
which it could have something that deserves to be called a feeling of
self is that between its own contents and itself, the possessor of
those contents. The feeling soul cannot assign some contents to
itself and some to something else, for that would be equivalent to
positing an external world, so self-feeling is not a matter of classifying feelings into two different kinds, feelings of self and feelings of
not-self. But the contrast between itself and its contents is not a
contrast that exhibits itself in the sensations or feelings themselves.
Since all feelings are its own, in every feeling the soul is feeling
itself, is self-feeling.
The soul is not a totally passive receptor, however; as we have
seen, its own state is a significant factor in its sensibility, and quite
naturally the forms of organization present in the feeling soul are
significant determinants of the higher-level organization of its sen/ 3. Petry translates this, incorrectly I think, as "self-awareness." The connotations
of this translation are too cognitive, for in self-feeling we are certainly not aware of a
self as a self.

Feeling

77

sible states. Self-feeling is present in every feeling, because the
organization of the whole, already present in the feeling soul, is a
determinant of each feeling: "We have before us here feeling subjectivity; it realizes itself, is active, emerges from simple unity as
liveliness. This activity belongs to the determination of liveliness; it
awakens the opposition in itself, but it sublates and preserves it
thereby, giving itself self-feeling, giving itself determinate being"
(PSS, vol. 2, p. 325; my tr.).4 The soul feels itself in every feeling
insofar as the content of the particular feeling, determined as it is in
part by the total organization in which it participates, implies that
total organization, the self.
Hegel applies the notion of self-feeling to the explanation of
mental illness. Mental illness, he says, is the pathological dominance of this lower level of spirit. Hegel's reasoning is something
like this. The sane subject is the one who has a solid understanding
of its world and its place in it; it lives in a well-ordered world. Any
subject has certainly progressed far enough that it possesses the
categorial structure necessary to having a concept of self, but in
derangement it puts its self-feeling in its place. This means that,
rather than constructing an objective world in accordance with the
categories of the understanding, it takes the immediate unity found
in its feelings to be objective itself, removing its thinking from the
constraints of the objective world.
As healthy and self-possessed the subject has the present consciousness of the ordered totality of its individual world and it subsumes into
that system each particular content of sensation, representation, desire, inclination that occurs and it classifies them in the proper place.

Caught in a particular determinateness, however, it does not assign
such a content the proper place and rank that belongs to it in the
individual world system that is a subject. In this way the subject finds
itself in contradiction to the totality systematized in its consciousness
and to the particular determinateness that neither flows with nor is
classified or ranked within that totality—derangement. (§408, my tr.)
4. This passage is given in Petry's text as a Zusatz to §407, but it is not one of the
Zusatze supplied in the original posthumous edition by Boumann. No other edition
of the Encyclopedia gives a Zusatz for §407. This passage comes from Griesheim's
notes. Parallel passages in other manuscripts authenticate it. See Petry's apparatus,
PSS, vol. 2, p. 325.
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Yet, if derangement were a matter of inconsistency in one's beliefs,
there would seem to be no difference between error and insanity:
I can, of course, be mistaken about myself as well as about the external
world. People of no understanding have empty, subjective representations, unfulfillable wishes that they nonetheless hope to realize in
the future. They restrict themselves to totally singular goals and interests, hold fast to one-sided principles, come into conflict with actuality. But neither this narrowmindedness nor this error are yet deranged
as long as the benighted still know that their subjective representation
does not yet exist objectively. Error and folly become derangement
only when someone takes his merely subjective representation to be
objectively present and holds to it in the face of the objective reality
that contradicts it. (§408, Zusatz, my tr.)

There is no clear line between stubborn error and derangement,
and we cannot, in the very nature of things, confront anyone with
the independent, objective truth. Self-feeling has the upper hand
when it is untempered by the complex principles of the understanding and tries to maintain its simple organization in the face of a
world incoherent with it. "Consequently, when someone speaks in
a deranged manner, one should always begin by reminding him of
his overall situation, his concrete actuality. If, when he is brought to
consider and to be aware of this objective context, he still fails to
relinquish his false presentation, there can be no doubt that he is in
a state of derangement" (§408, Zusatz).

THE SOUL'S RELATION TO REALITY
The most puzzling aspect of the soul as Hegel describes it in the
Anthropology is its ontological status and its relation to the rest of
reality. Early in the Anthropology, "soul" is treated almost like a
mass term—soul does not come in packaged units but is the "ideality" of nature in general. In the progress of the Anthropology the
soul is supposed to crystallize, as it were, into separate individualities. Yet even in the relatively late stages of feeling and habit this
individualization is not absolute; the boundaries between otherwise distinct persons can still be violated, for example, by two
different persons sharing the same sensation. "The soul is truly
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immaterial, even in its concreteness, and proof that it is capable of
this substantial identity with another is to be found in the somnambulent [hypnotized] individual's sensing within itself the tastes and
smells present within the individual to whom it is thus related. . . .
In this substantial identity, consciousness has only one subjectivity" (§406). Similarly, Hegel talks of the feeling soul having an
immediate access to the whole world, so that one can have direct
feelings (one is tempted to say "intuitions," but not as Hegel uses
that term) of spatially distant objects and events without, apparently, any objective, causal chain mediating between the event and
the feeling: "With regard, firstly, to what is spatially distant from
us, insofar as we are conscious and awake, we can only know
something of it on condition that we sublate the distance in a mediate
manner. The envisioning soul is not bound by this condition however. Space is of external nature, not of the soul, and in that it is
apprehended by the soul this externality ceases to be spatial, for it is
no longer external either to itself or us once the ideality of the soul
has transformed it" (§406, Zusatz).
Hegel wants a peculiar double status for the soul. He wants it to
be individuated by persons and their bodies for some purposes, so
that, for example, it makes sense to speak of states of the soul
(sensations, feelings, etc.) as having an owner, being someone's
states. For other purposes, for example, explaining the phenomena
of national character or clairvoyance and hypnotism, he wants soul
to be something shareable across persons, the "ideality" of a much
larger piece of the world than just a single body.5
Hegel cannot have it both ways. When he treats the soul as a
supraindividual reality, he seems to have to treat its states, in
5. Hegel not only deals with derangement in his discussion of feeling but also
discusses hypnosis, clairvoyance, and other psychic phenomena. At the turn of the
nineteenth century, before the rise of modern psychology, before modern biology, a
theory with no room for such phenomena was in trouble. "Confirmation of the
factual aspect could appear to be the primary need. For those from whom it might be
required it would be superfluous however, since they simplify their consideration of
the matter by dismissing accounts of it as delusion and imposture, infinitely numerous though they are, and accredited by the education, character, etc. of the
witnesses. They are so set in their apriori understanding, that it is not only immune
to all evidence, but they have even denied what they have seen with their own
eyes. . . . Comprehension of it is impossible insofar as one presupposes personalities independent of one another and of the content as an objective world, and
assumes spatial and material extrinsicality to be generally absolute" (§406).
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particular sensations and feelings, as quite independent entities in
their own right; the boundaries of the soul are wide because souls
are simply conglomerations of sensations. Thus two people can
share the same sensation; sensations are Humean, the soul is a
bundle of such states, and, since the grouping principle is not
spatial, the same sensation can be in two different bundles. But a
bundle theory of the soul comports ill with the alleged singularity
and unity of the soul and clearly violates the progression of the
Anthropology from soul as a general existent standing over against
nature as a whole to something singularized in individual souls and
individual sensations.
Hegel tries to combine the generality and the individuality of the
soul by describing it as a monad, an individual that nonetheless
contains a complete world. Leibnizian monads are active and generate the whole world in representation from within themselves.
Similarly, the soul is (though admittedly only potentially) the locus
of the whole world, a "featureless mine" out of which the entire
world can be generated or brought to light.
The filling of the soul has yet another aspect however, for apart from
this material [sensation], as an actual individuality we are also implicitly a world of concrete content with an infinite periphery, and have
within us a numberless multitude of relations and connections, which
even if it does not enter into our sensation and presentation is always
within us, and still belongs to the concrete content of the human soul
regardless of the extent to which these relations are able to change
constantly even without our knowing of it. On account of its infinite
wealth of content, the human soul may be said to be the soul of a
world, the individually determined world-soul. Since the human soul is
a singularity, determined in all its aspects and therefore limited, it also
relates itself to a universe determined in accordance with its individual
standpoint. That by which the soul is confronted is by no means a
being external to it, for the totality of relationships within which the
individual human soul finds itself is rather the actual life and subjectivity of this universe. (§402, Zusatz)
N

In another place Hegel says, 'The concrete being of an individual
involves the entirety of its basic interests, of the essential and
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particular empirical relationships in which he stands to other people and the world at large" (§406).
This comparison of the soul to a monad limps badly, for a monad
is a complete world in representation only. But the notion of representation does not have clear application in the realm of soul, for the
soul is supposed to be pre-representational. The fact that Hegel
attributes content to feelings inevitably forces us toward interpreting them as representational states. Yet the categorial (and syntactic) structures necessary for being truly representational are lacking.
There is a weaker sense of representation according to which anything registering a feature of the world in some law-governed fashion can be said to represent that feature—this is the sense in which
sensations represent the properties of physical objects. But feelings
are supposed to be more complex than sensations, without achieving the status of representations in the full sense.
What Hegel could be getting at is puzzling, but the interpretation
I have been developing casts some interesting light. Hegel seems to
be denying that the state of one's body is the sole important factor in
determining the state of the soul. We earlier described sensations as
being, in the first place, the being-for-mind of states of the sensory
organs. But here, in feeling, where such states begin to acquire a
meaning in virtue of their participation in an organized system, we
find that the scope of the factors relevant to that organization goes
far beyond the immediate state of the sensory organs. The soul, as a
totality, includes as part of its "filling" everything relevant to it.
One way to uncover what Hegel might be driving at here is to
return to our suggestion that the spiritual supervenes upon the
material. The point has been made several times by those investigating the supervenience relation that mental facts, if supervenient upon the physical, must supervene upon very large sets of
physical facts; not even an exhaustive set of physical facts about one
person's body would suffice to determine that person's mental
states.6 Hegel may be making a similar point here. What he calls the
6. See Burge, "Individualism and the Mental"; idem., "Other Bodies"; Garfield,
"Prepositional Attitudes and the Ontology of the Mental." But notice that the
arguments given in this literature all explicitly concern intentional, representational
mental states. It remains an open question whether the individuation of sensations
or feelings is individualistic.
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concrete being of a soul involves virtually the entire world and in
such a way that it need not enter into sensation or representation.
The soul is to be thought of as the ideality of this broad-ranging
"world" of facts, and I think we can take this to mean that the soul
supervenes upon this whole "world." In the interpretation of someone's feelings, which involves the specification of their role in the
unconscious organizational pattern of the soul, it is this world that
forms the appropriate background for the interpretation. In hypnosis and clairvoyance, sensations and feelings occur which Hegel
believes can only be appropriately interpreted as being the immediate appearance to the mind of some event or object to which there
can be no normal, causally mediated perceptual access. Should a
woman have a sudden image of her husband dying and experience
a feeling of loss, when at that moment her husband is in fact dying
in an army hospital on a distant continent, Hegel might be perfectly
willing to countenance the possibility of some fairly mundane explanation of the image and feeling—that it was occasioned perhaps
by a piece of spoiled mustard taken at dinner. But he would object
to an insistence that this must be all there is to the occurrence, for
such an insistence humbles the soul to a mere upshot of the cor- )
poreal. One's bodily states are causally coherent, but the states of
one's soul are not subject to that same requirement, for, as nonspatial and immaterial, they lack the proper ontological presuppositions for causal interaction. The net of events relevant to the interpretation of a spiritual event is wider than the immediate causal
substratum.
Another way to put this is that what counts as a coherent explanatory account of our feelings is not logically required to coincide with
the causal account of our sensory states. Our feelings are explained
by an interpretation against the background of our "concrete being," the entirety of our basic interests and so forth. In our example,
we are not logically required to insist that what the woman felt was
a bit of spoiled mustard, and to do so is to misunderstand the
relative priorities of spirt and matter. In the long run, it may well be
more enlightening to regard the occurrence as a case of immediate
spiritual contact between loved ones. The spoiled mustard would,
as it were, sink to an enabling condition.
Hegel seems to be assuming that we are implicitly representing
the entire supervenience base, and this is a mistake. The superve-
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nience base determines the character of our representation, no
doubt, but we cannot infer that we are therefore constantly, though
only implicitly, representing the entire base in such a way as to be
able to call up distant portions of it directly on occasion. Hegel
appears to be taking the relation between nature and spirit, which I
have classified as a supervenience relation, to be the relation of
expression. Jusfas the Leibnizian monad expresses the world from a
certain point of view, the Hegelian soul expresses the world from a
point of view. My feelings are the expression of my entire concrete
actuality, my world. And indeed, the correct description of numerous feelings depends on my broader situation—on, for example, the difference between pride and false "pride or anger and
righteous indignation. But it seems illegitimate to move from the
fact that my mental states, at whatever level of description, have a
broad supervenience base that extends far beyond my own body to
the idea that spatial determinations have no true reality for souls or

persons, that souls are expressions of the whole world from a point
of view. "Expression" itself also has a weak and a strong sense. In
the weak sense, expression is just reliable indication; in the strong
sense it involves full representation. Feelings can express the world
at most in the weak sense—yet Hegel decries their unreliability.
A written text constitutes an expressive being, and what it expresses—its meaning—supervenes on the physical text. But it does
not (apart from questionable cases of self-reference) express the
written text it supervenes on. The expression and supervenience
relations rarely, if ever, coincide.
As complex as the metaphysical issues are in Hegel's account of
hypnosis, clairvoyance, and the feeling soul, the epistemological
issues are treated straightforwardly. Knowledge strictu sensu involves rule-governed construction of the^fact or object known
within the mind. But so-called immediate knowledge can access its
internal world without recourse to the stepwise construction of
consciousness. The soul can be the "soul of a world" without
external limit because the constraints of space and time, which are
exact, determinate, and give the rule to the understanding, are not
operative here. This immediate access to the whole of the world is
unreliable and not objective, and it is cognitive at all only when the
content dredged up is subjected to categorial construction to some
minimal degree. "Visionary knowledge," as Hegel sometimes calls
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it, is really a misnomer—it would be better described as a "visionary cognitive state" because it is not knowledge at all.
THE LIBERATION OF THE SOUL
The material and the spiritual are not divorced from one another—although they are certainly not strictly identical, they are
unified. But the merely formal organization of spiritual material
which constitutes the form of feeling must express itself in the
body, for otherwise the bodily states of the individual would diverge increasingly from the self-determination of spirit. If spirit is
not divorced from body, it must gain control of the body, make the
body its means of expression. This organization of the body, if it is
to embody the spiritual unity of the determinations of the soul,
must be an organization of the body over and above that merely
organic organization already present. This form of organization is
habit. Notice that habit is purely formal; virtually any content can be
embodied in habit. "The form of habit, like any other, is certainly
open to complete contingency of content. . . . At the same time
however, habit is what is most essential to the existence of all
spirituality within the individual subject. It enables the subject to be
a concrete immediacy, an ideality of soul, so that the religious or
moral etc. content belongs to him as this self, this soul, and is in him
neither merely implicitly as an endowment, nor as a transient sensation or presentation, nor as an abstract inwardness cut off from
action and actuality, but as a part of his being" (§410).
Hegel says several times that grasping the determination of habit
is very difficult, and he seems to have considered the emphasis he
places on habit and the role he gives it to be a fairly novel and
important contribution to our knowledge of the mental. We can
question the novelty of such an emphasis in the light of the importance-of custom in Hume and his followers, but not its importance.
The essential determination of habit, Hegel says, is that it is our
liberation from sensation and feeling. It is this we must now seek to
understand.
The life of feeling and sensation is that of a soul totally sunken in
its sensations and feelings—it has no "distance" from them, but it is
overwhelmed by them and indeed is at best a merely formal point of
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unity within them. When the soul acquires habits, however, sensation and feeling lose their commanding grip on the soul; they no
longer dominate it. "It is free of these determinations insofar as it is
neither interested in nor occupied with them" (§410). This aspect of
habit is called inurement when considered as a theoretical attitude;
in its subjective practical aspect it is indifference to satisfaction, and
as objectively practical the soul is liberated from the particularities
of its existence by acquiring skill. "In habit the soul makes an
abstract universal being of itself and reduces what is particular in
feelings and consciousness to a mere determination of its being"
(§4io).
Up to this stage the soul has been a self only formally, which
means not in complete actuality. At its simplest level, soul is a
panoply of singular determinations; these are then connected with
one another and even come to wear their connectedness on their
sleeves, although only abstractly, in self-feeling. But when in habit
the soul makes itself an abstract universal, it must free itself from
the immersion into its particular feelings and sensations which
characterizes even the level of self-feeling. It does so in taking the
patterns of unification in feeling and making them natural, immediacies presupposed by and within which spirit realizes itself. Habit
makes the feeling organization of the determinations of soul into a
second nature. Thus this whole level of organization is now related
to the further progress of spirit as sensation and feeling are to
organic being. In habit the particular sensation or feeling is unimportant, as the particular pieces of matter are unimportant to the
body. And the soul, in having habits, relates itself not to a singular
determination of itself but to a universal and persistent determination of itself. Since the ego is the universal itself (according to
Hegel), it relates itself to itself more adequately in habit.7 "Nevertheless, the universal to which the soul relates itself in habit
differs from the self-determining concrete universal present in pure
thinking, in that it is only the abstract universality brought forth
through reflection from the repetition of numerous singularities"
(§410, Zusatz).
Because in habit its immediate determinatenesses are reduced to
unimportance, the soul, as their abstract universality, is now left
7. Hegel's conception of the ego or self is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 6.
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free of them. By no longer being exhausted in its particular states,
by acquiring interesting higher-order and longer-term properties,
the soul gains independence, a character of its own, an identity.
Thus through habit soul also gains dominance over its corporeality
and comes to control its body, which is now "something unresistingly pervaded by the soul, something subjected to the liberating power of the soul's ideality. It is therefore through this separation of the soul from its corporeity and the sublation of this
separation, that this inwardness of soul and externality of corporeity
emerge as a mediated unity" (§411, Zusatz). In this, the soul as
actual, the body is the sign and the expression of the soul. In
acquiring habits the soul has learned to withstand certain pains, to
forgo or ignore certain pleasures, to go beyond the immediate
material of sensation. By acquiring set patterns of simple behaviors,
it is ready to make the leap into larger and larger compounded
patterns that mark a significant increase in complexity and sophistication. The patterns of habitual action form the presupposition for
the rule-governed forms of behavior of later stages. The behaviorists were not totally off the mark; they just mistook one of the lowest
levels of mental organization for the totality of mind.
Actual soul is both the conclusion of the Anthropology and the
germ of the Phenomenology, for the self now sets itself as ari
abstract universality over against its particular determinations, and
"soul which posits its being over against itself, having sublated and
determined it as its own, has lost the significance of being soul"
(§412). This abstract universality is the I, the ego.

Phenomenology:
The I Emerges

, The Phenomenology of Spirit poses a major problem for Hegel
scholarship. Hegel composed a book entitled the Phenomenology of
Spirit in 1806 while at Jena.1 This volume was to provide an introduction to Hegel's system, showing the reader how natural consciousness (and therefore the reader's own as well) achieves the
standpoint of absolute knowledge, the standpoint of the system.
Ten years later the Phenomenology of Spirit appears embedded
within the Encyclopedia system, surrounded by the Anthropology
and the Psychology. Indeed/it is clear that very soon after the
earlier book had been published Hegel began treating the Phenomenology as preliminary to the Psychology, rather than prefatory to
the Logic. By 1812 the Anthropology had made its appearance as
the predecessor to the Phenomenology.2
The two Phenomenologies do not correspond exactly in content
either. In the early Phenomenology the major divisions include
Consciousness, Self-consciousness, Reason, and Spirit. The version
1. This volume's original title, changed in proof, was Science of the Experience of
Consciousness.
2. There is an extensive debate over the relation of the Phenomenology to the
Logic and the rest of the system; see Hans Friedrich Fulda, Das Problem einer Einleitung in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik; and Otto Poggeler, Hegels Idee einer Phanomenologie des Geistes, for some of the principal contributions to that debate. Unfortunately, much of this debate has taken little account of the evolution in Hegel's
thought during his Niirnberg period. At present, however, there is simply no
reliable edition of the Nurnberg materials. Until a reliable edition appears, Hegel
scholarship must acknowledge a serious handicap.
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we find in the Encyclopedia is much briefer. Spirit is no longer
included (many of the topics discussed there show up in the philosophies of objective and absolute spirit), and Reason is highly truncated as well, shrinking to a mere transition paragraph to the Psychology.
The early Phenomenology seems to start where the later, Encyclopedia version does, but it continues on, including most of the
themes and topics of the rest of the system.3 Yet we cannot say that
in writing the early Phenomenology Hegel simply forgot to stop
and added on the rest of the system, for there is good evidence that
he did not see the book that way. Furthermore, inspection of
Hegel's collateral work in 1805-6 indicates that what is presented in
the early Phenomenology does not coincide with his explicit attempts at the time to elaborate his system.
It seems reasonable to suppose that Hegel did indeed continue
beyond what started as the "Science of the Experience of Consciousness" to write something larger and slightly different, but not
that he simply annexed a chunk of his system to his original manuscript; the Phenomenology is far too organically unified to be such
an amalgam. I believe, rather, although I lack the space to argue it
here, that the core of the Phenomenology in both versions is the
analysis of the concept of an independent object of experience. The
Phenomenology is about the subject-object relation; it is an analysis
of what must be the case if that relation is to be truthful.
Hegel's analysis is essentially complete by the end of the sections
on Self'consciousness. The early Phenomenology then goes on to
interpret an astonishingly wide range of phenomena in terms of
the basic structures identified in the early chapters. In the Encyclopedia the conceptual structures outlined in the Phenomenology are
not abandoned, but neither are they the explicit model for the
interpretation of all higher phenomena. The early Phenomenology
is intended to show that the structures constitutive of consciousness (the subject-object relation) are revealingly applicable to all
forms of human life—that a form of life (or social institution, etc.)
3. Even their beginnings are not perfectly congruent, for Hegel admits in the
Encyclopedia version that it was a mistake to include specifically spatiotemporal
concepts like "here" and "now" in the argumentation of the chapter on sense
certainty (see §418).
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is also a form of consciousness and vice versa. It is to demonstrate
that neither abstract discussions of the foundations of our knowledge, such as Descartes's, nor psychological explanations, such as
Hume's, adequately portray the concrete, social reality of the subject-object relation. Thus scientific observation, morality, and religion are all treated as manifestations of knowledge, as forms of
consciousness, which means interpreting them in terms of the subject-object structure. In the Encyclopedia, on the other hand, each
phenomenon is examined on its own terms, not primarily as a form
of consciousness. There is no commitment to putting the subjectobject relation at the center of every case. In the Encyclopedia, therefore, the Phenomenology is confined to the examination of the
forms of consciousness as such.
According to Hegel, Kant's philosophy is nothing more than a
phenomenology, since it is concerned with the analysis of the subject-object relation (§415). Kant gives us a theory of consciousness,
according to Hegel, a theory of how an object can appear to a
subject—but Kant does not successfully push through to understanding the basis of the whole subject-object relation, to showing
us the truth of that relation, for he never goes beyond the appearance relation.
Because Hegel's phenomenology (primarily in the version of
1807) has already attracted so much commentary and critical attention, I do not rehearse its dialectic in this chapter. Because our topic
is the philosophy of mind per se, I focus instead on Hegel's conception of the subject of consciousness, the I, or, as he sometimes calls
it, the abstract ego.4

CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE I
There is considerable transcendental confusion surrounding Hegel's concept of the I. To minimize the dangers, I treat this topic, like
the topics of my opening chapters, in a linguistic mode. All the
4. As Retry remarks in the introduction to his edition of the Encyclopedia Phenomenology, there has never been a systematic comparison of the two Phenomenologies.
(Actually, there may be more Phenomenologies, since the Encyclopedia went through
three editions, and there are versions left from the Niirnberg period.) This is a study
begging to be written.
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essential points can be made for my purpose without treading
heavily on swampy, transcendental ground. Accordingly, I try to
answer two questions in this chapter:5 (a) What does the word "I"
mean, according to Hegel; in Fregean terms, what are its sense and
its reference? (b) What kind of creature can use the word "I"; that is,
what is presupposed about the utterer in any significant use of the
word?
Does "I" Refer?
Because sense supposedly determines reference, it might seem
best to start by asking what the sense of "I" is for Hegel.6 But there
is a prior issue: a common interpretation of Hegel claims that "I"
does not refer at all, that reference to individuals, or at least singular
demonstrative reference, is impossible.7 This claim is based on
passages like the following:
[When I say "I"] I do indeed mean a single T, but I can no more say
what I mean in the case of T than I can in the case of 'Now' and 'Here'.
When I say 'this Here', 'this Now', or a 'single item', I am saying all
Thises, Heres, Nows, all single items. Similarly, when I say T, this
singular T, I say in general all Ts'; everyone is what I say, everyone is
T, this singular T. (PhG, p. By, PhS, p. 62. Quotation marks added by
Miller)

A parallel passage from the much later Berlin Encyclopedia shows
that Hegel retained this view throughout his career.
Since language is the product of thought, nothing can be said in it
which is not universal. What I only mean [meine] is mine [ntein], belongs
5. Although Hegel does treat the word "I," his principal interest is in the concept
expressed by the word and what it stands for. His discussions shift without much
warning between the explicitly metalinguistic and the straightforwardly metaphysical. I follow suit and shift rather casually between the formal and the material
modes.
6. I employ the Fregean terminology of sense and reference in this work without
worrying about faithfulness to Frege's own use and without attributing any such
distinctions to Hegel. This terminology allows us to raise some important questions
about Hegel's understanding of the I.
7. Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception, pp. 140-46; Ivan Soil, An Introduction to
Hegel's Metaphysics, pp. 91-110; Gilbert Plumer, "Hegel on Singular Demonstrative
Reference," Southwestern Journal of Philosophy (1980); M. J. Inwood, Hegel, pp. 311-17.
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only to me as this particular individual; but if language expresses only
what is universal, I cannot say what I only mean. And what is unsayable, feeling, sensation, is not the most excellent, the most true, but
rather the least significant, the least true. If I say: "the individual," "this
individual," "here," "now," then these are all universalities; anything
and even/thing is an individual, a this, and, if it is sensuous, it is here
and now. Similarly when I say "I," I mean myself as this self which
excludes all others; but what I say, "I," is just everyone; I, which
excludes all others from itself. (§20, my tr.)

From our supposed inability to refer to individual objects it is
thought that Hegel infers their metaphysical unreality as well as the
impossibility of any knowledge of them.8 But in these passages
Hegel does not deny that we can refer to individual objects. His
argument is directed against a different doctrine: the belief that
indexical reference affords us a direct, preconceptual access to individuals.9 He attacks the position that "our approach to the object
must also be immediate or receptive; we must alter nothing in the
object as it presents itself. In apprehending it, we must refrain from
trying to comprehend it" (PhG, p. 79; PhS, p. 58).
Besides direct referential access, the empiricist Hegel is attacking
also attributes to indexicals an epistemological role—that of providing direct, preconceptual epistemological access to objects. Hegel
attacks this position by arguing that even indexical reference is
conceptually mediated and therefore cannot afford us preconceptual epistemological access.10
8. G. E. M. Anscombe has lately defended the position that "I" is not a referring
expression. Hegel's supposed rejection of indexical reference cannot be assimilated
to Anscombe's position, however. Anscombe wants to treat "I" as similar in use to
the "it" in "It's raining," claiming that "I" has only a use, and neither a Fregean sense
nor a reference. Hegel, in contrast, seems to say that "I" is a universal, implying that
it is a general term applying to all conscious beings—really a predicate in its depth
grammar, not a singular referring expression at all. Again, Anscombe thinks that "I"
is quite peculiar, different from other indexicals, whereas Hegel lumps them all
together. See G. E. M. Anscombe, 'The First Person," in Mind and Language, ed. S.
Guttenplan, pp. 45—66.
9. The position Hegel is attacking seems to have been most closely approximated
by Bertrand Russell. I have discussed Hegel's position on indexical reference,,,'
names, and knowledge in more detail in "Hegel on Reference and Knowledge,"
Journal of the History of Philosophy 26 (1988): 297-307.
10. Plumer misinterprets Hegel's position here because he thinks that sense certainty's "basic aspiration is the relation of [singular demonstrative] reference"; "Singular Demonstrative Reference," p. 73. But this is not right. Sense certainty's basic
aspiration is immediate, direct knowledge.
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Denying our ability to refer to individuals is unnecessary to
Hegel's goals; the arguments he presents actually assume that we
can successfully refer to individuals. He returns again and again to
the point that utterances containing "now" change truth-value over
time, that utterances containing "here" change truth-value depending on the place of utterance, and that utterances containing
"I" change truth-value depending on the utterer. These changes in
truth-value depend on the reference of the indexicals. " 'Here' is,
e.g., the tree. If I turn round, this truth has vanished and is converted into its opposite: 'No tree is here, but a house instead'"
(PhG, p. 82; PhS, p. 60).
Hegel's position on indexical reference is an attempt to assimilate
indexical reference to descriptive reference. Reference via a description is clearly mediated by the concepts (the universals) involved in
the description. Contrasting to descriptive reference is reference via
a proper name, which Hegel admits is immediate, for proper names
have no meaning:
s

Even the expression this contains no distinction; each and every something is exactly as much a this as it is an other. One means to express
something completely determinate by "this"; but it is overlooked that
language, as the work of the understanding, says only what is universal, except for the name of an individual object; the individual name,
however, is something meaningless [Sinnloses] in the sense that it does
not express a universal and appears as something simply posited,
arbitrary, for the same reason that proper names [Einzelnamen] can be
arbitrarily assumed, given, or even changed. (WdL, vol. i, pp. 104-5,
my tr.; SL, p. 117)

But if indexicals and descriptions both refer in a conceptually mediated manner, they nevertheless refer. Furthermore, indexicals, unlike names, have a meaning. This returns us to our original question, What does the word "I" mean?
The Sense of "I"
Hegel himself never precisely explains the meaning of "I." What,
then, should we be looking for? The previous discussion of Hegel's
treatment of indexical reference gives us a hint. Hegel classes "I"
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together with "here," "now," and "this." It has not been uncommon to take the word "this" as the basic indexical word, treating the
others as somehow derivative. And several things Hegel says indicate that he also thinks of indexicals in this way: "if we take the
This' in the twofold shape of its being, as 'Now' and 'Here' . . . "
(PhS, p. 60; see also the passages from PhS, p. 62, and WdL, vol. i,
pp. 104-5, quoted above).11
Hegel seems aware that "this," unlike the other indexicals, admits of completion by sortal predicates: "this man," "this ball,"
"this color." Indeed, given that indexical reference is always conceptually mediated, there must be some sortal completion at least
implicit in any use of "this." The obvious derivations of "now" and
"here" from "this" seem, then, to treat them as already having a
sortal built in—"this time" and "this place." Such an approach
seems consistent with what Hegel says about "here" and "now"
and suggests what we need to look for in the case of "I": some
appropriate completion or specification of "this ____ ."
But what counts as an appropriate specification? Even if we could
assume that persons are the appropriate referents of "I," we still
could not infer that "person" is the correct completion for "this
____," because coextensionality does not guarantee sameness of
sense. Furthermore, many of the things Hegel"says~about "I""seem
to preclude its having the sense of "this person." We must therefore
look more closely at what he actually says about the I.
The passage quoted earlier from Encyclopedia §20 is a useful starting point; in its continuation Hegel sounds most of the themes that
dominate his discussions of the I:
Kant made use of the awkward expression that I accompany all my
representations, also sensations, desires, actions, etc. The I is the
universal in and for itself, and commonality is also a form of universality, though an external one. All other men [Menschen] have it in
common with me to be an I, just as it is common to all my sensations,
11. In the Phenomenology of 1807, Hegel's treatment of "I" and "this" sometimes
seems to imply that they are coordinate—neither subordinated to the other, both
arising, as it were, together. There is much to be said for this interpretation, and I
cannot rule it out, but the preponderance of the passages seems to treat "this" as
prior. I doubt that Hegel had a clearly thought out position on whether "I" and
"this" were coordinated or subordinated.
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representations, etc., to be mine. The /, however, abstractly as such, is
pure relation to itself, in which all representation [Vorstellen], sensation, every state and every particularity of nature, talent, experience,
etc., is abstracted from. The I is insofar the existence of wholly abstract
universality, the abstractly free. That is why the I is thinking as a
subject, and in that I am simultaneously in all my sensations, representations, states, etc., thought is everywhere present and runs through
all these determinations as a category. (§20, my tr.)

The I is thus claimed to be (a) a wholly abstract universality, (b) pure
relation to itself, (c) abstracted from all its particular states, and (d)
thinking as a subject. And we are also given at least a partial
specification of the things to which "I" can be correctly applied—to
all humans. This passage, when correctly interpreted, is a key to
Hegel's concept of the word "I." The important clue is what Hegel
says about the I as such, for the "as such" locution is essentially an
operator restricting what can be correctly said about its argument to
things that are specially connected to the sense of the argument
expression. During the time Winston Churchill was the prime minister of England, it was true that the prime minister of England was
a leisure-time bricklayer; but it is certainly false that the prime
minister of England, as such, was a leisure-time bricklayer. The
prime minister, as such, is a member of the cabinet, advisor to the
throne, and resident of No. 10 Downing Street; but the prime
minister, as such, is neither male nor female, short nor tall, Labour
nor Conservative. To be more general, not everything true of A as
such can be reckoned as part of the sense of "A"; but everything true
of A as such must have some special connection with the sense of
"A." What is true of A as such is true of it because it can be correctly
referred to by "A." Of course, we must remember that even if it is
false that A as such is F, it does not follow that A is not F. It is false
that the president of the United States, as such, is a former screen
actor, but it is nonetheless true that the president is in fact a former
screen actor.
Hegel asserts that "the I, however, abstractly as such, is pure
relation to itself, in which all representation, sensation, every state
and every particularity of nature, talent, experience, etc., is abstracted from." Let me put aside for the moment the idea that the I
is pure self-relation. The I as such is abstracted from all of its
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particular states; that is, there is no particular state that an I, qua I,
must have. But this apparently leaves the I totally indeterminate.
Hegel does not, however, think of the I as indeterminate. For one
thing, that would not distinguish "I" from "this."12 It is important
that the I is abstracted from a specific group of states, namely, as we
see from the list he gives, primarily mental states (in a suitably
broad sense). But there is another important fact about the list from
which the I as such is abstracted: thinking is missing from the list.
Few philosophers distinguish mental representation and thought.
Yet for Hegel there is a clear difference; representation is a sensuous, imagistic type of mental processing, whereas pure thinking
is formal and nonsensuous (i.e., its phenomenology is not constitutive of it). Indeed, it is quite significant that thinking is omitted from
the list of thing's from which the I is abstracted; only a few lines
later, thinking is asserted to be the I. These considerations give us a
preliminary understanding of the sense of "I," namely, "this thinking subject."13
This is not an entirely happy choice on Hegel's part, for there are
problems with thinking that "I" has as its sense "this thinking
subject." First, "this thinking subject" could refer to someone besides the utterer. "This thinking subject" could have the peculiarly
first-person sense essential to "I" only if there were some special
form of demonstration that necessarily indicates its user. But "this"
used with that special form of demonstration would already be
equivalent to "I," and the sortal would not be necessary. We would
not need to specify what kind of thing—namely, a thinking thing—
the "this" picked out. "I" would be as conceptually indeterminate as
"this."
12. I have not tried to specify the sense of "this." A number of things Hegel says
about "this" indicate that a "this as such" could only be a bare particular, something
picked out as an individual shorn of all its properties. There are no bare particulars,
however. See Aquila's interesting discussion in "Predication and Hegel's Metaphysics." If "I" and "this" are coordinate terms, then a "this as such" would be a
pure or bare object contrasted with the pure or bare subject of the I.
13. This view obviously ties in with Kanf s use of the first-person pronoun to
express the transcendental unity of apperception. Hegel's interpretation of "I" is
deeply influenced by Kant's reflections in the transcendental deduction (see WdL,
vol. 2, p. 2igff.; SL, p. 583ff.). For an illuminating treatment of the thinking self in
Kant, see Patricia Kitcher, "Kant's Real Self," in Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy, /
ed. Allan Wood, pp. 113-47.
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One might try to give the demonstrative a smaller scope and take
"I" to have the sense the subject of this thought," but this has
difficulties as well. This move seems to assume some form of inner
demonstration, which is just as suspect as a form of demonstration
that applies only to oneself. It also presupposes that we can individuate thoughts before individuating their subjects. As a way
around this latter problem, we might suggest that there is a special
access to my own thoughts, so that I need not individuate them by
first individuating myself, but in that case again the simple "this"
expressing such access would be sufficient. Adding that a thought is
the kind of thing demonstrated is otiose.
In general, equating the sense of "I" with some form of the
demonstrative use of "this" seems to necessitate postulating some
special form of demonstrative contact that guarantees first-personness. This strikes me as implausible and ad hoc. And if I must
employ a special access available only to me in thinking of myself,
how can others understand my thoughts or assertions about myself? There is no adequate way to capture the essential first-personness of "I" using the essentially third-person resources of "this."
Such considerations make it more plausible that "I" and "this" are
coordinate, or even that "I" is the primary indexical.14
Nonetheless, according to the most natural interpretation of the
texts, "I" has a two-part sense for Hegel: first, it designates a
thinker, indeed, an individual thinker; second, it is the expression
of that thinker's pure self-relation, which itself is partly constitutive
of being a thinker. This pure self-relation is poorly expressed by an
objective mode indexical like "this." (The nature of the pure selfrelation intimated by the use of "I" is explored in the last section of
this chapter.)
14. When Hegel calls something a "this," his intent is usually to emphasize the
object's individuality. Hegel's concern with the metaphysical questions surrounding
the relation between the individual and the universal dominates such discussions.
He never explicitly discusses the specifically linguistic nature of the uses of "this" (or
"I," for that matter) as a demonstrative or anaphorical term, or the conditions of its
successful use. It is thus not surprising that Hegel fails to consider explicitly all the
technical difficulties in the use of "this" or "I." Nor is it surprising that the natural
proposal for the meaning of "I" stemming from the texts is subject to shortcomings.
Hegel is so interested in emphasizing the involvement of universals in indexical
reference that he pays only cursory attention to the specific differences between the
indexicals and between indexicals and definite descriptions.
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The Reference of "I"

Taking "this thinking subject" as our understanding of the sense
of "I," we can now ask what the normal reference of a use of "I" is.
Traditionally, one of four alternative referents for "I" has been
defended: a body, a Cartesian-style soul, a concrete person (an
animate organism strictly identical with neither body nor soul), or
some different thing such as a transcendental ego.
We can take it for granted that Hegel, a self-styled idealist, would
not take one's body to be the normal reference of one's use of "I." In
the same vein, however, we might think that a good idealist ought
to deny body or matter any essential role in the constitution of the
thinking subject to which the "I" refers. This would disqualify the
concrete person as the referent of "I," leaving only the substantial
Cartesian soul or the abstract transcendental ego as appropriate
candidates.
Hegel clearly rejects the whole notion of a Cartesian soul. The
"soul" of rational psychology, Hegel complains, is a confused notion—an attempt to think of the human spirit on the model of a
natural, material thing. Rational psychology attempts to distinguish the soul from natural things by simply denying certain natural predicates to it. But, Hegel in effect maintains, the predicates
that capture the nature of spirit have an entirely different logical
grammar and cannot be simply compounded from sense experience. Because the very notion of a Cartesian soul is confused,
Cartesian souls can hardly be the referents of "I."15
Is the balance of reasons then thrown in favor of the "I" standardly referring to a transcendental ego, some relatively abstract
entity, neither body nor soul nor concrete person, which lies behind
the phenomena of the self? Kant was reluctant to identify the I that
thinks with the empirical self and sometimes even with the noumenal self (Critique of Pure Reason, 64233). Given the importance of the
Kantian conception of the transcendental ego for post-Kantian German idealism, it would seem plausible that Hegel followed suit and
posited some transcendental entity as the referent of "I." But,
despite these appearances, Hegel does not take this path. None of
the motivations that pushed Kant to distinguish the empirical self
15. Recall the discussion of Hegel's critique of rational psychology in Chapter i.
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and the thinking subject have any significant hold on Hegel. Kant
has three different motivations for regarding the I that thinks as
nonempirical: his convictions about the nature and possibility of
ethics, his belief that thinking things are in principle unknowable,
and his belief that phenomenal properties are ultimately unreal.16
Hegel thoroughly rejects Kant's incompatibilism and the distinction
between the moral and phenomenal self; morality must be a thisworldly affair or it is useless, according to Hegel. Because Hegel
rejects the phenomenal-noumenal split, he can hardly maintain the
irreality of phenomenal properties, or that natural properties are
somehow fake (although they are false in the sense that they do not
reveal the complete truth of things). Finally, rather than believing
that the thinking subject must be unknowable in principle, Hegel
believes the opposite. Only insofar as something exhibits the structure of thought is it knowable, and only thought is absolutely
knowable.
We are forced, it seems, to reconsider the notion that a concrete
person is always the referent of "I." There is, however, an objection
to this—the fact that Hegel claims that the I as such is abstract.
Because of the abstractness of the I, it seems capable of maintaining
its identity across conditions in which the identity of a concrete
person would not be maintained. For instance, I can imagine being
the Emperor Claudius, and it seems plausible to claim that I might
have been Claudius. In one sense it is dear that I, Willem de Vries, a
man of the twentieth century, cannot have been Claudius; I have a
certain objective reality that cannot be altered so radically without
the destruction of the person I am. Nevertheless, we are able to
imagine ourselves to be quite different beings from what we objectively are, and Hegel recognizes the importance of this ability to
divorce ourselves from our objective reality and to project ourselves
into a different, call it subjective, reality.17 But the abstractness of
16. See Kitcher, "Kanf s Real Self," p. 122.
17. Zeno Vendler, in his article "A Note to the Paralogisms," attempts to exploit
our ability to abstract ourselves from our objective situation to argue for a distinction
between the transcendental I and the concrete person, but his argument assumes
that our ability to imagine being something else means that it is really possible to be
that thing. Then, assuming the necessity of all identities, it must be the case that
either I am not identical to Willem deVries or "I" is not a rigid designator. But both
"Willem deVries" and "I" seem to function as rigid designators. "The answer is that
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the I does not mean that the concrete person is not the I, any more
than the abstractness of "this" means that it cannot pick out a
concrete object. Our earlier distinction between names and demonstratives shows that this objection is fallacious, for it assumes that
"I" is a name, not a demonstrative.
Kant ought to have endorsed the Aristotelian dictum that it is the
same thing that thinks that runs,18 but it is clear that Hegel does
endorse it. Thinking (at least in its subjective variety) is a human
activity. To be sure, it is a very special kind of activity, but no
activity can occur without being realized in some particular, natural
embodiment. To consider a human an I is to abstract from that
particular embodiment of thinking. That the I can be abstracted
from its embodiment no more implies their separability than the
abstractability of shape from color or equilaterality from equiangularity implies their separability.

THE THINKING SUBJECT
Universality and Self-relation
Let me summarize the position we have reached. Hegel takes the
sense of "I" to be (roughly) "this thinking subject." The referent of
"I," as we see in more detail below, is an individual human [Mensch]
in a complex situation. Our apparent ability to wrest the I from its
the T', the subject of such a transference, has no content and no essence; it is a mere
frame in which any picture fits; it is the bare form of consciousness" (Vendler,
p. 117). This leaves it difficult to understand just what the transcendental I is, but we
can already see that Hegel rejects several of the crucial assumptions in Vendler's
Kant-inspired argument. First, Hegel rejects the assumption that the impossible
cannot be imagined. The ability to divorce ourselves in imagination from our empirical reality does not show that the self is something different from its empirical reality.
Second, Vendler also seems to be arguing that because the sense of "I" is abstract, its
referent must be an abstraction, because it designates rigidly. If the "I" designates
rigidly, though, it does so via an abstract description, and the designatum need not
be abstract. There is nothing here to force Hegel away from "I" referring to a concrete
person. See Zeno Vendler, "A Note to the Paralogisms," in Contemporary Aspects of
Philosophy, ed. G. Ryle, pp. 111-21.
18. It has been argued that there is no good reason for Kant to divorce the
empirical self and the thinking self, and that the thinking self must indeed be the
empirical self; see, for example, P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, pp. i6aff; or
Kitcher, "Kant's Real Self."
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concrete actuality is due to the fact that the coherence of counterfactual suppositions about x is controlled by the sense of the expression used to refer to x. Because the sense of "I" is highly abstract,
there are few counterfactual suppositions that are absolutely incoherent for something referred to solely as "I." But the fact remains that I am a man, according to Hegel, not a Cartesian ego.
The discussion of the sense of "I" began with a passage in which
Hegel characterizes the I as (a) wholly abstract universality, (b) pure
relation to itself, (c) abstracted from all its particular states, and (d)
thinking as a subject. So far, only the third and fourth characteristics have been considered. To present a rounded account of Hegel's
understanding of the "I," something must be said about its universality and self-relation. This also necessitates an explication of Hegel's conception of thinking, for a thinking subject is universality
and pure relation to itself in virtue of being a thinking subject.
There are two aspects to the claim that the I is self-relation—
material and formal. The sense in which an I is materially selfrelated is the most directly understandable, for it concerns our
relations to our own internal states. More important, the formal
self-relation is made possible by the material self-relation. We therefore begin by looking at Hegel's conception of the way each thinker
is materially self-related. This really only requires a review of the
previous development of subjective spirit with an eye to the emergence of a self, for the material self-relation of the thinking subject is
the self-relation of the organism. As a preface to this discussion, let
me remind the reader that the overall structure and intent of Hegel's mature system is decidedly more Aristotelian in style than it is
Cartesian. Beginning with his logic cum metaphysics, Hegel traces
the overall, fundamental structures of reality. The structures formally specified in the Logic are then applied to the analysis of
particular phenomena in ascending orders of complexity, each
building on the previous order, from mechanics through biology.
The philosophy of spirit picks up this progression, but one should
not think that the dividing line between nature and spirit is clearcut;
we have a great deal in common with animals. The Anthropology is
the transition point between the animal and the human; it describes
those structures essential to the emergence of the I.
The crucial stages of the emergence, as far as we are concerned,
start with sensation. A sensation has a peculiar two-sideness:
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viewed naturalistically, it is a state of the body centered around a
sense organ, but from the point of view of spirit (from within, as it
were) it is an absolutely simple, given reality, without structure,
without connection. The Anthropology describes a set of structures
in which the particular sensations involved become increasingly
less important as the functional organization of the structures becomes increasingly complex.
Sensations are, from one point of view, bodily states. The higherlevel organizations into which the sensations are brought, however, are not per se bodily; rather, they are functionally specified
and explained, and as such, they are only abstractly specified, the
particular sensations involved being contingent to them. These
structures of sensations exist as habits. "That the soul thus makes
itself into an abstract universal being and reduces what is particular
in feeling (and in consciousness) to a determination of it that merely
is—this is habit. . . . It [the soul] is free of [these determinations] in
so far as it is neither interested in nor occupied by them; in that it
exists in these forms as its possession it is at the same time open to
the further activity and occupation of sensation as well as of the
consciousness of spirit in general" (§410, my tr.). In an organism
that has developed large-scale habitual patterns of behavior, individual sensations are important only insofar as they figure in these
patterns. The soul is an abstract universal being insofar as it is best
described and explained in terms of these abstractly specified, dynamic structures of sensations. The soul is the totality of them. But
it is not in virtue of habit alone that man is capable of having an I:
"This abstract being-for-self of the soul in its corporeality is not yet
I, not yet the existence of the universal which is for the universal"
(§409, my tr.). Achieving a self, an I, requires a further recursion.
Freed from the particularities of sensation by reducing the role of
sensation to that of mere contingent occasion for the soul's (abstractly specified) activity, the soul now reduces the role of those
patterns of activity to occasions for higher-order structures. With
this move the I—the subject of consciousness—emerges: "This
being-for-self of free universality is the higher awakening of the
soul to the I, to the abstract universality insofar as it is for the
abstract universality, which is thus thinking and subject for itself and
indeed subject of its judgment [Urtheil], in which it excludes from
itself the natural totality of its determinations as [i.e., in the form of]
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an object, a world external to itself, and so relates itself to it that it is
immediately in that world reflected into itself—Consciousness"
(§412, my tr.).
Habit, as Hegel describes it, can be thought of as the organization
of sensory experience; the I emerges, not in that organization, but
as the possibility of a further unitary organization of the various
modes of first-order organization of sensory experience. A habit is
an abstract universality in that it is the same across times and places,
ready to manifest itself whenever it is elicited. It is in imposing a
further, higher-order structure on our habitually structured sensory
experience that the I and consciousness emerge. The I, then, apparently depends on the existence of a second-order functional organization.
If this is the nature of the I, we should be able to use it to
illuminate the difference between animals and humans. Animals
certainly have habits, but, if Hegel is right, these habits simply
coexist within the animal, as it were. They are not subject to any
higher organizing principle. Should two (or more) habits come into
conflict, say, because the eliciting stimuli for two mutually exclusive
behavioral patterns are present, the conflict is only resolved de
facto, depending on which habit is more firmly entrenched. With
humans, in contrast, there is a higher level of organization. Conflicts between habitual patterns are (often) resolved in a principled
and not merely de facto manner. The human is self-regulating in a
way the animal is not.
The picture obtained from the above discussion might be misleading, for some may be unable to resist the temptation to think of
man's initial reflective turn as essentially conscious, in which man is
aware of the behavioral patterns or mental structures reflected on as
either behavioral patterns or mental structures. This, however,
would be a major mistake, a serious jumping of the gun. When
Hegel insists that the natural determinations of the soul (the sensations, feelings, and first-order habits) are excluded from the soul in
the form of an external world, in the form of objects, he should
be taken at his word. The objects to which consciousness relates
throughout the Phenomenology are, strictly speaking, internal constructions of consciousness out of the manifold of sensation. This is
why Hegel can insist that "the Kantian philosophy is most accurately assessed as having grasped spirit as consciousness; and as
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containing throughout not the philosophy of spirit, but only the
determinations of its phenomenology" (§415, my tr.). The firstorder patterns of mental activity on which consciousness directs
itself do not appear to it as patterns of mental activity, but as
constituting independent objects.
We can now see the sense in which the I, the subject of consciousness, stands in a material relation to itself. The objects it takes to be
independent of itself, and in relation to which it defines itself, are in
reality determinations of itself, for they are the complex structures
of sensory data we have (subconsciously) prepared for further conceptualization.19
The I is a higher-order organizing principle. Strictly speaking, it
relates itself directly only to other organizing principles, and thus
only to things of its own basic ontological type. If we grant that
organizing principles are always universals in some suitable sense
(whether^abstract or concrete universals), then the I, itself a universal, relates directly only to other universals, which are, furthermore, contained within it. This is the formal sense in which the I is a
pure self-related universal. It is, to use the Aristotelian vocabulary,
the form of forms. It is also important to note that this formal self19. Because of the essential self-refatedness of the I, it is tempting to attribute to
Hegel the belief that all prepositional attitudes are de se, a la David Lewis or Roderick
Chisholm. The belief that all reference is directly to one's self and only indirectly, by
means of individuating descriptions, to other things does not sit comfortably with
other Hegelian doctrines. First, whereas Hegel sometimes seems to treat "I" and the
other indexicals as coordinate, he never seems tempted to make "I" primary. Second, the idea that we are, in thought, directly related to and directly aware only of
ourselves flies in the face of the phenomenology (in the non-Hegelian sense) of
thought; deep thought is precisely when we forget ourselves, lose ourselves, as Hegel
remarks in several places. Third, insisting that we act as our own intermediary
between our thought and the world still leaves us with an intermediary and thus
threatens to revive the problem of a thing-in-itself inaccessible to us.
There are, however, other elements of Hegel's philosophy that indicate such an
interpretation—his comparisons! of the feeling soul to a monad, for instance. At a
deeper level, Hegel's confinement to an Aristotelian logic of terms, which underlies
his conviction that judgments and syllogisms are ways the internal structure of a
concept (universal) unfolds itself, also encourages the view that thought and belief
ought to be understood as self-attribution of a universal, whether in the still implicit
form of a concept, the dirempted form of a judgment, or the fully unfolded form of a
syllogism.
Hegel did not have a clearly articulated theory of the prepositional attitudes; it was
not a clear issue for the age. I presently believe that Hegel's position is indeterminate
with respect to this question, although I hope to return to it in future work.
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relation supervenes upon the material self-relation. Anything with
the material self-relation exhibited by a normal human being would
ipso facto also exhibit the formal self-relation of the I (though not
necessarily vice versa).
Thinking as a Subject
The major characteristic of the I—thinking as a subject—needs to
be further explicated. Thought is seen by Hegel as the universal
ordering activity manifested as much in the order of objective reality as in our subjective mental activity. Pure thinking is the structure
or organizing activity necessary to any (metaphysically) possible
world; it is the system traced in Hegel's Logic.
M. J. Inwood interprets Hegel's claim that the I is thinking as a
subject to mean that Hegel identifies the pure I with the self-determining system of pure thoughts.20 There are several startling
consequences of such an identification. First, there is no distinction
between individual thinkers.21 Inwood suggests that different particular egos might be identified with different chunks of the total
system of pure thoughts—namely, with that part of the system an
ego commands. But this seems already to presuppose the identification of egos in some other way, for there is no way intrinsic to the
system of pure thoughts to differentiate egos. Second, identifying
the I with the system of pure thoughts would make it impossible to
distinguish any particular thinker from that system, from the Absolute. A Kojevean vision of a megalomaniacal Hegel, who having
understood his own system has become the very intellect of God,
would be right after all. Another untoward consequence of such a
position is that it seems to make it impossible to draw the distinction
between occurrent thinkings, attributable to persons at specific
times, and the pure thoughts themselves. The system of pure
thoughts is always present—the pure thoughts are not datable. But
then how can I or my occurrent thoughts, which surely are datable,
be identical to (even part of) the system of pure thoughts? I argue
20. Inwood, Hegel, pp. 34-42.
21. This consequence can be softened somewhat by taking the position that there
is only no distinction between individual egos qua pure thinkers. But if thinkers are
truly to be identified with pure thoughts, there can be no distinction among them,
for pure thought is one.
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below that Hegel believes that at the highest level of mental activity—pure thinking—we are the activity that thought is (see also
Chapter 11). But it is a mistake to take this to be a strict identity
between me and the system of pure thoughts; one batter does not a
ballgame make.
The untoward consequences of a strict identification of the pure I
with the system of thoughts can be avoided without losing the
essential and intimate relation between the two by employing one
of Hegel's favorite devices, the distinction between form and content. The pure I and the system of pure thoughts must have, according to Hegel, the same content, but in significantly different forms.
This distinction, as employed by Hegel, is not a simple juxtaposition of two independent, separable elements in a complex whole.
Although one content can appear in different forms, it is sensitive to
the form in which it appears. A mismatch between form and content does violence to both. Without the appropriate form, the content cannot appear as it really is; an inadequate form distorts, or at
least conceals, part of the content.
The most familiar example of the use of this distinction within
i Hegel's system is his description of the relations among the triad of
the final stage (Absolute Spirit) of the philosophy of spirit: Art,
Religion, and Philosophy. Hegel claims that these three share a
common content—the self-knowledge of spirit as Absolute Spirit.
But he also claims that they differ in the form this content is given.
In Art, spirit's self-knowledge is clothed in an externally perceptible
form; in Religion, it takes an imaginative, imagistic form. Only in
Philosophy does spirit's self-knowledge attain the fully adequate,
explicit form best suited to it.
The system of pure thoughts is a network of interrelated pure
concepts. But his is how Hegel conceives of the I as well. Hegel
adopts the Kantian idea that the categories (pure concepts) constitute the I in their operation. The subject and the object are simultaneously constituted by the activity of thought. But unlike Kant,
Hegel sees no reason to confine pure concepts to subjective minds
alone. Pure concepts are also constitutive of objectivity; anything
supposedly lying "behind" the objects of our thought must be
nonobjective, illusory. Thus Hegel's I is an active, self-constituting
system of pure thoughts.
The same may be said of the Idea, the total reality of the world.
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The important difference between the I and the Idea is that the I is
, an existent self-constituting system of pure concepts (WdL, vol. 2,
p. 220; SL, p. 583). To say that something exists or is existent is to
say that it is involved in relations of mutual dependence with an
indeterminate number of other things of similar status. "Existence
is the immediate unity of self-reflection and reflection in another. It
is therefore the indeterminate collection of existents as things reflected into themselves which are just as much appearances in
another or relative, and which constitute a world of mutual dependence and an infinite connection of grounds and groundeds" (§123,
my tr.). Existence is the form, for instance, of spatiotemporal particulars. The world-whole, or the pure Idea, cannot be said to
participate in relations of mutual dependence—there is, after all,
nothing else it can depend on. The I, however, does participate in
such relations, for each person is an I necessarily related to other I's
and to nonthinking beings as well. Thus, although the content of
the Idea and the I are the same, their forms are significantly different.
Since existence is a matter of entering into dependency relations
with other things, there is an inherent tension in the notion of the

system of pure thoughts existing. The system is supposed to be
absolutely self-determining. How can it adopt a form so antithetic
to its nature?
This last shape of Spirit—the Spirit which at the same time gives its
complete and true content the form of the Self and thereby realizes its
Concept as remaining in its Concept in this realization—this is absolute knowing. . . . Truth is the content, which in religion is still not
identical with its certainty. But this identity is now a fact, in that the
content has received the shape of the Self. As a result, that which is the
very essence, viz. the Concept, has become the element of existence,
or has become the form of objectivity for consciousness. (PhG, p. 556;
PhS, pp. 485-86)

The system of pure thoughts—the absolute Idea—cannot itself
adopt the form of existence, for the system requires a form fully
adequate to its content. Its content is the categorial structure governing the constitution of the world. Considered as a pure content,
independent of considerations of form, this is the Concept—an
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abstract structure (explored in the Logic) realized by the worldwhole. The only form fully adequate to this content is the worldwhole itself. But that abstract structure is also realized within the
world; there are, as it were, partial, microcosmic realizations of the
structure of the macrocosm. An existent individual who possesses
sufficient internal complexity with the appropriate categorial structure partially realizes the Concept in a self-reflective mode. The
content of each I is the same, but the individual I's, as distinct
existences in the natural world, are themselves thereby distinguished.
It is, indeed, part of the very structure of the world that its own
structure be internally duplicated in this way, and in this sense the
world comes to its own fullest realization in our thought about
, ourselves as realizing the Concept.
All human activity is imbued with thought; thought is a moment
in everything we do. Just as thought is involved in all the structures
of the objective world, it permeates all the structures of subjectivity.
In this sense we are always thinking, according to Hegel. But surely
there are some episodes of mental activity which are pure thoughts
in a more straightforward sense—for instance, what someone does
in reading and understanding Hegel's Logik. Thought is the structure of our mental activity. In pure thinking that structure is also the
object of our thinking. Thus thinking as a subject and thinking as an
object coincide in pure thought, the self-conscious realization of the
Concept.
i,
We began with a question: According to Hegel, what am I? I am a
complex organism whose internal states exhibit a self-reflective,
multileveled structure enabling me to consciously recreate the
structure exhibited in the world as a whole. I am a thinking thing
and therefore necessarily also an embodied, sensate thing. Strictly
speaking, I am neither a merely material nor an immaterial thing.
What is important about me is not what I am made of, but what I
do—namely, think. And in thought, at least, I participate in the
Absolute.

7
Intuition

THE ROLE OF INTUITION IN THE PSYCHOLOGY
Intuition is the first division of theoretical spirit, and although
Hegel could have called it "rational sensibility" or even "perception," its placement after the Phenomenology emphasizes the difference between intuition and sensation or feeling.
The connection between sensation, feeling, and intuition is that
they are all mental states with significant sensory content directed
on individuals. In Kant's botanization of the genus representation
(Critique of Pure Reason, A^2o/B-}^6-7), an intuition is classed as an
objective perception that "relates immediately to the object and is
single." This is strikingly echoed in the Zusatz to §445, where the
first stage of theoretical spirit is described as "material knowledge
relating to an immediately single object,—or intuition." In specifying that intuition is a form of material knowledge Hegel is excluding
cognitive states that relate to a single object, but that do so formally,
as for instance a definite description might. A representation with
the content "the tallest man in the room" might well relate to a
single individual and yet not be a piece of material knowledge. For,
if there were such an individual but no sensory contact between
him and the representation, the representation could not be immediately applied to the individual. Not all singular representations
are intuitions, therefore—only those that represent an individual
directly through their sensory content.
As in Kant, the objects to which intuition relates are highly struc-
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hired. The objectof intuition is a spatiotemporally extended object,
possessing causal properties and sometimes intentions, desires,
and reason. It is only at this relatively late stage that Hegel finds a
place for the rich_perceptual-experience-of-the-world with which we
are all so familiar.1 This is important, for the fact that our ordinary
perceptual consciousness of the world is dealt with under intuition
means that it is not under consideration in the Phenomenology.
This reinforces our earlier claim that Hegel's Phenomenology is not
the proper place to look for his theory of perception.
Sensation providesJhejnaterial for intuition. "The content that is
raised into intuitions is its [spirit's] sensations^ just as its intuitions
are changed into representations and immediately its representations into thoughts, etc" (§440, my tr.). But sensation, as we saw
earlier, is thoroughly nonconceptual, so there seems to be no room
for the concept of "rational sensation." And indeed, Hegel writes
very little of sensation in the section on intuition. Hegel rather
recapitulates the notion of feeling as forming the first stage of
intuition. But the notion has broadened in scope here a bit, for
Hegel remarks that "feeling has already occurred earlier (§339ff.) as
a mode of the soul's existence. In that case the essential determination of the finding or the immediacy is natural being or corporeity.
Here however, it is merely abstract, immediacy in general" (§446).
Notice that his reference here is, perhaps surprisingly, not to the
section on feeling in the Anthropology but to the Philosophy of
Nature. Feeling is a determination of the animal and therefore properly treated in the Philosophy of Nature as well. In saying that here, in
intuition, feeling has become merely abstract, Hegel is opening the
realm of feeling and sensation to things that are not simply the
mental counterparts of externally determined bodily states. Thus he
fulfills his earlier statement (§401, Zusatz) that internal sensations
are, properly speaking, to be discussed in the Psychology. The
important point is that such feelings have not been mediated by the
i. Sellars has argued for years that a Kantian perceptual judgment has the form
"This cube is pink," where the subject phrase "this cube" models the intuitive
component of the perceptual judgment and therefore the structure of the intuition
itself. In Hegel's Logik the singular judgment takes precisely this form. If Hegel takes
his logic and his statements about the singularity of the object of intuition seriously,
he would have to find Sellars's model suggestive and very agreeable. See W. Sellars,
Science and Metaphysics.
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objective, rule-governed constructive processes that constitute intuitions.2
Intuition is for Hegel, like Kant, the constitution of that form of
our cognitive experience in which we relate immediately to the
singular as singular. Material relation to the singular as singular,
however, can be guaranteed only by a sensory connection. Concepts never relate to the singular as singular. In intuition the content retains the form of the found or the given (the immediate), but
its givenness is merely the way it appears, for the content is a
determination of spirit itself, and in its relation to it spirit relates
itself only to itself; that is, the object of intuition seems to be given to
us directly, without intermediary process or medium, but in fact the
rich structure that the object of intuition is presented as having is
itself the work of the constructive processes of spirit itself. Hegel
does not believe that this structure is only a subjective artifact of our
mental processes—the objective structure of the world and the
subjective, cognitive structures of rational beings are ultimately
congruent—but that the object as presented in intuition has been
constructed in accordance with the categorial structures of consciousness, although that activity is not present to the intuiting
consciousness itself.
In the Psychology there is a steady progression in the explicitness
of the activity of spirit. "Psychology is therefore concerned with the
faculties or general modes of the activity of spirit as such—intuiting,
representing, recollecting, etc., desiring, etc." (§440, my tr.). In
intuition the activity of spirit, its constructive contribution, is not
2. It is not altogether clear, however, that in his discussion here Hegel respects his
own distinction between sensation and feeling. In particular, my interpretation of
the distinction seems to be belied by his remark that "cultivated, true sensation is the
sensation of a cultivated spirit that has acquired the consciousness of determinate
differences, essential relationships, true determinations, etc., and in which it is this
rectified matter that enters its feeling, that is, contains this form" (§447, my tr.). This
sentence is rather obscure, but I take it to imply, not that sensation comes as loaded
with essential relations, but thai in their very entry into feeling, as a result of the
immediate synthesis of sensation to create feeling, they already obtain this form,
since the unconscious synthesis is now informed by reason. This sentence, so
interpreted, does not threaten my interpretation of the distinction between sensation and feeling. There are passages in the Additions where these terms seem to be
used loosely, but this is not surprising, for in writing the Additions Boumann had a
variety of different sets of notes, both from Hegel's hand and from his students',
some of which were relatively early, before Hegel had solidified this distinction.
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yet evident in the experience, however present it may be to the
mind reflecting on the nature of intuition. Theoretical spirit is "the
activity by which the seemingly alien object [of the stage of Consciousness] receives, instead of the shape of something given, isolated and contingent, the form of something inwardized, subjective, universal, necessary, and rational" (§443, Zusatz, Miller tr.).
It is therefore a mistake when theoretical spirit is sometimes distinguished from practical spirit by characterizing the former as passive
and the latter as active. This distinction does, indeed, appear to be
correct. Theoretical spirit seems only to accept what is already there,
whereas practical spirit has to produce something that is not yet
externally to hand. In truth, however, as we already indicated in the
Zusatz to §442, theoretical spirit is not a merely passive acceptance of
an other, of a given object, but reveals itself as active by raising the
inherently rational content of the object out of the form of externality
and singleness into the form of reason. (§444, Zusatz, adapted from
Miller tr.)

Theoretical spirit begins with a found immediacy (its apprehension of
the object of consciousness). In this seemingly immediate apprehension of the object of consciousness spirit indeed knows the
external object—but it does not yet apprehend its own self and the
extent to which the object of consciousness is its own, its self
(because constituted by it). The concepts with which subjective
spirit understands its own activity are the subject of the Psychology. The Psychology is a crucial level of Hegel's system, for
its thoroughgoing self-reflectivity is the defining characteristic of
spirit.

ATTENTION, SPACE, AND TIME

Full-fledged intuition is not, of course, present at the lowest level
of intuition; as we have seen, the lowest level is simply feeling
recapitulated and abstracted. The level above that, called "attention" by Hegel, has (as is common with the second step of a triad)
two "moments" within it. The fact that spirit finds itself in intuition
implies an internal split, a distinction between that which finds and
that which is found. In intuition spirit is self-related, which requires
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that there be two distinguishable (though not necessarily separable)
moments. Naturally, these two moments are thoroughly correlative: the moment of spiritual activity is attention; what is found is a
spatiotemporal world.
It is important to note here that attention is apparently conceived
of as the mental activity through which experience receives its
spatiotemporal form.3 But this notion seems implausible, for attention (Aufmerksamkeit) is a fairly strong word, implying a high degree
of conscious mental activity and willful self-control. The constitutive function of the perceiving spirit is not a conscious function of
spirit, yet in the Addition to §448 Hegel seems to say that it is. This
view would seem to make the constitution of the spatiotemporal
world of our experience something we do by paying attention either
to our feelings or sensations or to the objects of experience, and this
seems patently false.
To understand Hegel's concept of attention we must remember
that it occupies a place within the dialectic of intuition parallel to
that occupied by self-feeling and by the whole level of consciousness insofar as it is in consciousness that the distinction between the
subjective and the objective is made explicit. I take it to be the case
that self-feeling, consciousness, and attention are all different levels
of one and the same generic form of mental activity, with attention
being a more highly developed and articulated level of this activity
or function of mind. Each of these levels has as a primary feature a
subject object split in which the object is projected away from the
subject or externalized.
Two observations have to be made in respect of the significance of this
externality however; firstly, since what is spiritual or rational constitutes the objects' own nature, what is sensed assumes the form of a
self-externality in that it becomes an object external to the internality
of spirit. Secondly, we have to note that since this transformation of
what is sensed proceeds from spirit as such, what is sensed is endowed with a spiritual, that is to say with an abstract externality, and
so acquires the same universality as that which can pertain imme3. The implication is clear: the objects of consciousness in the Phenomenology do
not have a spatiotemporal form. This continues the remark in the Phenomenology
(§418) that "here" and "now" are determinations that do not really apply to the
object of sense certainty but are properly reserved for intuition. This is made even
clearer in the Addition to §418.
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diately to what is external, a universality which is still entirely formal
and devoid of content. (§448, Zusatz)

These are the two respects in which intuition differs from its earlier
counterparts. First, Hegel says, intuition experiences its objects as
sejf-external. This means that in intuition we experience objects
as imperfectly manifesting a determinate essence, an essence independent of that singular object and only fully realized by us,
through our conceptual grasp of it Insofar as the object of intuition
is determined by this essence—without which, of course, it would
not be what it is—the object is self-external. Second, the externalization of the sensuous content is performed in intuition by spirit as
such, and this dictates the form in which that content is externalized. The point here is that the external form imposed on something by spirit itself is essentially appropriate—it is the externality
the thing itself has. So when spirit imposes an external form on the
sensuous content presented to it, it imposes the same form of
externality as singular, sensuous things themselves have—space
and time.
But this leads us to ask a more probing question: Are we to
understand that sensations are themselves in a spatiotemporal ordering, even though spirit, although perhaps temporal, is certainly
not spatial? We have already seen a quandary similar to this in our
discussion of sensation, a problem that we decided was a weak spot
in the Hegelian theory. Here however, the situation is different, for
whether Hegel realizes it or not, he has room for a sophisticated
answer to the present problem.
The answer is, as it should be, a decided yes and no. Yes, the
ordering of sensation is spatiotemporal, but no, this does not engender special problems once we realize what Hegel intends by a
spatiotemporal ordering. If we turn to the relevant discussion in the
Philosophy of Nature (§254-59), we find Hegel discussing the idea
that space is a mere form of intuition. To this notion he replies,
eliminate the element of subjective idealism in this statement and it
is right—for "space is a mere form, that is, an abstraction" (§254).
Or, as he says in §448, space is "the form of indifferent juxtaposition
and quiescent subsistence." Time, also a mere form, is the "form of
restlessness, of the immanently negative, of successiveness, of arising and disappearing."
I suggest that we take Hegel seriously here and think of time and
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space as purely formal ordering relations indifferent to what they
order other than that (since they are the forms of self-externality) it
be self-external. It might well be the case then that there are two
different sorts of items exhibiting these sorts of relations among
themselves, the objects that really are "out there" and the sensations that arise in the subjective mind. The idea is that space and
time, as formal orderings of items, can apply to different kinds of
items as long as the internal structures of the domains are isomorphic. There is in the mind a formal isomorph of the perceived
spatial relation between two objects of intuition, and this is sufficient for the spatiality of the intuition, since space is, by its nature,
formal.4
This idea of counterpart dimensions to account for the spatiotemporality of our experience is not clearly among the arsenal of the
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers. Sellars, in his
discussion of Kant, for instance, can only claim that, had Kant made
a few of the distinctions Sellars has made, he would have been led to
some such idea. Yet the case that something like this was in the back
of Hegel's mind seems stronger, for he also makes it clear that "if we
have said that what is sensed derives the form of what is spatial and
temporal from the intuiting spirit however, this statement must not
be taken to mean that space and time are only subjective forms. . . .
The truth is that the things in themselves are spatial and temporal,
this dual form of extrinsicality not being one-sidedly imparted to
them by our intuition, but in origin already communicated to them
by the implicit, infinite spirit, by the eternally creative Idea" (§448,
Zusatz). Space and time are both internal to the subjective spirit and
real forms of nature.
Why are space and time the forms of intuition? Could there be
other forms of intuition? Kant, it seems, has to acknowledge the
4. I am obviously drawing on some of the suggestions that Sellars has put forward
in his interpretation in Science and Metaphysics of Kant's views on space and time, but
there are some significant differences here. On my reading of Sellars, the sigma- and
tau-characteristics of impressions would be properties the impressions have because
of their causal history. For Hegel this causal influence is nugatory; they would rather
be characteristics assigned to sensations by the mind because the mind here, as
spirit, implicitly cognizes their nature as self-external and takes them as having the
appropriate form—gives them this form, in effect. Of course, spirit only gives to
them what they already are in their nature, but the spontaneity of mind in the
constitution of the spatiotemporal order seems to me heavily emphasized in Hegel.
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possibility of other forms of intuition and can offer no reason why
space and time happen to be the forms of our intuition. For Hegel,
though, such a question does not really arise. Space and time are
the determinate forms of self-externality in general (see the arguments in PN §254ff.); this is why they are not merely subjective
forms but are present in nature itself. They are forms of our intuition simply because they are the forms in which self-external individual objects are realized. If those objects could adopt a different
form, the form of our intuition of them would change accordingly.
Hegel's derivation of space and time from self-externality is overly
aprioristic, but his belief that the forms of our intuition depend on
the structure of the world, and not vice versa, represents a healthy
realism on his part.
Hegel exploits the fact that attention is more determinate and
focused than mere consciousness, for the object of attention is more
than a relative other, it has become totally determined, located in
the determinate metric of space and time, given an independent
existence all its own, and thus, since it is not really independent,
made self-external. "Intelligence thus determines the content of
sensation as something that is external to itself, projects it into time
and space, which are the forms in which it is intuitive" (§448, Miller
tr.). But finite things are self-external and spatiotemporal, according
to Hegel, and intuition thus gets at their very heart.
It seemed, above, that Hegel might be insisting that we are conscious in intuition of bestowing spatiotemporal form on objects. But
I do not think that he is in fact committed to such an implausible
doctrine. Even though in attention spirit is actively directing itself
on certain aspects of the world rather than others, this need not be a
conscious effort, nor need a person be aware of doing so. That
would indeed be a higher level of self-consciousness than is present
in intuition.
Much of Hegel's talk of attention treats it as the ability to focus on
one thing, which involves both the negation of one's self-assertiveness and the ability to give oneself to the matter at hand. Whereas in
feeling the distinction between subject and object is indeterminate,
"intelligence necessarily goes on to develop this difference however, to distinguish the object from the subject in a determinate
manner" (§448, Zusatz). The focusing of attention emphasizes the
subject's activity in cognition and determines the object more fully
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for the mind, thus sharpening the split between mind and object
while also fostering a deeper appropriation of the object in its
fullness by the mind and thus overcoming the split between subject
and object.

INTUITION PROPER
In feeling proper the item found is "found" as a member of an
indeterminate connectedness; in consciousness it is found as external and independent of the ego, and the ontological structure of the
object itself comes under investigation. In intuition the item found
is found as an item (or as belonging to an item) in an external,
spatiotemporal world. The structure of the connectedness among
the found sensations is now completely specified. And it is only in
intuition that adequate sophistication is reached to account for the
experience of a spatiotemporal world as spatiotemporal. On Hegelian principles, animals cannot be attributed the experience of a
spatiotemporally ordered world.5
The third step in the triad of intuition is the rather bland assertion
that intuition proper is the "concrete unity" of the moments already
discussed. We may take the time to differentiate intuition proper
from some of its other neighbors, as Boumann's Zusatz does.
One of the more interesting remarks in the Addition to §449 is the
contrast drawn between intuition and the sensuous consciousness
of the Phenomenology. As stated, though, it seems to set intuition
off, not just from sensuous consciousness, but from all those attitudes summed up under the heading "Consciousness." Such consciousness, he says, "in unmediated and wholly abstract certainty
of itself, relates itself to the immediate singularity of the object,
which falls apart into a multitude of aspects. Intuition, on the
contrary, is a consciousness which is filled with the certainty of
reason, its general object having the determination of being something rational, and so of constituting not a single being torn apart
5. Hegel takes spatiotemporal relations to be not merely qualitative but also
metric, and we cannot attribute to animals knowledge of a metric: "Space is, in
general, pure quantity. . . . Consequently, nature begins with quantity and not
quality" (PN §254).
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into various aspects, but a totality, a connected profusion of determinations." (§449, Zusatz). "True intuition," he goes on to say,
"apprehends the genuine substance of the object."
It is clear here that somehow intuition gets a hold on the essences
or concepts of things in a way that is impossible for phenomenological consciousness; can we explain how this can be the case without
calling on the vague and unhelpful point that intuition is informed
with reason and therefore grasps things as they are? We have seen
that the big advance in the nature of the object constructed by
intuition over consciousness is that it is explicitly spatiotemporal,
and this provides us with the key, for the objects constructed by
intuition trace a path through space and time. It would seem from
most of Hegel's pronouncements about the abstract nature of space
and time, their low level of reality, for instance, that the spatiotemporality of an object has very little to do with its essence. But such is
not quite the case. It is true that in intuition the grasping of the
object is still merely immediate and is not yet true cognition, for "it
has not yet achieved the immanent development of the substance of
the object, but rather limits itself to apprehending the unexplicated
substance still surrounded by the concomitants of the external and
contingent" (§449; Zusatz, my tr.). But what intuition must have a
grasp of is the recipe for constructing a spatiotemporally extended
object—an object with a backside, an inside, a past, and a future—
on the basis of the sensations that have none of these qualities. This
recipe is the first step toward possessing the essence, the concept of
the thing, for this recipe is the important recombination into a
"living" totality of what consciousness has separated and analyzed.
The object is no more the simple conglomeration of its causes and
effects, its past and its future, its parts and the whole, than bread is
the simple conglomeration of flour, yeast, water, sugar, eggs, heat,
and pressure.
Because Hegel insists that all content can occur in feeling, and
therefore in intuition, he can also use his account of intuition to
approximate the more everyday sense of the term (which it has in
German as well as English). Thus he talks of a historian's intuition,
and of course of the artist's intuition. These remarks, however,
dilute the pure epistemic force of his position and have probably led
many of his readers astray, but an immediate grasping of the es-
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sence of the object is what any kind of intuition is about. In intuition
one conceives the object correctly, but it is mere correct belief, for
one's justification is not made evident for or by intuition.
When, on reflection, the subject realizes that strictly speaking its
object is not really external, but internal and determined by the
subject, the move is made into representation, that set of mental
activities surrounding memory and imagination. This is the topic
for chapters 8-10, but it is fitting to note here that in representation
the intuitive activity of the mind provides the material for further,
more complex activities. Intuition is extremely complex on Hegel's
account, yet it is but the first stage of a series of successively more
complex, compounded levels of mental activity.

8
Representation and
Recollection

THE ROLE OF REPRESENTATION
A division of the abilities of the mind into perceptive and thinking
capacities is old and common; one of Hegel's more noticeable innovations is a tripartite division of the mental faculties into the intuitive, the representative, and the thinking. The middle element
here, representation (Vorstellung),1 presents us with particular difficulties. Some of the phenomena Hegel treats under the rubric of
"representation" are dearly sensory—such things as delusions,
dreams, and hallucinations—yet others are such as we would today
unanimously attribute to thought, namely, the phenomenon of
language. I begin here by distinguishing representation from intuition. In the second section we turn to recollection, the lowest level
i. Vorstellung also presents related difficulties for the translator. For Kant it is the
generic term covering mental acts and is usually translated as "representation." In
Hegel's usage Vorstellung is no longer the genus of all mental acts, for it does not
include thought. Petry translates it as "presentation," whereas Wallace and Miller
continue to use "representation." I have adopted "representation" partly to prevent
confusion with the more general notion of something's being presented to spirit and
to mobilize the play on "re-presentation," which captures some of the spirit, although not the exact semantic content, of Hegel's plays on Vor-stellung, and partly
because Hegel's criticisms of Vorstellung are criticisms of what is today called the
representational theory of mind. "Representation" is a fortuitous choice as well in
that representations are treated by Hegel as re-presentations, or presentations in a
new mode, of intuitions.
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of representation. We return to the distinction between representation and thought in Chapter 11.
When Hegel separates representation from the phenomena of
intuition, he claims that in representation the fact that the mental
state or act is subjective becomes explicit:
However, that the object has the character of being mine is only
implicitly present in intuition and is first posited in representation. In
intuition the objectivity [GegenstiindlichkeH] of the content predominates. Only when I reflect that it is I who has the intuition—only then
do I step into the standpoint of representation. (§449, Zusatz, my tr.)

Accordingly, spirit posits intuition as its own, penetrates it, makes it
into something inward—recollects itself in it, becomes present to itself
in it and thereby free. Through this inwardization intelligence raises
itself to the stage of representation. Representing spirit has intuition,
which is sublated in it and neither has vanished nor is something only
past. (§450, Zusatz, my tr.)

It might appear that any representation wears its subjectivity on
its sleeve, yet such things as hallucinations do not obviously present themselves as any more subjective than any other perceptual
states, although Hegel calls them representations. Of course all our
mental states, perceptual states as well, are subjective, but what
qualifies these mental states to be particularly well suited to be
called representations?
At the level of representation, the subjectivity of the content of
the mental state, which was only implicit in intuition, is made
explicit. Hegel does not think, however, that it must be explicit to
the subject having the representation that it is subjective—otherwise hallucinations and delusions could not be considered representations. It must rather be made explicit to an objective point of
view. But an objective point of view also realizes that even in
intuition the content is subjective, although it agrees with the objective reality. To this extent, intuitions and representations are not
exclusive, for intuitions form a special subset of representations.
We still need to distinguish the sense in which the subjectivity of
the content of a mental event becomes explicit in a representation.
We can understand this by asking what would count as the correct
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explanation of the presence to mind of that content. If we reflect for
a moment on what we have already seen of Hegel's theory, it is
apparent that what the manifold of sensation is presented as is not
an occurrent, simple property of a certain complex of sensations;
rather, what a complex of sensations is presented as is a matter both
of the internal structure the activity of spirit has endowed that
complex of sensations with and of the relations that that complex,
again through the activity of spirit, has with other sensate complexes. Thus a mental state that seems to fit in with the course of
intuition in us—and is therefore presented as an intuition—may,
on later reflection, be discovered to have been a mental state that
does not cohere with the order of intuition and is thus a mere
representation. In theoretical spirit we adopt an objective standpoint even on that which is subjective. Thus representations are not
self-presenting in the sense that, when had, they reveal of necessity
all their essential qualities, including whether they are mere representations or representations that also qualify as intuitions in virtue
of correct connection with extra-mental objects.
This last remark should also make it clear that there is no absolute
demarcation in internal ("felt") qualities between intuitions and
mere representations, at least not at the lowest levels of representation, for indeed, in intuition itself we have a representation. One is
tempted to say that the difference between intuition and representation is the attitude the mind takes toward its own state, but this
way of talking nourishes the misleading picture of a spectator in a
theater watching images on a screen and reacting to them. We must
rather tell a more complex story and give up the attempt to simplify
so radically. The mental life of an individual forms a whole, and
even this whole is not a totally isolated atom but interacts in various
ways with the subject's environment. Each mental act or state is an
item in the course of the world that is open to explanation, and the
distinction between some of them as intuitions and some of them as
mere representations lies more in the kind of explanatory considerations that must be advanced to explain them than in any properties
intrinsic to the states themselves. Thus mental states are dassed as
mere representations both when they fall short of intuition and
when they are at a higher level. Let me explain this.
The first constraint we must recognize is that accounting for a
mental state or act is not just a matter of explaining its origin in strict
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causal terms; one must also show how the act fits in with the
subject's other mental states and the state of the environment. Thus
it is important to give, not only a causal chain leading from the
object to sensations forming the material of the mental state, but
also an account of the principles according to which these sensations are unified with all others to form a coherent whole. This is a
large part of what we are saying when we describe a mental state in
terms of its content. The full explanation of the genesis of a mental
state includes as a crucial factor its fit with other mental states—
even though this is a matter of interpretation.2 We must remember
that the coherence of any sensation with any other need not be
evident to the subject itself; nonetheless, that there is such a coherence is presupposed by our assigning the sensation to the same
subject.
There are three important factors to be taken into account in the
explanation of a sensuous mental state: the environment, the perceptual apparatus, and the internal spiritual apparatus responsible
for the constructive activity. In normal intuition, the activity of the
subjective spirit and the operation of the sensory apparatus are
standard and therefore not important in explaining that particular
state. When a subject is alert, in standard conditions, with perceptual organs operating properly, no reference to the state of the
subject other than its orientation in the environment and perhaps
perceptual set is necessary to explain why the subject has the experience it has. The subject's own state and activities, since quite
normal, form part of the background conditions of the perceptual
experience, and the burden of explaining why that particular experience is had is carried by facts about the physical environment of
the subject.
In cases of mere representation, the explanatory burden is shifted
for whatever reason to facts about the subject itself, whether about
the perceptual apparatus or the spiritual apparatus. The subject's
own activities are now important in explaining why this experience
was had at that time. There is still a causal story to be told about the
generation of the sensate material, but now the form that that
material is given by spirit is not a normal reconstruction of the cause
2. These considerations of coherence and the process of interpretation are holistic,
Ideological, and normative, of course; see Chapter i.
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of the sensations. The standard relations between the causal and
semantic characteristics of the mental states do not hold. It is this
difference that means that the experience is not an intuition, but
this difference need not be evident in the experience itself. Such a
situation can occur in two ways: (a) there can be some disturbance
in the normal operation of the sensory organs; (b) it is possible that
there is some breakdown in the activity of construction. This second
alternative can occur for two different reasons: (i) the causal input,
the material of sensation, does not fully determine the object constructed, and due to lack of or faulty contextual information the
wrong object is constructed or the object is constructed with some
wrong properties; (ii) the mind itself "processes" the material incorrectly and constructs something that corresponds to nothing in the
environment. These possibilities allow for illusion, hallucination,
and even madness, and in such cases it is clear that the state of the
subject is crucial in the explanation of the experience. In cases of
such a breakdown in the otherwise normal course of intuition we
are forced to be more aware of the subject's own role in intuition,
and of the fact that the subject possesses a subjective representation of
the extra-mental world. In this way some representations are best
understood as falling short of intuition.
There are, however, other ways the contribution of spirit to its
own experience can come• to the fore. Spirit is free—it determines
itself and is not totally dependent on the external world for its
content. Insofar as spirit determines its own experience, it is evident that spirit itself bears the explanatory burden in explaining
why it has this experience now.3 The most intuitive example of such
self-determination by spirit is a case of imagination, where, for
instance, I let my fancy wander amid images of flowered fields and
3. It would be a mistake to think that spirit's self-determination is to be understood here as spirif s willing a certain state into existence, for a volition itself is
something to which spirit determines itself. At this level, spirit's freedom is the
freedom of organic self-determination, of the independence of the complex from the
environment. The force of saying that spirit determines itself in a certain way is not
the imputation of a volition or some such mental state but rather a sign that we are at
an explanatory dead end. Since spirit is free, its actions are not externally caused,
and saying that spirit has freely determined itself in a certain manner lets us know
that the explanation stops with spirit itself. The explanation of a free act of spirit is in
terms of spirit's ends, which it has determined for itself and which are ultimately
implicit in its essence.
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beautiful skies, thus escaping the drear of a winter's day. This need
not be an intentional action, something I set out to do, but it is
something I do. Alternatively, I could sit down and work on designing a house or solving a problem. We can give reasons for why I am
thinking what I am thinking, but these are again internal to me and
refer to my thoughts, desires, goals, character, perhaps my physical
condition.
This notion of a spirit freely determining its own mental content
seems to raise some problems. Do we, by this formulation, commit
Hegel to the thesis that a spirit can create sensations, the basic
material of mind, freely? Since sensations are, as we have already
seen, states of sensory organs having immediate being for mind,
this interpretation would involve mind's ability to influence the
body directly. Hegel would object to putting the question this way,
for it suggests a real separation of mind and body, but the point
does confront him with a real difficulty. If there are sensations that
do not arise by the standard causal patterns, Hegel must account for
such processes—but to my knowledge he does not do so.
Need we suppose that the mind can simply create sensations ex
nihilo for use in imagination? Hegel might say that there is a continual though changing fund of sensation, that in creating representations spirit constructs the sensations in novel ways, making use of
the material at hand. In talking about a certain case of visions that
someone had and recognized to be mere visions, Hegel remarks,
"Internally we have before us a representation, and this presence is
a moment of corporeity, and through illness this presence can be so
augmented that it assumes the form of seeing" (quoted from the
Kehler ms. in PSS, vol. 2, p. 271, my tr.). But to suppose that the
eidetic image of a flower arrangement which an eidetic imager may
have while, say, skiing in the mountains is merely a novel reconstruction of the sensations caused in standard ways by the environment seems to stretch plausibility. An eidetic image is too close to
the original. Hegel's rather bland explanation that something was
brought about by spirit or dredged up from within spirit's "nightlike abyss" (§453) is simply insufficient.
If this is the nature of the self-determination of spirit in imagination, how exactly does it differ from an illusion or hallucination,
spirit's merely incorrect construction of the material of sensation?
Again, internally there need be no difference, except insofar as in
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spirit's free self-determination the constructs are presented to mind
as bearing the stamp of self-creation. This difference, however, can
only be cashed in in terms of the relations the construct bears to
other mental states or acts. For instance, suppose someone to be
having a pink elephant experience, although there are no such
elephants around. Whether we say that the person is hallucinating
or merely imagining vividly depends to a great extent on the further
behavior and reports of the person. If she describes the elephants in
detail, matches their color to a printer's sample, and yet does not
expect others to see or respond to the elephants, does not cower in
front of them, and so on, we may well marvel at her imaginative
capabilities but we shall not assert that she is hallucinating or under
an illusion. To be hallucinating she must think that there are elephants out there, and we tell this by, for example, her running to
escape being trampled. Whether a representation is an imagining or
an incorrect intuition depends on the connection it is given to other
representations.4
RECOLLECTION
Hegel's treatment of Representation is divided triadically, under
the headings Recollection (Erinnerung), Imagination (Einbildungskraft), and Memory (Gedachtnis). These headings are a bit misleading; there are perhaps no better words for labeling what he is talking
about, but if one takes these in their ordinary meaning certain
confusions are bound to arise. In each case Hegel isolates particular
mental abilities, and although each retains some relation to the
normal sense of the word, it is stripped bare of most of the connotations it normally carries. Furthermore, the finer points go absolutely
untouched, as is necessary in an encyclopedic treatment. Hegel
warns us also against treating each of these three as different and
separate faculties constituting the mind. The three are understood
by Hegel to be hierarchically ordered in increasing complexity, each
one presupposing and involving its predecessor: "The precise nature of a truly philosophical comprehension consists however in the
4. Some of the material dealing with derangement quoted in Chapter 5 reinforces
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grasping of the rational connection present between these forms, in
recognizing the sequence of the organic development of intelligence within them" (§451, Zusatz).
Recollection, the first of the three main stages of representation,
is itself divided triadically. This creates some technical difficulties
for us, for Hegel uses the important term "recollection" within each
of these three stages without acknowledging explicitly that the
meaning has shifted slightly because the term is now applied to a
simpler, now to a more complex, ability. To avoid merely verbal
confusions at the small expense of some stylistic awkwardness, I
simply subscript the terms to make it clear in each case which level I
am dealing with.
Recollectioni is described as follows: "As initially recollecting
intuition, intelligence posits the content of feeling in its inwardness,
in its own space and its own time. It is thus (i) image freed from its
initial immediacy and abstract singularity against others and taken
up into the universality of the I in general. The image no longer has
the complete determinateness that intuition has and is arbitrary or
contingent; it is in general isolated from the external place, time,
and immediate context in which intuition stood" (§452, my tr.). In
recollectionj the sensate material present to mind (the content of
intuition) is no longer presented as an object external to the mind in
space and time. The sensate material is still given an internal structure sufficient to make it a representation of an object, but the
particular sensate clump is no longer united with all the others by
those strict categorial principles that impose spatiotemporal structure on the field of intuition. Thus the image is no longer presented
as in objective space and time, but as an object in no particular space
at no particular time. The object imaged has thus been removed or
abstracted from its spatiotemporal context. If I consider the objects
in my visual field not as physical objects independent of me but as
visual images, even though I may be correctly intuiting a typewriter
and desk, I have moved up to the recollectioni of these objects, for
the objects are no longer located for me in objective space.
This abstraction of the image (whether visual, aural, gustatory,
etc.) from its immediate spatiotemporal context is the first important step presupposed by all higher activities of spirit, for all these,
especially thought itself, involve the ability to go beyond the immediate situation into the actual past in memory, into nonactual possibilities in the imaginative construction of possible pasts, presents,
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and futures, and beyond the sensible altogether in the contemplation of the universal per se. The first and elementary step toward
these more sophisticated intellectual achievements is this simple
abstraction of the present material from its complete context.
Although the content of feeling is no longer completely subjected
to those rules or categories that impose complete spatiotemporal
determinateness on it, it is certainly not left devoid of such structure, and the entire categorial arsenal developed in the Encyclopedia
Phenomenology is presupposed here. Without these categories, the
subject-object split would remain meaningless to the subject, who
would be unable to perform the act of recollection, unable to contrast his states with extra-mental objects at all. In recollection!,
"what is represented, however, gains this permanence only at the
cost of the clarity and freshness of the immediate, fully determinate
singularity of what is intuited. Intuition palls and dims in becoming
an image" (§452, Zusatz, my tr.). This passage brings to mind
Hume's distinction between an impression and an idea. Hume
distinguishes the two solely on the basis of their force and vivacity,
which seems to be similar to Hegel's distinction between the relative freshness and clarity of intuition and recollection!. But Hume's
differentiation between impression and idea is merely phenomenological; he has no other way to explain why an idea is less vivid than
an impression other than that ideas derive from impressions, for
which conclusion a major argument is that the impressions are
more vivid. But since Hume draws several other distinctions on the
basis of force and vivacity, it is not clear just what the distinction
between impression and idea, which is supposed to be an important distinction in kind, really amounts to.
Hegel, on the other hand, can give a theoretical explanation of the
phenomenological difference between intuition and representation. Vivid and strong presence to mind is not merely a matter of the
original strength of sensation, according to Hegel, but also of the
weight in the constructive process it is given.5 But if we are to
5. We must remember that the categorial scheme developed in the Encyclopedia
Phenomenology does not give us rules for the construction of particular objects in
general. The construction of particular objects always demands special knowledge; it
is, moreover, imbued with thought and is something that we unconsciously and
sometimes consciously learn to do. To a trained taster certain flavors, in a complex
dish or drink may be quite strong and vivid, while to the untrained palate they are
lost in the multitude of other flavors.
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construct an object abstracted from its spatiotemporal, causal environment, certain of its properties and certain of the sensations it
causes to arise within us must be given short shrift in the construction. To give them their full due would involve constructing
their impact on the environment, and this would slowly extend
itself thoughout the spatiotemporal world. To the extent that these
properties of the object (ultimately all of them to varying degrees)
are not given their full weight in the construction, the object is
presented as less clear, less vivid, less fresh. One might consider as
an analogy the phenomenological difference between the sound a
familiar voice makes in the various environments in which we
normally hear it and the radical change it undergoes in an anechoic
chamber, where it is deprived of its normal richness through interaction with the environment.
Recollectionj is a fairly straightforward concept. Recollection2"is a
little more problematic, for it is the unconscious preservation of the
image isolated in recollectionj. Each representation we have is preserved in the "night-like abyss" of intelligence. We encountered a
claim tike this about the feeling soul earlier, but I said little about it
then, so let me say a bit more now. First of all, there is no clear rule
for individuating representations or feelings. Is the representation
of a typewriter a different representation from the representation of
a blue typewriter or the representation of a battered, old typewriter
with thirteen keys and the ribbon missing? All our intuitions can be
treated as representations, so we must take Hegel to mean that our
complete intuitive experience of the world, as Well as any inner
intuitions we are able to develop at higher stages, is preserved in
recoUection2. In a stretch of intuitive experience we are able to focus
on any of its aspects and turn it into an image, and as potential
images the whole panoply is preserved within recollection2Second, the mode of preservation in recollection2 is not correctly
conceived as an anatomization and pigeonholing operation within
the mind: "It is the inability to grasp the universal, which is concrete
in itself while yet remaining simple, that occasioned [the notion
that] particular representations are preserved in particular fibers
and locations; different things are supposed also to need singularized spatial existence" (§453, my tr.). Hegel insists on the "need to
grasp the Concept in its concreteness, to grasp it, as it were, as the
seed which contains affirmatively and as a virtual possibility, all the
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determinatenesses which first come into existence in the development of the tree" (§453). It is clear that thinking of the images as
preserved in pigeonholes or as stored in Locke's mental closet
promotes a thorough misconception of mind, for then the images
would remain independent actualities that are merely rearranged
by the mind. But the images no longer exist, they are not discrete
individuals discoverable within the mind but potentialities capable
of being actualized by the mind. Locke's image of a progressively
better stocked closet is exactly wrong.
Hegel heavily emphasizes the unity and simplicity of spirit exhibited by the fact that all these images are retained, but not individually and discretely. But an even more important lesson perhaps is
the generative power of spirit. Hegel uses the metaphor of a seed:
"the germ which contains affirmatively and as a virtual possibility,
all the determinatenesses which first come into existence in the
development of the tree" (§453). The infinite generative power of
our minds has been a central fact in contemporary reflections on the
nature of mind—but contemporary theorists have been generally
concerned to show how such infinitary capabilities can rest on finite
resources. Any attempt to sketch how the infinitary can be generated by the finite is noticeably absent from Hegel's works, however,
for he is convinced that the finite really presupposes the infinite.
The finite, he believes, might be reached by an "analysis" of the
infinite (as a point, perhaps, is an analytic part of a line), but the
(true) infinite cannot be generated by synthesizing finite pieces (as a
line cannot be built by stringing points together).
Hegel's talk of an "abyss" also constitutes a denial that there is
any privileged set of simple ideas or images into which perceptions
can be decomposed and from which memory or other images can be
recomposed. We preserve the whole of our experience and recall
parts of it. Hegel's approach to the mind is antithetical to the
contemporary cognitive scientist's analytic approach. Unfortunately, Hegel gives us no concrete suggestions about how to secure
infinitary generative capacities without a set of elementary parts
and combinatory operations.
It is intriguing to speculate about how Hegel would have considered an analogy drawn between the preservation of an image in this
"abyss" of the mind and the preservation of a part of a picture in a
hologram. There is no one-to-one correspondence between the
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parts of an image generated from a hologram and the parts of the
hologram itself; from any part of a hologram a complete, though
less detailed, image is generable. Another model of "distributed
representation" is offered by a new and fascinating branch of cognitive science—connectionism. Connectionist machines can perform
apparently difficult and sophisticated tasks in real time by manipulating highly interconnected networks of very simple processors.
Unlike standard algorithm-crunching von Neumann machines,
there are no separable memory addresses for different pieces of
information, either program or data. Whatever representations are
attributed to the machine cannot be localized; they are distributed
across the machine. It is possible that Hegel would have found even
these analogies too materialistic in their treatment of mind, but
perhaps such a treatment is still fitting at this low level of representation.
These potential images hidden within the intellect would be an
empty fiction unless they could be actualized, but they can be
actualized only in an intuition: "To have determinate being such an
abstractly preserved image needs an intuition with determinate
being. Recollection properly so called is the relation of the image to
an intuition, in particular as the subsumption of the immediate
singular intuition under what is universal in form, under the representation that has the same content" (§454, my tr.). In recollection
proper (recollection3) spirit gains control over the images within it,
for they are no longer present as either isolated intuitions or mere
potentialities of images. In recollection3 the relation between these
two aspects is brought to the fore, and this somehow gives spirit
this control. The paragraph is rather murky, but what Hegel is
getting at is that in recollectioni there has to be an actual intuition
present to the mind, and the potentialities discussed under the
heading of recollection2 can only find their actuality in those intuitions. Spirit can, however, produce this product on its own, rather
than waiting for it to be elicited by the environment: "In recollection
therefore, intelligence is within itself in the determinate sensation
and its intuition, and recognizes them as already its own, while at
the same time it now knows its image, which in the first instance is
merely internal, to be also confirmed in the immediacy of the intuition" (§454). This phrasing is a little misleading, for recognition
and knowing are sophisticated cognitive acts, well beyond the

Representation and Recollection

131

powers of this level of spiritual activity. I shall return to the interpretation of this sense of recognition below. "The image, which in
the abyss of intelligence was its property, is now, with the determination of externality, also in its [intelligence's] possession. It is
thereby at the same time posited as distinguishable from the intuition and separable from the simple night in which it is at first
immersed. Intelligence is therefore the power of being able to express what it possesses, and no longer to require external intuition
in order to have this possession existing within itself" (§454, my tr.).
Two questions are raised in §454: (a) in what sense are these
images general, and (b) what is the nature of the recognition we
gain in recollection3? The "abstractly preserved image" is the ability
to generate the image, but insofar as this ability is itself something
general, it is a general representation. But why is it that this descendant from a completely determinate intuition can be something
general? There are two ways to understand this new generality,
neither of which excludes the other. One of these involves a general
point about the nature of abilities; the other involves the specific
nature of images as Hegel conceives them.
First, there is something inherently general about abilities. Each
actual action is fully determinate; it is an individual. But I do not
think that we can make sense of having an ability that can logically
be realized in one and only one fully determinate way. I might have
theability to commit suicide at 10:53 P.M. on March 23,1989. Is this
an ability that has only one possible realization? True, it is necessary
that it can have only one actual realization, but there are still any
number of fully determinate possible actions that would realize this
ability. I could commit suicide with a knife, a gun, with sleeping
pills, at home, in my car, sorrowfully, or gleefully. We could add all
such conditions onto our specification of the ability, but there are
always others left unspecified. If we attempt to avoid these considerations by picking some fully determinate possible action, naming
it "Harry," and then saying that I have an ability to Harry, there are
several replies to be made. First, the context "an ability to ____"
takes a verbal-action description, not a name or singular term.
Second, if we understand this ability as "the ability to perform
Harry," there is an epistemological problem about assigning such
an ability without assigning the more general ability to perform
other Harry-like actions; our evidence could never be that complete.
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Can we think of conditions under which "He has the ability to
perform Harry" is justifiably assertable but "He has the ability to
perform other Harry-like actions" is not? It seems to me that this
makes sense only in a world so thoroughly determined that Harry is
the only possibility given the whole state of the world. But if the
events of this world are so thoroughly determined, it seems that the
notion of an ability becomes trivialized, for things would only have
"abilities" to do exactly those things they do. The abilities to construct images are standing abilities of spirit of which one realization
does not exclude other earlier or later realizations (unlike the realization of an ability to commit suicide). Even though the image
generated may be quite determinate, the same image can be generated again, and the generation of one particular image can also be a
realization of several different abilities. In each case the realization
is particular but the ability realized is general.
Second, an image, as we have seen, is an abstraction from the
objective spatiotemporal order; but once we have abstracted from
the spatiotemporal order and can no longer refer to it to individuate
cases, the image can present any number of different objects.
Locke, for instance, also saw this property of abstractions. As we
shall see when we consider the imagination, the more we abstract
not only from the object's spatiotemporal context but also from its
own spatiotemporal features, the more suitable it becomes as a
representation of a wide range of objects and properties. A recollection3 of a triangle is general in being an ability to generate other
perspectival views of the triangle, given the intuition of the triangle
as stimulus. The image generated is general in the sense that only
its internal properties are still fairly determinate, its spatiotemporal
position and perhaps other individuating relational properties being abstracted from.
In recollection3 we "subsume" an intuition under the abstract
representation, and this constitutes a sort of low-grade recognition of
the object. This is not full recognition, for no concepts are applied to
the thing in this recognitive process. I have talked as if the one-time
occurrence of an intuition is enough to preserve its image indelibly
in the mind, and although this is theoretically true, from the practical standpoint it is too simple, as Hegel recognizes quite well. The
strength with which a content is preserved is proportional to its
repetitions within experience. "If I am to preserve something by
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recollecting it therefore, I must have the intuition of it repeated. In
the first instance of course, the image is revived not so much by me
as by the immediate intuition corresponding to it. By means of
being thus frequently elicited, however, it acquires within me such
a liveliness and presence, that I no longer need the external intuition in order to recollect it" (§454, Zusatz). When this ability to call
up an image on one's own has been developed, a new and higher
stage of spirit, that of the reproductive imagination, has been
reached.
We can give another sense to the way a "general" representation—this ability to construct an image—subsumes an intuition,
and to the way we recognize the intuition as one we have already
had. It must be clear that we do not hold one intuition up against an
image and compare the two, deciding that they are the same or that
one is a specification of the other. Generally speaking, one thing is
subsumed under a second when the first is an instance of the second, and this approach can be extended fairly straightforwardly to
the case at hand: an actualization of an ability is an instance of it,
and a specific intuition is an instance of spirit's ability to construct
such an image. This still leaves unanalyzed the manner in which
spirit can recognize the content of an intuition as one it has encountered before.
That which is recognized as previously encountered, as our own,
is what is familiar. It is easy to fall into the trap of thinking that
recognizing something involves assigning it a linguistic or conceptual tag. The recognition we speak of here is definitely prelinguistic,
of a sort we might also be able to assign to animals, for instance.
Seeing something as familiar does not involve comparing it to any
other representation or sticking a tag on it mentally, but, phenomenologically speaking, it is presuming to know how things stand,
having certain definite expectations about what would happen
if. ... This form of knowing or recognition is founded on the
immediate knowledge of ease in the performance of an ability. All
explicit knowing that is founded on a set of epistemic skills, knowing hows.
If I am exercising a certain skill, I do not need to look at my actions
to know what I am doing or what the result of my actions ought to
be. Development of a skill brings along with it immediate, noninferential knowledge that the skill is being performed during the
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performance. This does not mean that in the performance of the
skill we are necessarily reflectively aware of the performance, but
that when we do have such reflective awareness it is noninferential.
Such awareness of ease in construction is immediate and noninferential, but it is not infallible, and it is based on our ability to
habituate ourselves to the ordinary course of events. Through this
process of familiarization and habituation, spirit gains control over
its representations. There is no suggestion here that this is a will-ful
learning process; at this stage we are confronted with a brute ability
of spirit, one spirit can learn to control consciously, but one that
does not depend on such conscious control. After repeated hearings, for instance, one can simply sing a song, without ever having
made an effort to learn it. And there are different degrees to which

the song can be mastered. Some people might require a good deal of
prompting, that is, the repetition of part of the appropriate intuition, to be able to keep going with the song. Others eventually find
no prompting at all necessary—they now know the song. Knowing
a song is a knowing how, it is a skill, and the kind of knowledge of
objects we possess in our recollective activities is a similar kind of
knowing how. It is a kind of technical knowledge always limited by
the immediate situation in its applicability and usefulness; it is not
yet theoretical knowledge, which escapes the limitations of particular situations, transcending the dependence on particular sensate
material that still characterizes recollection.

Imagination: Universality
and Signification

In Petry's edition of the Encyclopedia, it appears from the table of
contents that Imagination is subdivided into (a) Reproductive Imagination, (b) Associative Imagination, and (c) Phantasy, which is
then itself subdivided into (i) Symbol, (ii) Sign, and (iii) Language.
But this division seems to be Boumann's, not Hegel's, for if attention is paid to the architectonic mentioned in the main paragraphs,
it is clear that Reproductive Imagination and Associative Imagination are one and the same, and that the three divisions of Imagination are (a) Associative or Reproductive Imagination, (b) Symbolic
Imagination, and (c) Sign-making Imagination. I treat them in this
order.
ASSOCIATIVE OR REPRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION
Spirit, in the exercise of the ability to set images before itself
which are no longer occasioned by the immediate intuition, is the
reproductive imagination. As a result of spirit's having gained unconscious control over what is presented to it (which means that
reference to the present intuition as stimulus is no longer necessary
in the explanation of the occurrence of the mental act), the process
of abstraction, analysis, and generalization which was already in
evidence in recollection has become more thorough, more advanced. For now, "it is however only within the subject, in which it
is preserved, that the image has the individuality in which the
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determinations of its content are linked together, for its immediate,
i.e., its initially merely spatial and temporal concretion, its being a
unit within intuition, is dissolved" (§455). In recollection, the contents of the images were still complete spatiotemporal objects as
met with in intuition, although abstracted from their spatiotemporal context. But when the skills of construction have reached the
sophistication involved in imaginative reproduction, the distinct
determinations met with and united in the experience of a spatiotemporal object become dissociable from each other, no longer
hanging altogether in natural clumps. The connection between
determinations is no longer given by the general rules of construction or the particular knowledge of spirit; in forging the connection, spirit no longer follows the rules constitutive of objectivity
but unites the determinations in accordance with some subjective
general representation. "The reproduced content, as belonging to
the self-identical unity of intelligence and produced from intelligence's universal mine shaft, has a general representation for the
associative relation of images, of the representations which, in
accordance with other circumstances, are more abstract or more
concrete" (§455, my tr.).
The picture of mind operating in reproductive imagination which
emerges from these remarks seems to be the following. In recollection, mind achieves the ability to generate images of each particular
determinateness an object may possess, but intuition is still a controlling factor. In the reproductive imagination, these abilities are
freely exercised, but they are not informed with a rational order
either; they are governed by arbitrary associations, In more intuitive
language, having only encountered red fire trucks and green lanterns, with the power of imagination I can separate and recombine
these into images of green fire trucks and red lanterns. Images of
particular determinations are produced, not individually without
any connection, but as realizations of a more general representation, which, however, can be quite abstract, a mere association.
What we want to know is the nature of this general representation. We have already noted that images have a certain generality;
we must now see that imaginative representations have a higher
level of generality: "Images are already more general than intuitions; however, they still have a sensuously concrete content
whose relation to other such contents I am. In that I now direct my
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attention to this relation I obtain general representations—representations in the proper sense of the word. For that through which
the individual images relate to each other is precisely what is common to them" (§456, Zusatz, my tr.). Hegel goes on immediately to
explain this common element: "What is common is either a certain
particular aspect of the object raised to the form of universality,
such as the red color of the rose for instance, or the concrete universal, the genus; in the case of the rose for instance, the plant" (§456,
Zusatz).
We can now understand more exactly what has been accomplished in the earlier stage of recollection and here in reproductive
imagination. The abstract general representation within the mind in
recollection was still the representation of a particular individual
object, arid its generality was that of subsuming beneath it the
multiplicity of intuitions in space and time to which it could give
rise. Strictly speaking, it is only now, at the level of the associative
imagination, that we have achieved a truly general representation,
namely, the first representation of such things as redness and humanity.
It is important to note that Hegel distinguishes two different
forms of universality, although they are not distinct for subjective
spirit at this level: there are particular abstract properties and there
are concrete universals. What is the difference, and why is it so
intportant? Hegel himself identifies the concrete universal with the
genus, and other texts make it clear that Hegel thinks of the genus
of a thing as giving its essence, its concept, its ideal type, the
peculiar unity among the otherwise contingent determinations
which makes the thing what it is. In associative imagination both
kinds of universal become indifferently available to spirit, but the
associative imagination draws no distinctions between them. It is
only at the stage of thought that this distinction can be made by
spirit, for only at that point has spirit so systematized its own
products that it can isolate the crucial nodal points within the
system.
It is here within the treatment of the associative imagination that
Hegel discusses briefly what he1 takes to be the shortcomings in the
previous treatments of this subject, specifically, the notion of laws
of association of ideas and of abstraction. His first attack on the laws
of the association of ideas is merely terminological, for he points out
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that "it is not ideas that are associated," which is true in his system,
since his definition of "idea" is quite different from any given by
anyone working in the empirical tradition he is attacking. But this
hardly strikes a death blow. His other criticism, however, cuts
deeper. He claims that the "modes of relation" commonly considered under this heading are not laws, "the precise reason for this
being that the same matter is subject to so many laws, that what
occurs tends to be quite the opposite of a law in that it is capricious
and contingent,—it being matter of chance whether the linking
factor is an image or a category of the understanding such as equivalence and disparity, ground and consequence, etc." (§455). Associationists of the time often multiplied their "laws" beyond all
plausibility (although Hume certainly did not), and when care was
taken to keep the number small, they were stated vaguely enough
to be quite unscientific in any case.
There is also a deeper criticism lurking here, which we can restate
as follows. In physics the fundamental laws are relatively few, and
they apply universally. There can be great complexity in their application, thus rendering the actual calculation and prediction of
specific events practically impossible, but this is not a difficulty with
the theory; it creates no problem in employing the theory to explain
events, for they are all explained in parallel fashion. The so-called
laws of psychological association, however, are in a very different
situation. There are even greater difficulties with prediction—but
this might at first be thought to be merely practical. What is more
important is that these laws are not treated as universally applicable; in constructing a post hoc explanation, we do not mobilize the
full set of laws but choose one that will give the proper result, and
accordingly the other laws must not hold. In one case we invoke the
law of associating resembling representations, in another case we
invoke contiguity, and in a third, causation. There is, or at least
seems to be on the Humean account, nothing to decide which laws
get invoked until after the fact; the laws are to that extent merely ad
hoc. And this points up a nonpractical difficulty in using these laws
to construct predictions about what a person will think: even having specified the antecedent conditions, we cannot decide which
law will be the one obeyed. Unless we have a higher-order law to
give us some method of deciding this, we are in principle barred
from predicting. Thus, I believe, it is not merely the multiplicity of
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purported associative laws which is the focal point of Hegel's criticism—Hume avowed only three and Hartley only the law of contiguity—but their nonsystematic multiplicity that bears the brunt of
the objection. The "laws" of association simply do not share the
characteristics of law-likeness with other laws.
Is this a fair objection to Hume and the other associationists?
There are things the associationist can do to hold this objection off,
such as insist that the laws of association are measures of the
probability of a certain kind of idea following another and must be
given various weights relative to the background conditions. Thus,
in any particular case, prediction is not possible, since the laws
are only probabilistic, but all the laws apply, just with different
strengths, and all have universality and necessity. But this is not a
very happy move, and I am not aware of anyone making it or a
similar move at the time. Hume and the other associationists took
themselves to be developing a system of laws for the operation of
mind in the same way that Newton gave laws for the operation of
natural systems. Hegel has seized on some of the significant differences in the formal nature of the two kinds of laws to demonstrate
the inadequacy of the associationist program to its own ideal. The
ideal of a predictive psychology modeled on physics never attracted
Hegel in any case, of course.
Hegel is not yet finished with the associationists, however; he
takes a further look at the concept of abstraction. He does not deny
the legitimacy of the concept, but he does find fault with the associationists' attempts to analyze it. He claims that associationists
think of the abstraction of a general representation as a kind of
superimposition of similar images. This has been a common postLockean attempt to explain Locke's rather unfortunate pronouncement that the idea of a triangle "must be neither oblique nor rectangular, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and
none of these at once" (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
bk. IV, pt. 7, sect, ix, my emphasis). Hegel does not attack this
rather confused notion of an abstract idea (which was not Locke's
reflective position) straightforwardly, however; rather, he points
out that with this in mind one still needs to explain how just these
images get combined: "In order that this superposing may not be
entirely accidental and conceptless, an attractive force or something
of the kind had to be assumed between the similar images" (§455,
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my tr.). This remark of Hegel's immediately brings to mind one of
Hume's: after discussing the principles of association that govern
the mental world, Hume notes that "here is a kind of attraction,
which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary
effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various
forms. Its effects are every where conspicuous; but as to its causes,
they are mostly unknown" (A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. I, pt. i,
sect. iv). But, says Hegel, it is silly to treat the bond between
different images as some sort of attractive force; the bond is spirit
itself.
Hegel's point is that representations have the powers they
have—they are the representations they are—because of their role
in a complex system. The associationists cling here to the idea that
our representations are thoroughly natural and that their interactions are also as natural as the causal relations among physical
particles. But the holism of representations defeats the conception,
for their interactions are not atomistically determined. The system
is primary, not any particular property of the representations. The
"attractive force" between representations is not an empirically
demonstrable entity on empiricist principles; there is no perception
of it, and if there were, that perception would be just another
impression. Images are not united by some intrinisic attractive
force; the postulation of a natural attractive force between subjective entities constitutes a pseudo-solution to understanding their
order and connection. An attempt to construct a mechanical model
of the mind and of the nature of an idea or concept must fail, for it
fundamentally misconstrues the nature of spiritual activity, which
is not mechanical but holistic and teleological. And once spirit is
recognized as this force, and the images are understood to be
determined by the totality in which they participate, the road to the
proper understanding of what is spiritual has been opened.
Yet to talk of a free act of spirit is not to say that the ordering of
images is chaotic or indeterminate, for "intelligence itself is not only
general form; rather, its inwardness is in itself determinate, concrete subjectivity with its own content or worth [Gehalt] which
stems from some interest, implicit concept, or idea" (§456, my tr.).
But how are we to understand such an internal determination?
What is the mechanism of determination here? If we say that we
have a form of agent causation, not mechanical causation—under-
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standing the activity of spirit in the terms that seem to spring most
quickly to mind given Hegel's own idiom—we have then set up a
picture that presupposes an agent, a mind within the mind itself,
the "little man" theory of mind. Clearly this is not something we
want to attribute to Hegel. But agent causation is not the only
alternative to mechanical causation. Another model of determination is that of an element's being determined by its place in a whole.
Hegel's point is that the order of particular images and representations can often be legitimately and usefully explained by reference
to the whole train in which they occur, which is itself accounted for
by reference to some higher-level mental entity, such as an abiding
interest or an attempt to solve a problem, which involves even
further holistic reference to the mental life of the subject.
/
On the basis of this functional determination of mental acts, we
can then reintroduce a notion of agent causation in the mental
sphere, as is clearly necessary at a later stage, since we can cause
thought to occur by trying to think of something, setting oneself to
consider a problem, and so on.
This possibility of the holistic explanation of series of mental acts
shows up another fault in naive associationism: if the associationist
principles are adopted as the sole explanatory principles of mental
activity, rational, goal directed thought is unintelligible—or, rather,
is unintelligible as rational thought. On the basis of the associationist laws alone we cannot distinguish flights of fancy from wellcontrolled problem-solving patterns of thought. The recognition
that series of thoughts come as intelligible units or wholes is the first
step toward separating "the play of a thoughtless representing"
(§455) fr°m rationally informed thought itself.

SYMBOLIC IMAGINATION
Insofar as individual images acquire a place within a train of
thought, they begin to point beyond themselves and thus begin to
acquire meaning. This is the next level, the symbolic imagination,
which together with sign-making imagination Hegel often calls
fantasy. We must not presume that because Hegel talks here of
meanings he has moved into quasi-linguistic mental activity, nor is
the abstract rational content that unifies the subjective representa-
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tions a "hovering presence" or a ghost. It exists in the representations and needs them in order to have actual existence: 'Thus,
while informing [this fund of representations] with its own content,
[intelligence] is in itself determinately recollected in it—fantasy,
symbolizing, allegorizing, or poetical imagination" (§456, my tr.).
Thus a particular image of a particular rose becomes a symbol for all
roses, and it is called to mind at times in order to be the particular
embodiment of or vehicle for, for instance, a representation of
beauty. Which particular rose-image is present to mind when one is
thinking about flowers or roses or beauty is entirely unimportant,
and the explanation of the occurrence of the image does not account
for it in all its particularity, but only in its general formal features.
There are of course certain conditions the image must meet to be
eligible as a symbol for a certain general representation, namely, it
must be an image of something that shares the appropriate property: "This [fantasy] chooses, to express its general representations,
no other sensuous stuff than that whose independent meaning
corresponds to the determinate content of the universal to be imaged. So, for example, the strength of Jupiter is presented through
the eagle, since the eagle is held to be strong" (§457, Zusatz, my tr.).
But fantasy can operate with complex sets of symbols, and "it is
rather by a coherence of details that allegory expresses what is
subjective" (§457, Zusatz). This level of mental activity underlies the
possibility of art, but the discussion of the particular modes of
symbolization belongs properly to the philosophy of art and is not
discussed here at all. We can note, however, that the art of poetry,
as explicitly linguistic, is a strange hybrid between the symbolic and
the signific. It would be interesting to see how consistent with this
account of symbols and signs Hegel's treatment of poetry and art is.
Symbolic fantasy is an important turning point in mind's growth
to free self-determination, for "insofar as the content it derives from
itself has an imaged existence, intelligence is perfected into intuition of itself within phantasy" (§457>. Previously what was present
to mind was best accounted for by reference either to the external
influences on mind (intuition) or to what prior experience the mind
had already accumulated together with the present intuition (representation in the lower stages). In symbol fantasy, however, this is
no longer true; the particular images, what is present to mind, are
now to be accounted for by reference to particular goals or interests
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or to larger-scale chunks of spirit's life, such as character or projects.
With the ability to symbolize, spirit becomes capable of dealing
effectively, although still rudimentarily, with universals beyond the
universals of sense. We can symbolize such universals as justice
and thus begin to get an adequate grasp on what must otherwise remain beyond the power of sense or recollection. Spirit and thought
are themselves nonsensible universals, and the symbolizing imagination marks a significant step toward the self-comprehension of
spirit.
Let me summarize metaphorically the route we have watched
spirit take. At the level of intuition spirit is, as it were, a mirror of its
objective environment. It obeys set laws in reflecting the environment, but these are constant enough to be ignored for most purposes—the explanation of what plays across the face of the mirror is
carried by the facts about the environment* But this will not do
totally for two reasons, and our attention is directed to the mirror
itself. There are or can be flaws in the mirror that need to be taken
into account (illusion, madness), and, more important, the mirror
itself is not a merely passive reflector—it is active within its reflection, reorganizing the input. At first the reorganization of the input
seems merely a matter of adding depth or body to the reflection by
including in the now increasingly multidimensional reflection afterimages and other perspectives of the objects reflected, but we then
notice that some images now are "shadowed" with related but noncoobjectual images, and that these shadows group the images into
new suborganizations. We also find some images unrelated to anything in the immediate environment. In our explanations of why
the mirror's overall image is what it is, we find these shadows to be
of increasing importance, and by grouping them into similarity
classes we can develop theories of the character of various mirrors,
what their interests are, and so on—and these theories simplify our
now otherwise incredibly complex task of explaining why they
reflect the images they do.

SIGN-MAKING IMAGINATION
In that spirit only begins at the level of symbolic fantasy to determine itself, to determine its own content, it is only relatively free,
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for to embody the general representation it must find an image that
exemplifies that property. Spirit advances to sign-making fantasy,
for the sign is an arbitrary vehicle for the universal content of spirit,
and in the sign spirit achieves a higher measure of freedom. But the
transition from symbolic to sign-making fantasy is not clear in the
Encyclopedia; it seems the proper move, but just how is it effected?
Hegel points out several times that the symbol is subjective, and he
maintains that this failing is overcome in the sign. "Subjective" is a
protean word in Hegel's philosophy, and each of its occurrences
demands our attention.
In using "subjective" here Hegel is clearly not pointing out the
mentality of the image that serves as symbol. Insofar as we are
dealing with mental images here this needs no pointing out; but if
we extend our discussion to include artistic images, which Hegel
seems to allow, then we are no longer limited to mental images at
all. In what other sense are all these things subjective? If the ontological status of the symbols is not relevant, then I suggest that the
link between symbol and symbolized is. There is a purely natural
connection between the two in that they share common properties.
But this does not account for the choice of a particular image as a
symbol, for there are presumably many other images that share the
natural link to the symbolized. There is no rule to decide what
symbolizes what, and no common agreement is necessary for something to be a symbol to someone. To this extent the link between
symbol and symbolized is subjective and up to the whim of the
agent. In the sign, this subjectivity is supposed to be overcome, but
as the sign is also an arbitrarily chosen entity that stands for another, is the sign-signified link not just as subjective? It is subjective, but this case is different in an important aspect. There is no
longer a natural link between sign and signified. Whereas symbols
can be varied relatively arbitrarily on the assumption that the natural link between symbol and symbolized will carry the brunt of the
symbolic labor, such an assumption can no longer be made about
signs. Precisely because the link between sign and signified is totally arbitrary, it must be held to consistently; the arbitrary linkage
has become the essential tie.1
i. Even in a private language, if such is possible, the sign-signified relations must
be held to consistently if they are to exist at all.

Imagination: Universality and Signification

145

Any semantic relation must depend on certain uniformities. In
the case of the symbol-symbolized relation, the crucial uniformities
are intrinsic to the respective contents, but the existence of a particular symbol-symbolized relation is dependent on fully arbitrary
choice. In the sign-signified relation the crucial uniformity is none
other than the continued observance of a once-arbitrary correlation.
The original correlation was fully arbitrary, but the existence of a
particular sign-signified relation depends on its having become a
rule, an objective fact, that the two are correlated.
If this is the sense in which a sign is a more objective embodiment
of spirit's representation, why is this to be seen as an advance
beyond the more subjective symbol? Because, in making a sign,
spirit has broken still further from being determined and has become to an even greater extent the determining factor in its own
existence. "In its use of intuition therefore, intelligence displays
more willfulness and sovereignty in designating than it does in
symbolizing (§458)." For in the sign the particular content of the intuition employed has become fully unimportant; it must, of course,
have a content, but which content is fully arbitrary. In creating signs
"from its own self, [intelligence] then gives its independent representation a definite determinate being, using the filled space and
time, the intuition as its own, effacing its immediate and proper
content, and giving it another content as significance and soul"
(§458, my tr.). The sign-signified relation is higher than the symbolsymbolized relation because the activity of spirit is now fully responsible for the link. Further, because there need not be a direct
sharing of properties between sign and signified, more complex,
more abstract, more universal contents can be easily signified than
can be symbolized, and thus spirit is able to possess these more
abstract contents determinately in the sign.
The sign-making fantasy seems to mark a watershed for spirit in
that, due to the markedly increased ability to deal with universals
that such signs afford, a significant advance can be made in spirit's
self-comprehension, and in particular in spirit's ability to give itself
concrete embodiment and expression. "Intelligence qua reason
starts by appropriating to itself the immediacy it finds within itself . . . , that is, by determining it as universal; from here on its
activity as reason (§438) is to determine as being what is perfected
(completed) to the concrete intuition of itself within it/ that is, to
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make itself into being, into the subject matter [Sache]" (§457, my tr.).
In earlier stages the emphasis was on unfolding the universal content of the "found" material. The emphasis now shifts, however, to
individualizing and expressing the universal, the proper content of
spirit, spirit's inner nature. "It is to be emphasized that insofar as
fantasy brings the inner content [Gehalt] to image and intuition and
this is expressed by [fantasy's] determining it as having being, the
expression that intelligence makes itself be or makes itself into a
thing should not seem peculiar, for its content [Gehalt] is intelligence itself, as is the determination intelligence gives the content"
(§457, my tr.).
Spirit's self-comprehension makes its first recognizable appearance here, but it is still severely limited by the mode of universality
available to sign-making fantasy, for it is confined to the abstract
universal and is therefore merely formal. "The formations of phantasy are recognized everywhere as such unifications of what is
proper and internal to spirit [the universal] with what is intuitable
[the singular]; . . . As the activity of this unification, phantasy is
reason, but insofar as the capacity [content, Gehalt] of phantasy as
such is a matter of indifference, it is merely formal reason, whereas
reason as such determines the truth of the content" (§457).
We are now on the brink of language, but we must be aware that
not all signs are linguistic signs. Hegel's first examples of signs are
cockades, flags, and gravestones. These are signs, for their link
with what they signify is fully arbitrary and conventional. Indeed,
to the extent that they lack the semantic structure we find in language, they are more adequate examples of signs than words are,
for linguistic structure looks beyond the imaginative activities we
have been discussing, anticipating the standpoint of thought, of the
understanding in particular. The ability to create signs Hegel calls
the productive memory; he reserves the term "memory" (Gedachtni$Y for sign-using mental activity, "for although in general usage
memory is often taken to be interchangeable and synonymous with
recollection, and even with representation and imagination, it is
never concerned with anything but signs" (§458).
2. Unlike Erinnerung (etymologically, "inwardizing"), which we translate "recollection," Gedachtnis seems to be derived from the past participle of "to think."
Perhaps it is for this reason that Hegel uses it for the higher activity of signification.
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Although language itself is the product of the later stage, memory, Hegel devotes a good deal of time in §459 to a discussion of the
nature of the linguistic sign per se, for the linguistic sign, in particular not the written sign but the spoken, exhibits the nature of being
a sign most fully. As a sign, "intuition . . . acquires the essential
determination of having being only as a sublatedness. . . . In its
truer shape, the intuition of a sign is therefore a determinate being
within time—determinate being which disappears in that it has
being, while in accordance with its further external, psychical determinateness it is the positedness of the tone, which intelligence
furnishes from the anthropological resources of its own naturalness, the fulfillment of the expressiveness by which inwardness
makes itself known" (§459).
Spirit's being is spatial and temporal, but since space is static and
time active and moving, spirit expresses itself more adequately in
time than in space. The tone is "physicalized time" (§401, Zusatz),
and, in the tone, space and time find a relation that parallels the
abstract nature of their relation in spirit itself to a surprising degree.
"For in the tone, corporeality becomes posited temporally as motion, as an internal oscillation of the body, a vibration, as a mechanical shock through which the body as a whole moves only its parts
without having to alter its relative place, sublates its indifferent
juxtaposition by positing its inner spatiality temporally, and by this
sublation allows its pure inwardness to emerge from the superficial
alteration brought about by the mechanical shock, before immediately restoring itself" (§401, Zusatz). In the tone, the activity of
spirit is evident as activity, rather than as frozen in the spatial selfexternality of the written word.
Hegel is attempting here to give a proof that spoken language is
metaphysically or ontologically prior to written language, an attempt that depends both on his analysis of the nature of spirit and
on certain theses of his philosophy of nature. The attempt does not
succeed, for we can no longer take all his premises seriously. But
from this priority Hegel derives the superiority of alphabetic over
hieroglyphic writing systems, since in an alphabetic system the
signs do not directly signify representations but rather signify the
tones that are naturally used to signify representations. Insofar as,
the alphabetic system is an encoding of the phonemic system,
which is both temporally and metaphysically prior to it, it is both a
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more adequate or proper and a more efficient expression of spirit
than a hieroglyphic system. Hieroglyphic systems, for instance,
tend to be tainted with symbolism rather than being pure signs.
There is, however, no sudden break between symbolic and sign
systems, for our spoken language has its roots in the onomatopoeic
replication of natural sounds. But, as elsewhere in Hegel's thought,
the fact that onomatopoeia is only the beginning of language shows
that it is the lowest level, unessential (§459).

10
Memory: Language as
the Material of Thought

SIGNIFICATION AND LANGUAGE
At the level of sign-making imagination we have sign making
only in its genesis. The immediate cry welling up from within, the
grunt that only later comes to be attached to an object or situation—
these are better illustrations of sign-making imagination than the
more complex activities of highly trained language users. "The
name is initially a single transient production, and the connection of
the representation as something inner with the intuition as something external, is itself external" (§460, my tr.).
In the section on memory we watch this attempt of spirit to
indicate and embody itself gain objectivity and independence, become stable and meaningful, and then get left behind by spirit as
something still too external, atomistic, and passive to properly
express spirit's nature as spirit then transcends symbols and signs
to realize itself as pure thought. The word is itself something intuited, something perceived; consequently it too is subject to the
generalizing activity of representation which gives rise to signs in
the first place. But the recollection of a word is not the same as the
recollection of the sound constituting the word, for sounds can at
best be tokens of words—and even so one can hear a sound as a
sound yet not hear it as a word, if, for instance, one does not know
the language. So the recollection of a word is no longer the recollection of a mere intuition but the recollection of a significant intuition,
one that already embeds within it a prior recollecting. To clarify this
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difference, let us look more closely at Hegel's conception of the
signification relation before we turn to the paragraphs on memory.
The theory of meaning plays a central role in contemporary epistemology and metaphysics, so we find ourselves naturally putting
great weight on the theory of meaning when we turn to the examination of a past philosophy. But to some extent the emphasis on the
theory of meaning can be misleading; as crucial a role as pretwentieth-century philosophy may have accorded language, language was not thought to be the key to resolving most epistemological and metaphysical problems.1 Hegel was still under the influence
of the (by then old) new way of ideas, according to which the
primary explanandum was our understanding of the world, not our
ability to speak correctly about it. It was taken for granted that
language's connection with the world is quite indirect; words are
signs or marks for ideas and gain meaning or reference to objects
only because their immediate significations are ideas, mental acts,
that have antecedent connection with the objects. Locke insists on
this understanding of signification and claims that to try to make
words signify something other than the ideas of the speaker "would
be to make them signs of nothing, sounds without significance" (An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, bk III, pt. 2, sect. 2)
It is within this tradition that Hegel is working. When Hegel says,
for instance, that a word signifies a representation, he clearly does
not mean that all we can talk about is our representations. Hegel is
concerned here to understand the role language plays in the economy of the individual spirit as a being that comprehends his world.
For Locke language plays no essential role in the constitution of
experience or knowledge; language opens up experience in that
through language we have access to the experience of others, but
our basic experience of the world is not affected by language or the
lack of it. According to Locke, language's role is the communication
of thoughts to another, which is only a supplement to the ideational
process, not an essential part of it. In Hegel's theory, on the contrary, language is essentially involved in the process of thinking.
i. lan Hacking argues that Locke, Arnauld, and others working within the new
way of ideas had no theory of meaning as we presently understand the term, and
that to expect them to deal with our problems leads to misunderstanding and
disappointment; see Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?.
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Hegel does not believe that one could have a full, rich cognitive life
without language; indeed, language is a necessary presupposition
and concomitant of thought, according to Hegel, and is therefore
not a mere adjunct that conveniently allows us to communicate
with others. Language plays a necessary role in the development of
the richness and complexity of our mental life; it is essential for
Spirit's ability to instantiate reason.
Whereas Locke tends to think of the ideas words signify as images, Hegel by no means thinks of the representations signified by
Words as particular images. Locke, of course, founders when confronted with words like "or," "every," or "when," for it seems
impossible to come up with an image they could signify. Hegel, on
the other hand, has told us that the signified representations are
abilities to generate images either on the occasion of external causal
affection or freely, that is, determined from within. Locke talks as if
1
the ideas are images of objects; for Hegel the representations are
generals that find their being in and subsume mental individuals,
namely, intuitions. He acknowledges that "the formal factor in
language is, however, the work of the understanding, which informs it with its categories, and it is this logical instinct that gives
rise to what is grammatical" (§459). The understanding, we shall
see, is concerned with the universal articulation of experience, and
the logical operators or grammatical words in a language signify,
not images of objects, but the ability to structure images and representations in general in a certain way and to recognize that structure
in our experience. Bluntly put, "and" signifies the ability to conjoin
images and representations and the (same) ability to experience a
conjunction of items as a conjunction. This is why the grammatical,
structural principles of the understanding and reason must already
be at work in intuition, even though they only "come to consciousness" in the higher, still more reflective stages of the Psychology.
'By having words that signify our mental activities or abilities, we
can invoke those abilities without having to use them. Language
performs the immensely useful (indeed, necessary) task of distilling
the complex abilities of mind into simple form; a general representation, "however rich a content it may include, is still for the mind
simple in, the riame." I may have, for instance, the general representation of a democracy, which means having the ability to recognize
a democracy and the ability to generate images on my own of
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situations that count as democratic.2 Democracy is a general notion,
and for me to have an actual thought of democracy it must be
embodied in something singular, such as images. But if our images
were always as complex as the phenomenon in question, it would
be very difficult for our finite, limited minds to do much thinking at
all. Rather than thinking about democracy by the complex use of my
ability to intuit and imagine one, I think about a democracy through
the mention of this ability in the simple use of a word. The connection between the word and the general representation is immediate;
the word, as it were, goes proxy for the representation: "With the
name lion we need neither the intuition of such an animal, nor even
the image; rather, the name, in that we understand it, is the imageless, simple representation. We think in names" (§462, my tr.).
The fact that words allow one, if not totally to dispense with
intuition and the sensible, at least to minimize the direct involvement of complex sensate constructions in the higher mental activities of man, is also important to Hegel, for this is yet another
stage in the progressive sublation of sensation. The particularities of
sensation become less and less important. It is certainly impossible
for a congenitally blind man to possess a direct image of red, but he
can acquire the use of the word "red" and thus an indirect ability to
recognize cases of red, not on the basis of direct perception, but on
the basis of descriptions, meter readings, and so forth. Thus Hegel,
unlike a severe empiricist, need not deny a representation of red to
a well-educated blind man. The empiricist tends to think that the
ability to recognize red directly is essential to the representation of
redness, but for Hegel the former ability is not essential to representing redness, to being able to reason correctly about redness.
The sensation of red is something subjective, itself noncognitive,
and it gives us only the nonconceptual occasion for forming the
representation of red.
This analysis leaves some problems. Clearly the abilities that, on
my account, constitute the representation of red can be quite different for a blind man and a sighted man; by what right do we call
them representations of the same thing, and how is intersubjective
communication between the two possible, given that the representations invoked by the word "red" could be disparate? We have
2. There is no reason to think that the images generated must be static, or of
individual objects; an image of a democracy might be a montage of images of
actions—people voting, an assembly convening, etc.
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been treating having a representation of red as basically having the
ability to recognize red things in a wide range of actual and possible
circumstances. But the ability to recognize something cannot be
simply the ability to attach a label, for that is what we are trying to
explain. It rather comes down to an ability to generate in image an
appropriate similarity class of situations and an ability to respond
appropriately in other ways. The blind and the sighted man can
agree, by and large, on which situations count as similar in this
respect even if their criteria, their ways of telling, are different.
There may be some minor divergence due to the vagueness of the
term "red," but we do not need exact correspondence. Large-scale
intersubjective agreement is sufficient at our present level.
The most important aspect of language, however, is that the
complex abilities of spirit to generate images and recognize things
can now be replaced by the relatively simpler ability to use words.
Words are simpler elements standing for complexes, and to that
extent they are something like abbreviations. They are of course
more, for the intuitions that are words themselves go through the
process of recollection, and the representative powers of spirit reflect on themselves, creating still higher levels.3 This first reflection
occurs at the lowest level of memory, to the examination of which
we now turn.

THE STAGES OF MEMORY
The section on memory is subdivided into three subsections: they
are, roughly speaking, (a) recollective or name-retaining memory,
(b) reproductive or imaginative memory, and (c) mechanical memory, which is, so to speak, memory memorized.

Recollective Memory
Recollective memory is the analysis of the activity of understanding words at the level of recollection3. "Making that connection,
3. There may be interesting analogies between the way words function in Hegel's
theory and the way function names operate in a computer language such as LISP. If a
large number of complex functions are defined in the computer language, an extremely complex program can be expressed very simply and elegantly, because each
function is itself very complex. Furthermore, in LISP there is no distinction between

program and data; everything is a function.
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which the sign is, its own, intelligence raises the single connection
to a universal, that is enduring connection, through this recollection, in which name and meaning are objectively combined for it,
and makes the intuition, which the name initially is, to a representation, so that the content, the meaning, and the sign are identified,
are one representation" (§461, my tr.).
The sound is originally a single spontaneous production of spirit
which expresses or signifies spirit's representation. But, by recollecting the sound with its connection to the representation, spirit
constructs a standing connection; the word as significant is now
present within spirit as an abstractly preserved image that is called
forth by the appropriately related intuitions. Once again, the "abstractly preserved image" is nothing more than the ability to recognize and appropriately respond to a word given the appropriate
intuition. But already at this level the connection between the sign
and what it signifies has become objective: "The primary thing here
is that we retain the meaning of names—that we become able, with
the linguistic sign, to recollect the representations objectively linked
to them" (§461, Zusatz, my tr.). Note that Hegel is not saying here
that, on hearing a word, an image of something to which the word
applies comes into our heads, but rather that at this stage knowing
the meaning of a word does mean that one has the ability to generate such images; the word signifies the ability, not the images. This
is what is most important for Hegel, for insofar as the word goes
proxy for the representation, in order for us to have an actual
mental presentation of the content of a general representation we
need no longer invoke the imagistic abilities involved in it. We can
dispense with all actual images, for, if necessary, we can construct
or generate the necessary images given the words. Things are now
presented to us through words. The connection between sign and
signified is now fully objective [Objektiv] because, having been generalized through the activity of recollection, it no longer depends on
the whim or immediate urge of an individual subjective spirit.
Reproductive Memory
Insofar as the process of full appropriation of verbal signs has
been accomplished, the stage of reproductive memory has been
reached: "The name is the subject matter [Sache], as it is present in
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the realm of representation and has validity. The reproductive memory, with neither intuition nor image, possesses and recognizes the
subject matter in the name, and with the subject matter the name"
(§462, my tr.). A content of representation can be either an individual spatiotemporal thing or an abstractum such as justice; in either
case, for actual representation there must be a determinate individual presented to mind that acts as the vehicle or embodiment of the
content.4 In the lower stages of representation we must re-present
,the thing itself, which makes the representation of abstracta (contents peculiar to spirit itself) impossible. At a higher level we can
substitute a symbol for the thing itself, and finally an arbitrary sign
serves as the representation of the thing and the content of the
mental act is embodied in a foreign matter. Insofar as we recollect
this matter as a sign, we create an ability that embeds another, for
the recollection of the sign is an ability to represent the connection
between sign and signified, which last is itself an ability.
We can set out the parallelism between stages of representation
arid stages of memory as follows. We have analyzed the recollection
of a lion as the ability to re-present the lion, as knowing how to
construct the lion from sensate material and how to respond to such
intuitions. The recollection of "lion" is the ability to re-present
"lion" as a sign—that is, to construct "lion" in its relation to the
ability to represent lions. In reproductive imagination we achieve a
general representation of lion, the ability to re-present not just a
lion, or a class of similar-looking lions, but lions in general—that is,
to construct lions from sensate material. The reproductive memory
of "lion" is the ability to represent "lion"s,—that is, to construct
"lion"s from our sensate material. In recoUective memory we are
still re-presenting word tokens, and in reproductive memory, I
believe, we move up to the re-presentation of word types. Again
there are embedded abilities in reproductive memory, for the representation of "lion"s as signs involves the implicit reference to
what they signify, itself an ability. But the embedded ability need
exist only implicitly—to represent "lion" as a meaningful sign, I
need not actually exercise the ability it signifies; and an unexercised
4. Spatiotemporal "individuals" are almost as much general things for Hegel as,
for instance, properties such as redness; individuals have properties in common,
and properties have individuals in common; which way one slices the pie is a matter
of indifference.
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ability, having nothing actually embodying it, remains a mere potency and thus is not realized in any mental act at the time.
Thus through our use of words we have eliminated the need for
intuitions and images of the things we represent. The things we
represent exist for us in the names themselves: "As the existence of
the content within intelligence, the name is intelligence's internal
self-externality, and as the intuition brought forth from intelligence,
the recollection of the name is at the same time the externalization in
which intelligence posits itself within its own self" (§462). This
passage, so confusing in its statement, is explicated in the following
passage from the Zusatz:
Although the spoken word vanishes in time, and time therefore displays itself in the words as an abstract or merely destructive negativity, the truly concrete negativity of the linguistic sign is intelligence,
since it is through intelligence that it is changed from an externality
into an internality, and preserved in this altered form. It is thus that
words become a determinate being animated by thought. This determinate being is absolutely necessary to our thoughts. We only know
of our thoughts, only have thoughts which are determinate and actual, when we give them the general form of objectivity, of being
different from our inwardness, i.e., the shape of externality—and
moreover of an externality which at the same time bears the stamp of
supreme inwardness. (§462, Zusatz)

Thought is general; its form and its content are general, and it is
mere appearance that we can think the individual. But the general
cannot exist without the individual; if something general is to be
one of an "indefinite multitude of existents as reflected-into-themselves, which at the same time are correlative, and form a world
of reciprocal dependence and of infinite interconnection between
grounds and consequents" (§123), it must individualize itself and
become a determinate one among many. The general contents of
theoretical spirit are most adequately individualized and given a
determinate being through words, for, since words are the free
production of spirit, unlike intuition and even images, they are
immediately presented to mind as imbued and informed with spirituality. Words have a thoroughly mundane existence as sounds,
but what they are—words—is essentially the expression of the
spiritual. Without such an expression spirit would remain unarticu-
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lated generality. Implicit in this view is the thesis that the individuation and identity criteria for words give us the individuation and
identity criteria for thoughts, and thus, although they are not the
same as words (words are in a language, for instance, whereas representations and thoughts are not), our only access to the thoughts
we have is through and in words. Further discussion of this difficult
topic must await our examination of thought itself in Chapters n
and 12.
Thought and reason are essentially systematic; insofar as language considered at the level of memory has not yet attained the
level of thought, and thus is not yet systematized, the individual
signs are not systematically joined but simply follow one another in
our heads as we experience the world and respond to it verbally. In
intuition or representation we "run through series of" (§462) words
internally with no particular connection between them. The move
to names within grammatical structures rather than lists depends
on language use being informed with thought. In the grammatical
structures available in language we can do more than simply name
our representations; we have the ability to think about them, to
reflect on their relations and internal structure. The representations
this reflection gives rise to are themselves capable of being named.
Mechanical Memory
The reproductive memory itself does no more than set the foundations for the complex activity of language use. The next stage,
what Hegel calls mechanical memory, presents us with a rather
surprising move in which spirit, which in the previous few stages of
its activity had been trying to express itself ever more fully, now
divorces itself from its product, the words, rendering them senseless. This is the last stage of representative spirit and the transition
to thought itself.
Hegel's concept of mechanical memory poses many problems for
us, for on Hegel's own admission, "to grasp the placing and significance of memory and to comprehend its organic connection with
thought in the systematization of intelligence, is one of the hitherto
wholly unconsidered and in fact one of the most difficult points in
the doctrine of spirit" (§464). Mechanical memory is crucial in
Hegel's account, for it constitutes the point of transition from repre-
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sentation to thought—even though it seems itself to be the antithesis of thinking.
Briefly and bluntly put, in mechanical memory, spirit is once
again divided into a multiplicity of simple elements that "appear as
something found" (§463) on the one hand and as a purely abstract
container holding them together on the other. We have seen similar
stages earlier in spirit's progress, for instance at the stages of feeling
and habit. But as we shall see, there are significant differences, for
the elements at this point are of a radically different nature.
Hegel's manner of speaking about this stage is fairly confusing.
He talks of subjectivity here being the "universal space" of "senseless words" and spends a disproportionate amount of time unfolding the analogy to rote memorization, which analogy I find not
particularly illuminating unless one already understands his interpretation of memory sufficiently well to see why it serves as the
example. The interpretation Hegel has in mind may be briefly put as
follows. In reproductive memory an important new wrinkle enters
the picture of mind Hegel has been sketching: mind explicitly presents itself to itself insofar as in the general representation of a word
the link between the sign and the signified is represented, for in
order to do this, the signified, which is itself a general representation, something subjective that needs an objectivity in order to
achieve actuality, must itself be at least implicitly represented. Thus
the general representation lion is included implicitly in the general
representation 'lion'. But this latter general representation can itself
be named, signified—as indeed we have done with the word
"lion." Any representative ability of mind can be named. We have
already seen that names come to replace images and intuitions. If
we take the process of naming to its extreme and abstract from the
necessarily ongoing intuitions and representations in the mind,
what is left? "At the same time however, this taking up [of the heart
of the matter in the word] also has the further significance of intelligence making a matter [Sache] of itself, so that subjectivity, in that
it is different from the matter, becomes something that is quite
empty.—The spiritless reservoir of words that constitutes mechanical memory" (§462, Zusatz).
We certainly have a mess of names left—but what else? Any
actual ability of mind to represent either intuitions, images, or
names is itself named and replaced by the name. Yet we cannot say

Memory: Language as the Material of Thought

159

that all we have left is a large collection of names, for undoubtedly
spirit itself is not identical with these names, these externalizations
of itself, its products; yet it is nothing in particular over against
them, for otherwise it would have been particularized in a name
and replaced. Still, something must be left to account for the coexistence and occurrence of series of names. "The I, which is the
abstract being, is, as subjectivity, at the same time the power of the
different names, the empty bond that fixes series of them in itself
and keeps them in stable order" (§463, my tr.). Another way to put
this is to point out that none of the particular representative abilities
of spirit exhaust spirit. The particular abilities of spirit can be named
insofar as they are particular—"intelligence is however the universal, the simple truth of its particular externalizations" (§463). There
dan be no real name for spirit because naming particularizes, and
spirit can never be reduced to a particular.
This account of the nominalization of subjectivity explains Hegel's talk of subjectivity as a space of or abstract power over words,
but we still need to see how it is that words have become "meaningless" at this stage. This is particularly important, for, just as words
have become meaningless in mechanical memory, Hegel claims
that thought itself "no longer has a meaning" (§464). It seems at
best incongruous to attribute meaninglessness to thought, so we
must understand just what is involved in the denial of mearjing to
thought.
Having a meaning is, according to Hegel, a relational characteristic1 of intuitions; an intuition has meaning when it stands in the
signifying relation to a general representation, which is then its
meaning. But given this state of affairs, we can ask several revealing
questions. What are the relations between these various products of
intelligence, the words? And second, if we carry through the "nominalization" of spirit discussed above, what is left of this notion of
meaning?
The answer to our first question is that the only relations that exist
between words at this stage are accidental juxtapositions as spirit
runs through them in series in reaction to its internal and external
environment. That there are only accidental relations between any
words here can be demonstrated as follows. Each general representation is different from every other, even though it is not clear just
what the criteria of individuation are. Still, each general representa-
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tion receives a name, which is its simple presentation to mind. That
must mean that, qua name, no name admits of analysis; it is the
simple presentation of a general representation. The general representation of a male sibling receives, for instance, the name "brother." But as this is its simple presentation to mind, it is not itself
capable of analysis, and neither does subjective spirit have the
conceptual tools at this stage to perform any acts of analysis. Thus
in our minimal verbal reactions to our environment it may well be
the case that "brother" always occurs together with "male" and
"sibling" as we survey our world, but there is at this level insufficient structure for spirit to construct the assertion that brothers are
male siblings. Our words at this stage are linked in parallel with the
representations they express, and the representations still retain
priority. In the second edition of the Encyclopedia (1827) this point is
made adequately clear in a paragraph Hegel later replaced with the
present §463: "There is a general multiplicity of words, and insofar
as they are as such mutually contingent, there is nothing but ego
and this multiplicity" (PSS, vol. 3, p. 207). To the extent that we do
not yet have a language system, the words are meaningless (in our
sense), since any kind of definition, either explicit or implicit, is
impossible.
In answer to our second question, if the nominalization of spirit is
carried through, then the general representations have lost distinct
actuality, for they are abilities to generate images, abilities that,
with the dominance of words, have become otiose. These imagegenerating abilities remain actual, then, only insofar as they are
themselves represented in the general representation of the word
that signifies them. But insofar as the word replaces the images that
are the actualization of the general representation it signifies, the
word replaces the general representation itself and makes it unnecessary. The word thus becomes meaningless, since it has now lost
that toward which it bore the meaning relation. Clearly this never
occurs so baldly in the human, for, even while we are verbalizing,
we are also intuiting, recollecting, imagining, and thus invoking the
abilities to image. But the point is that these activities are separable
from the verbal activities we have been investigating. They are
surely the presuppositions for verbal abilities in that without them
verbal abilities would be impossible to acquire, but once those
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abilities have been acquired we can "dispense" with the lower
abilities on which they are built, except insofar as the lower abilities
actually constitute a part of the higher. Once we have an appropriate stock of words, we no longer need images. But then to the extent
that our imagistic abilities have been rendered otiose and superfluous, the words that name those abilities have become meaningless. Becoming meaningless thus means becoming independent of
the original imagistic base, and such meaninglessness becomes
more and more prominent, particularly as linguistic sophistication
increases and, as an activity of thought, new words are gained
through definition in terms of already familiar words. In philosophy in particular it is important to divorce the words one uses from
the shallow imagistic bases that may still cling to some of them, for
in those abstract reaches images only confuse the matter, introducing contingent elements into a necessary discipline.
We are now finally in a position to understand why Hegel calls
this stage mechanical memory and compares it so often to the
phenomenon of rote memorization. Insofar as the imagistic abilities
have been replaced by words, which, however, are not yet systematized by thought, the words are mere counters, series of which
are produced by subjectivity with no necessary order or connection
between them. This situation is similar to that of rote memorization,
the perfect example of which for Hegel's purposes is, not the actor
recreating a character in a scene, but a schoolboy ticking off the
words of a poem expressionlessly, neither understanding what is
said nor even calling up the images the poet tries to evoke. The
poem has been reduced to a mere series of words, and nothing at all
is "going through the child's head."
The ability to retain by rote series of words the connectedness of which
is devoid of understanding, or which by themselves are as senseless as
a series of names might be, is therefore so truly remarkable on account
of its being the essence of spirit to be with itself [bei sich], whereas here
it is as it were inwardly externalized, its activity seeming to be a
mechanism. Spirit is with itself only as the unity of subjectivity and
objectivity however; and here in memory, after being initially external

and so finding determinations in intuition, and recollecting and appropriating what is found in presentation [Vorstellung], it makes itself
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inwardly into an externality as memory, so that what it has appropriated appears as something found. Objectivity, which is one of the
moments of thought, is here posited within intelligence itself as a
quality pertaining to it. (§463)

What we have in spirit at the level of mechanical memory is a
reliable verbal responder, someone whose "language" skills are
purely Skinnerian, untouched by the formal syntactic and semantic
structures indigenous to real thought, someone whose references
have roots but not fruits.
Hegel's account of mechanical memory is far from unproblematic. If words are, as I suggested earlier, our access to "general
representations," then each person has a limited number of such
general representations, and different people can have sets of general representations that diverge to a significant degree. But more
important, if at this stage the structure of language is not present,
what sense can we make of talking about words in any case? We are
confronted with the modern dictum that words have meanings only
in the context of a sentence, which seems to be precisely what Hegel
is denying. There is of course ambiguity in Hegel's use of the word
"meaning" and its meaning in the Fregean dictum. But even so, the
problem still remains of differentiating between a word properly so
called and other verbal signs such as the ejaculation "Owl" With the
machinery available to him here, it is unlikely that Hegel can make
the distinction. Is this, however, a problem for him? Should he be
able to make that distinction here? I see nothing in his task indicating that he should. With the machinery he has he can explain the
fact that "Ow!" has a significance that is conventional but objective;
the fact that it is a rather peculiar part of speech, one that does not
enter normally into syntactic combination with other verbal signs to
form sentences, is not yet in his purview. Hegel is setting up what
he takes to be the foundation of highly sophisticated, thoughtimbued, linguistic activity. The social practices necessary for such a
sophisticated activity find their discussion elsewhere.5
In the process of replacing representations by words it is clear
that, whatever level we are at, we can always go higher. But could
5. The best survey of the role of language in Hegel's phOosophy that I know of is
T. Bodammer, Hegel's Deutung der Sprache.
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this process come to an end; could we reach a point at which there
are only words, and no abilities? Clearly not; it is impossible for a
mind to be a mechanical memory and nothing else and to still be a
mind. But again this is not a problem for Hegel, for he takes mechanical memory to be, not a separable faculty of mind, nor a
distinct stage in the growth of a thinker, but a form of activity that
can be isolated within, but not separated from, the complex activities of a thinking being. One must pay careful attention to the
task Hegel concerns himself with at each level of analysis; it is easy
to think that he is trying to do more at each stage than he actually
intends.
There is one major problem left: how does mechanical memory
constitute the transition to thought? The full answer to this question
requires the complete account of thought, which is the subject of
Chapters 11 and 12, but we can point the way now. In thought spirit
almost begins again from the beginning; as in feeling, subjectivity is
the merely abstract and indeterminate unifying power that stands
over against its material. But there is now a significant difference in
the material. No longer mere sensations, the material of thought is
loaded with implicit internal structure, for words are the material of
thought. The paradigmatic activity of thought will be rational discourse, the systematization of words, although thought infects,
informs, and affects every level of spiritual life.
Because its material is words, thought has broken away from any
immediate dependence on intuition and sensuous experience. Furthermore, in its systematization of words, which we can view metaphorically as the construction of an ideal language, particular contingent truths are not what is sought, qua thought. Any particular
unification of words, such as "The cat is on the mat," which is
contingent, is a representative use of thought's structures; thought
itself is concerned with necessary, systematic connections between
words, and, insofar as it treats the words only with respect to their
necessary connections, the words are raised to signs of concepts,
not mere general representations.
Mechanical memory is the transition to thought because it represents the point at which thought can begin to realize itself as the
pure activity of organizing and uniting words: "Reason now exists
in the subject as its activity, and as such is thought" (§464).

11
Representing versus Thinking

In Hegel's account of the increasing generality of spirit's productions, the theory of the structure of representations may seem an
attempt to solve the problem of generality by sophisticating the
perception-based "new way of ideas" found in Locke and Hume.
But in the long run, Hegel believes, all such approaches fall short of
a full explanation of the nature of thought, for real thinking is
something that differs in kind, not just in degree, from the imagistic
abilities of representing. My task in this chapter is to explain Hegel's
distinction between representing and thinking in preparation for
our examination of his theory of the structure of thought in the
following chapter.
TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS OF THOUGHT
The Classical and Symbolist Theories of Mind
According to H. H. Price, there have been two major approaches
to explaining what it is to have a concept, the classical and the
symbolist theories.1 In the classical theory, whose heritage extends
at least to Plato, having a concept is a relation to a special sort of
object, usually called a concept or a universal. The kind of relation
the thinking mind has to this object is most often conceived as
analogous to sight, a version of the classical theory which Price calls
i. This distinction is taken from H. H. Price, Thinking and Experience.
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inspectivism. Opposed to this rich tradition stands the more radical
approach of the symbolists. On this approach, having a concept
consists of possessing a certain ability, in particular, the ability to
engage in symbolic activity. "The symbolist philosophers, when
they talk of concepts or abstract ideas, treat them not as inspectable
entities ('objects of thought') but as dispositions or capacities. To
possess a concept, they tell us, is just to have the acquired capacity
for using one or another sort of general symbol."2 The symbolists
take the basic sense of having a concept to be dispositional—the
disposition being acquired (at least in the case of simple concepts)
by abstraction from an encounter with an instance of the concept
through sense experience. Using the concept is a later actualization
of such a disposition. Those who take images as primary and words
as secondary symbols that must be understood in terms of the
primary symbols (Price cites Berkeley) are called imagists; those
who take words to be the primary signs or symbols with which we
think Price calls nominalists.3
Neither classical nor symbolist accounts of the nature of thought
are necessarily representational, that is, committed to the view that
thought is to be understood in terms of the thinker's possession of
an inner representational system that bears some semantic relation
to the world. Nonrepresentational symbolism has been given a
spirited defense by Gilbert Ryle. But once one says that thinking is
overt symbolic activity, the move to admitting that there is also
covert symbolic activity within an internal representational system
seems irresistible, given the variety and richness of intelligent human activity. The pressures on the classical view to posit an internal representational system seem not nearly so strong, since the
2. Ibid., p. 309. Hegel and Price both use "symbol" and "sign," but whereas
symbols for Hegel have some natural connection with what they symbolize and
signs do not, it is just the reverse for Price. This terminological matter should not
bother us.
3. Although lately there have been few advocates of the classical view—Kurt
Godel and Alonzo Church, perhaps—the symbolist tradition is dearly dominant,
especially in the cognitive sciences. Within the contemporary debate there are none
who would adopt a pure imagist position, but there is considerable controversy over
the forms mental representation might take and the possible role of images and
natural language words in thinking. See Ned Block, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of
Psychology, vol. 2, or Ned Block, ed., Imagery, for a representative sample of positions.
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relation to the universal which defines this approach can be variously interpreted and need not be thought of as a relation to an internal representation of the universal. The following table roughly
sketches the possible positions and gives some putative examples
in each category.4

Theory

Representational position

Nonrepresentational position

Classical

Possessing a concept of A =
standing in some relation R to
an inner representation of A
(Plato, Descartes)

Possessing a concept of A =
standing in some relation R' to
A itself (Russell and Moore in
their realist period)

Symbolist

Imagist: Possessing a concept of
A = being able to image A
(Berkeley)
Nominalist: Possessing a concept
of A = being able to use
mental word "A" (Hume,
Geach, Sellars)

Possessing a concept of A =
being able to behave
appropriately toward A's and
the absence of A's (Ryle,
Skinner)

The classical inspectivist and symbolist theories are too narrow to
account straightforwardly for the full range of thought; each has a
different area of strength. The classical theory is more suited to an
account of our thought about abstracta, whereas the symbolist
theory seems especially suited to our thought about concreta. It
seems implausible to claim that, when I think about what I had for
dinner, I am inspecting a universal or concept; it seems much closer
to the truth to say that various images, visual and gustatory, or
various words, such as "omelet," "potato," or "sauerkraut," are
flashing through my mind, and that my thinking consists in the
rehearsal and interaction of these symbols. On the other hand, the
idea that mathematical thinking consists of the inspection of or
insight into the nature of pure intelligible entities has long had a
(perhaps surprising) power to it.
Hegel makes a studious attempt to reconcile and do justice to the
truth in each of these theories by incorporating the strong points of
4. The examples are meant only to be suggestive; each of these thinkers is too
complex to be adequately characterized in this simple chart.
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each into a highly structured theory of mental activity.5 Contrary to
what one might expect, Hegel rejects the classical representational
theory of Plato and Descartes and unites symbolic representationalism with classical nonrepresentationalism.
Problems with Symbolism

In symbolist theory it is maintained that thinking is nothing but the
rule-governed manipulation of symbols or signs. But even at first
blush only the knowledgeable or intelligent (though not necessarily
conscious) manipulation of symbols can be plausibly identified with
thought, and that seems either circular or regress-generating.6
Hegel's symbolist predecessors often did not fully exploit the
possibilities of their position. All too often they treated simple
possession of a symbol, its mere presence before the mind, as
sufficient to constitute having the appropriate concept. The lure of
the classical, relational picture of concept possession is evident in
this tendency. This view is made plausible by the idea that there is a
set of natural symbols, namely, the symbols for simple concepts,
that wear their meanings on their sleeves. Simple concepts are
supposed to be intelligible independent of any other concept, even
in isolation from all others, and are represented in the mind by
nonconventional symbols—either innate or generated by perception. If the symbolist then forgets to take the dispositional sense of
concept possession as basic, the occurrence of the thought and the
occurrence of the symbol seem identical, making it easy to infer that
5. I use "mental activity" here to signal that my concern is with Hegel's theory of
what he calls subjective thought. Hegel distinguishes subjective thought—what
goes on in the minds of individual thinkers—from objective thought—the working
of reason in the world at large (see §§24-25).
6. This is a relative of what Daniel Dennett calls "Hume's Problem"; see Brainstorms pp. 102, 12. Symbolists give two answers to this problem. The answer given
by Dennett or Jerry Fodor avoids the regress by analyzing intelligent capacities into
complexes of less intelligent capacities. Ryle, on the other hand, replies by giving an
adjectival analysis of intelligence: doing X intelligently or knowledgeably is not
doing two things concurrently, namely, doing X and thinking about X, but is instead
a matter of how one does X. Both strategies defeat the regress; the most satisfactory
theory might combine them. For evidence that Hegel noticed this problem, see
Encyclopedia §455. I find no evidence that he saw either of these ways out of the
problem.
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the thought and the symbol are identical. Such a view leads toward
the possibility of having a concept by having a symbol present to the
mind which is not connectable in any way with any other symbol.
Conflating concept possession with the simple presence to mind of
a symbol results in a very poor theory of thinking and one particularly inept at dealing with self-reflection, for it abandons the
essential symbolist insight into the active nature of thought.
Hegel strongly attacks this weak but popular form of symbolism.
Since symbol and concept are identified, mental activity seems to be
decomposable into various distinct operations on symbols—thinking, remembering, imagining,—and the unity of conceptual activity as such is lost. Rather than engaging in one complex activity
with many essential components, we seem only to engage in assorted simple activities. Thus, Hegel complains, thinking becomes
just another faculty of mind alongside others (EL §20). Furthermore, the content of thought then appears to be without intrinsic
connection—a set of individual, discrete universals (§20). From the
weak symbolist point of view, any connection between two concepts must appear totally contingent; necessary, intrinsic connection between concepts must be impossible, for there are no necessary connections between symbols. Such a conception of thinking
condemns all thought to being incapable of containing truth.7
Furthermore, symbolism, especially as instantiated in the classical empiricist theories of Hume, David Hartley, and James Mill,
tends toward the mechanistic, and Hegel is absolutely convinced
that no mechanistic theory can be adequate to the phenomenon of
thought. Mechanism leaves no room for ends and purposes and
thus cannot account for the teleological process of rational thought.
Even a mental chemism, as John Stuart Mill liked to call his theory
to contrast it with his father's, falls short in this respect. Hegel is
committed to a mental organicism, which he takes to mean a teleological holism. The fact that symbolist theories of mind are particularly attractive to materialists and mechanists, however, is not
much of an argument against them, even for Hegel, for it is not clear
that a mental organicism must eschew symbolism. And in his theory, symbolic representations do play a central role.
7. See §25. We examine Hegel's reasons for this below, in the critique of representationalism.
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Hegel in fact maintains that all subjective thought is tied to symbol and sign manipulation. We think in words, he says (§462);
whenever we think, the thought is embodied in a sign or symbol
(§462, Zusatz). The thought is not the sign or symbol; rather it is at
work through the sign or symbol (§462, Zusatz). Thinking expresses
itself in the use of a sign. When we think about thought, we think
about what is at work in the symbols or signs that are presented to
us.

Problems with the Classical Theory
In classical theories it is claimed that thinking consists of the
mind's standing in some relation to a universal. But how, then, can
we think about individuals? The answer must be that we have no
such contact with individuals qua individuals.
Attempts by classical theorists to explicate the nature of the relation between mind and universal have not been very successful.
The metaphor of seeing has dominated such attempts.8 Inspectivism is a child of substahtialist theories of mind, theories in which
the mind itself is reified as an entity related to its objects in the way a
person perceiving physical objects is related to them. Inspectivism,
like symbolism, is threatened with either circularity or a regress,
for, as Kant saw, perception itself involves thought and therefore
relation to the universal. Hegel puzzles over how an individual
mental entity can represent a universal.9 A representational version
of classical inspectivism seems to boil down to the obviously inadequate theory that there are signs the mere presence of which to
mind constitutes possession and exercise of a concept, a theory
Hegel rejects. Hegel does not completely reject the classical theory,
however. How and why he thinks it has to be salvaged is revealed
by his understanding of the problems of representationalism. The
idea of a nonrepresentational symbolist theory of mind is entirely
foreign to him; the existence of internal symbols in imagination and
memory is obvious to him. So symbolism is considered by Hegel to
8. For a sustained critique of visual metaphors in epistemology and the philosophy of mind, see Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.
9. The section of the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit entitled Vorstellung traces the
stages in which our mental representations become increasingly universal in content.
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be committed to representationalism. Yet he believes that representationalism entails certain consequences that condemn it as a final
answer about the nature of thought.
Problems with Representationalism
Hegel is well aware of the pressures within any representational
theory, pressures that tend to cut the mind off from external reality,
keeping it trapped behind a veil of ideas. Whatever semantic relation is supposed to exist between our representations and their
objects, its veridicality must remain forever beyond our ken. If this
worry is taken seriously, even our self-knowledge is threatened.
Epistemological skepticism and the problem of the thing-in-itself
are vitally linked for Hegel. Both are often motivated by entirely
separating the subjective from the objective world to be cognized,
by adopting a picture of the mind as an inner space populated with
merely subjective representations.10 But then, since we have access
only to our representations, we cannot independently ascertain
whether they are indeed veridical representations or whether there
is any relation at all between our representations and any other
reality. We cannot even ascertain whether they are correctly characterized as representations. The Kantian answer to such empiricist
skepticism, the division of knowledge into possible phenomenal
and impossible noumenal knowledge, Hegel regards as a sham.
Knowledge that is not knowledge of things as they are is not knowledge at all; Kant's theory is just another form of skepticism, according to Hegel.
Purely representational theories of mind, Hegel believes, condemn one to subjective idealism, an intolerable position. Hegel
does not reject representationalism wholesale, however; he believes that, as a theory of perception and the lower cognitive functions that involve sensory elements (intuition and Vorstellung), representationalism must be the correct answer. There needs to be a
nonrepresentational anchor for our mental activity, however, one
that ensures that our knowledge is of things as they are in themselves.
Hegel's rejection of representationalism in order to escape from
10. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, also criticizes this metaphor of inner
space at length
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subjective idealism depends on his other metaphysical positions. In
particular, his claim that the universal, and not the individual, is the
substance of the world is crucial. We cannot have other actual
individuals in our minds; this is why our dealings with such individuals in perception, imagination, and so forth are representational. But the idea of having universals themselves in the mind has
not seemed as impossible. Often enough it has been claimed that
this is the only place they exist. It is our knowledge of the universal—the object of pure thought—that is nonrepresentational and
fully objective, according to Hegel; because the universal is the initself of the world, we know things as they are in themselves. Hegel
does admit that we can represent universals to ourselves (and do so
in art and religion), but when we do so we have not yet achieved
true thought. In true thought we stand in a nonrepresentational
relation to the object of our thought, which must always be a
universal. Thus we turn next to explicating the nature of the universal, the object of thought, and the nature of its relation to the
thinking mind.
HEGEL'S RESPONSE TO THE TRADITIONS
Hegel's attempt to reconcile representational symbolism and
nonrepresentational classicism revolves around his notion of a concrete universal. He believes that his predecessors erred in assuming
an absolute distinction between individuals and universals and
attempts to overcome this rigid distinction by arguing that both the
individual and the universal are to be reconceived as moments of a
more complex, articulated unity, the concrete universal, or concept.
For our purposes, his technical terms "concrete universal" and
"concept" can be treated as one. His basic argument for reconceiving the world in these terms is that we are otherwise incapable of
reaching a fully coherent conception of the world. That argument,
however, is beyond our bounds here.
The Active Concrete Universal
Hegel believes that most of his predecessors have chosen the
wrong paradigm of predication. These philosophers—philosophers trapped in the "attitude of the understanding"—have taken
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such accidental predications as "The ball is red" as paradigmatic. In
such a case there is no intrinsic connection between the universal
and the individual it is predicated of—both the universal and the
individual seem quite indifferent to each other. Taking this to be the
paradigmatic predication relation leads, Hegel believes, to a metaphysics in which the world is seen as composed of nexus of bare
particulars (in his terminology "abstract individuals") and ontologically independent universals (he would call these "abstract universals"). Hegel thinks such a metaphysics impossible; to escape being
trapped in it one must reject both the abstract individual and the
abstract universal.11
In the place of accidental predication Hegel considers a version of
essential predication as an ideal to be striven toward, for in an
essential predication the universal and the individual are intrinsically tied. The essence of something is also seen by Hegel to have
some explanatory power; saying of what kind a thing is can be a
legitimate explanatory move. But Hegel goes further than this, for
an essence, something's concept, is held to be, not a descriptive
essence, but a prescriptive ideal. Something's concept offers an ideal
pattern that the thing strives to realize in the course of its existence,
although individual things are never perfect exemplars of their
essence. In this respect we can begin to see a rather strange melding
of Aristotle's concept of essence with the Kantian notion of concept.
Kant insisted that "a concept is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule" (Critique of Pure Reason,
Aio7). Hegel seizes on three aspects of Kant's a priori concepts—
their unrestricted universality, their prescriptive force, and their
conceptual priority over their instances—and transfers these properties to the basically Aristotelian conception of an essence or thingkind.
Hegel also learned from Kant that concepts are not discrete entities that exist and can be known each independent of any others;
neither thinker has the notion of a simple concept. We can say that
Hegel took over from Kant a coherence theory of concepts: even
bottom-level basic ideas are to be understood through their interaction with other ideas in basic principles, in contrastive relations,
and so forth. Perhaps most important, the crucial relations between
concepts need not all be construed as analytic "inclusions"; Kant
it. See R. Aquila, "Predication and Hegel's Metaphysics."
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inaugurated the search for nonanalytic but also nonpsychological,
rational connections between concepts, and Hegel willingly followed. Thus what Hegel calls a concept is a prescriptive ideal that is
part of a system of such ideals that the world is striving to realize
and in terms of which we can make sense of what happens in the
world. Hegel, however, takes the rule-like character and implicit
systematicity of concepts so seriously that he makes a move Kant
would never dream of; he insists that the being of the I is the being
of a concept, for the I is the rule for the unification of all experience.
The unity of apperception is the ideal governing all synthetic activity in the mind. Indeed, since the I provides the ultimate rule—
all concepts must be unified under it, including the pure concepts—
the I, the self, becomes a super-concept, a concept of concepts
(WdL, vol. 2, pp. 220-21; SL, p. 583).
Every universal of whatever kind unifies something, but, in contrast to abstract universals like red, concrete universals not only
unite various different individuals under some heading but also
account for their internal unity. The model for this internal unification is the synthesis of the manifold into the unity of apperception.
The manifold is unified, according to the Kantian vision, because I
make it mine, constituting myself in that very process. Hegel attributes this kind of self-constituting activity to every concrete universal, to all concepts. Any unity of a manifold which is not thus
actively involved in the very nature of the elements, while also
constituting its own self in the activity, is to that degree a merely
abstract universal. A concrete universal is therefore different from
the abstract universals that previous thinkers in the classical tradition took to be the object of thought: "The universal of the concept
is not a mere sum of features common to several things, confronted
by a particular which enjoys an existence on its own. It is, on
the contrary, self-particularizing or self-specifying, and with undimmed clearness finds itself at home in its antithesis" (EL §163, my
tr.). An abstract universal is a tag that can be hung on things
otherwise quite indifferent to it in order to sort them out; a concrete
universal, on the other hand, must reach to their very hearts and
afford an explanation of their being. An abstract universal is static
and unchanging because it is dead, a mere sum of otherwise unrelated features. A concrete universal, however, is alive, dynamic,
and dialectical; it is essentially a part of a self-developing system.
In sum, the foremost characteristic of a concrete universal is that
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it is active. The whole universe is the realization of a universal
activity—and this activity is the concrete universal. Its mode of
action is teleological, that is, it is self-realization; the concrete universal is both cause and effect, it is self-developing. Second, a
concrete universal is the truth of those objects it characterizes and
animates. It is their essence, that which explains what they are and
why they behave the way they do. Third, a concrete universal is not
separable from its instances; it actively manifests itself in and
through them. Fourth, concrete universals, concepts, have an essence of their own, the concrete universal, which realizes itself in
the active self-realization of its contributory moments. Concrete
universals are essentially parts of a self-realizing system. What
ultimately is, according to Hegel, is a universal self-constitutive
activity that becomes self-conscious in man's knowledge of it—the
Absolute.
The Rejection of Inspectivism
It is Hegel's ontology that allows him to break away from representationalism and the classical tendency toward inspectivism, for
at the highest level of pure thought, he believes, the concept is not
an inert entity we inspect but rather the activity we are. Instead of
standing apart from a universal or a representation that we somehow "look" at, in pure thought we become a special realization of
the concrete universal, and realizing a concrete universal is not the
same as representing it.12 Hegel ultimately transcends representationalism, abandoning a common assumption shared by most philosophers since Descartes.
Hegel takes thought to be a certain distinctive and dynamic,
structured activity. He is a symbolist to the degree that he holds that
this activity must be realized as symbolic activity in a subjectivity,
but he refuses to identify thinking with any specific set of symbolic
activities; he also refuses to say that the action on the symbols is
itself symbolic. Hegel insists rather that, when We are thinking, the
symbols themselves, the representations before the mind, are in12. This is one of the points of his discussion of thought in §§20-25 of the
Encyclopedia. Only in this way can we make good sense of his distinguishing between
objective and subjective thought while maintaining their identity. This also explains
why philosophy or thought is the self-movement of the concept, which we, as it
were, simply observe; §238, Zusatz. See also WdL, vol. 2, pp. 485-8; SL, pp. 824-7.

Representing versus Thinking

175

consequential. What really counts is what we do with the symbols.
The activity actually operating on the symbols—for which the symbols are but "pieces in a game"—is thinking. This activity is not, of
course, a kind of action performed by some homunculus on inner
symbols. The activity is implicit in the symbols themselves; they are
symbols for concepts by virtue of participating in a system of demands and permissions, and in this sense they are codes that
directly invoke activity.13 Although Hegel would admit that symbols are not the things they symbolize, but only representations of
them, he would not say that the system of demands and permissions that govern the interactions of the symbols (in veridical
thought) is only a representation of the demands and permissions
that govern the interactions of the things symbolized.14 Real thinking, which, according to Hegel, is always veridical, is achieved
when our internal symbol system is governed by the same rule
system as the world. Thinking is to be identified with the instantiation of this rule system; our ability to think true thoughts about the
world is based on the fact that we instantiate the same rule system
that governs the world.15 In philosophy this rule system also becomes the object of our thought, not by our symbolizing it to
ourselves, but by our self-consciously participating in the system,
self-consciously playing the game. Thus Hegel rejects a representationalistic reading of thought, rejects inspectivism, and synthesizes
the symbolist and classical theories through the claim that in thinking the active universal is present in our symbolic activity.
13. In Douglas R. Hofstadter's popular book Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden
Bfaid, a distinction is drawn between inert and active symbols. Hofstadter, along
With other contemporary symbolists, insists that active symbols are spatiotemporal
entities and that, in the final analysis, their interaction is to be explained causally.
Hegel, in effect, would deny that such symbols are physical entities (according to
him, they are like mental utterances) and would probably even more strongly deny
that their interaction is to be explained by the laws of physics and chemistry. The
interaction of such symbols must be explained entelechially, as being the fulfillment
of a telos.
14. Otherwise, he would have to deny the identity of subjective and objective
thought.
15. Hegel sees the world as the interplay of concrete universals. But thinking is
precisely that, an interplay of concrete universals. He distinguishes objective thought
and subjective thought, the only difference between them being their venue and
mode of realization. Objective thought is realized everywhere, subjective thought is
realized within individual subjectivities (through their symbolic activity). But Hegel

insists on the identity of the two forms of thought.

12
Thought

As central to Hegel's philosophy as the concept of thought is, it
seems strange that there are only four relatively short paragraphs
(§§465-68) devoted to it as the culmination of theoretical spirit.
Hegel takes thinking to be the ultimate activity lying behind all
worldly processes, responsible for the grand structure the world
exhibits. But these paragraphs in the philosophy of subjective
spirit are not an outline of that topic, to which Hegel devotes a
gread deal of space, for instance, in the Wissenschaft der Logik. However, in the philosophy of subjective spirit Hegel is concerned, not
with Thought, the active substance of the world, but merely with
thought, an ability possessed and exercised by individual human
beings, the relation of which to Thought is open to discussion.
Hegel claims that subjective thought and objective Thought are in
reality one and the same, though admittedly in different forms.
In the first section below I restate the situation at the lowest level
of thought. The second section is devoted to spelling out in greater
detail what Hegel thinks goes on when we think, and in the third
section we briefly discuss the transition to practical spirit, which
does not concern the nature of thought itself so much as the relation
between thought and will.
THE IMMEDIACY OF THOUGHT
"In the first instance, however, thinking cognition is formal; universality and its being is the simple subjectivity of intelligence. Thus
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the thoughts are not determined as being in and for themselves,
and the representations recollected as [or into] thought are still the
given content" (§466, my tr.): thus the general situation at the end
of the section on representation is stated. Spirit is taken as an
abstract power standing over against a collection of words, which
are the embodiment of or represent certain spiritual capacities.
These words, the representations, are raised to the level of thought
through a recollection. But insofar as this recollection is a kind of «
generalization in which we move behind the words to what is
expressed in them—not subjectively (that would be a regression to
an earlier stage of representation) but objectively (that is, for a
hypothetical anyone who understood the words)—there are several
things to be said about words recollected as thoughts.
First, such thoughts are merely abstract universals, not concrete
universals. They are taken as sundered entities, each apart from all
the others, and the individuals in which they are taken to be expressed are words, not the things themselves. They are not yet
inner principles of activity, structural nodes organizing their local
relatives to fit into a larger pattern. A concept can be understood
itself to be a set of permissions, demands, and prohibitions on that
power of unification which is thought in abstract generality. No
concept can be an atomistic counter indifferent to the power of
thought that manipulates it. Thought, therefore, must go beyond
this initial abstract universal to develop the true concrete universal.
Second, thoughts here are in an important sense present to mind
as merely given; that is, we find language already there and already
cutting the world up a certain way. We do not invent the words we
use, we learn them. We slowly learn the abstract connections between words and phrases as we learn to think. The creation of a
new word for something previously unexpressible, when done
consciously, is itself an act of highly sophisticated thought. The
world generally seems to come to us prearticulated by our language, and we continue to see it in these terms unthinkingly most
of our lives until we start theorizing, thinking in the strongest
sense. The articulation of the world is taken to be a mere matter of
fact for the most part, something given, but Hegel insists that all
such articulation is ultimately generated out of the self-revealing
nature of thought. Thought is.active in subjectivity and in nature; it
is not conscious of its own activity in nature; this activity is for itself
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only in subjectivity. "In the first instance, thought knows the unity
of the subjective and objective as wholly abstract and indeterminate, as merely a certain unity, which is neither filled nor confirmed. To this unity therefore, the determinateness of the rational
content is still external and therefore given,—and cognition is
therefore formal. Yet since this determinateness is implicitly contained in thinking cognition, this formalism contradicts it and is the
therefore sublated by thought" (§466, Zusatz). The thinking spirit is
convinced of the adequacy of its thought to the world. But at first
this is an unreflective assumption; spirit merely finds its words
fitting its experience. That thought and being are one is precisely
the "determinateness of the rational content" that Hegel talks of
here, for the "rational is the actual and the actual is the rational"
(preface to the Philosophy of Right). But although at the opening level
of spirit, spirit has this conviction, it is nothing but a conviction;
spirit cannot back it up. Spirit's original conviction that its thoughts
capture the world successfully does not result from its own thinking
about thought and the world, and to this extent its claim to knowledge of the world is merely formal, awaiting fuller justification. The
conviction that thought and being are one and that thought is
adequate to the world is, according to Hegel, both the necessary
assumption of the attitude of thought—its working hypothesis, as
it were—and its ultimate result.

THE NATURE OF THOUGHT
Hegel compresses his theory of the essential structure of thinking
activity into one paragraph, §467. In this culmination of the entire
discussion of theoretical spirit, we find two lists of three levels
within thought. What is the relation between these lists? They
duplicate each other; there is one set of levels described with two
different aspects highlighted. In the first list the distinction between
form and content is retained; taking for granted thoughts as the
"content" of thought as discussed in his previous paragraph, Hegel
describes the increasingly adequate form into which these contents
can be cast. Thus the first list gives us a description of the formal
structure of thought. The second list is, I believe, a slightly more
adequate statement, for it leaves the rather static and artificial dis-
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tinction of form and content behind, even as heuristic, and brings
out more fully the activity that thought is.
The Formal Structure of Thought

Concepts
In respect of this content [An diesem Inhalte] thought is (i) formally
identical understanding, which transforms the recollected representations into genera, kinds, laws, forces, etc., in general into the Categories, in the sense that the material first has its truth in these forms of
thought. As negativity infinite in itself, thought is (2) essentially diremption—judgment [Urtheil], which however no longer dissolves the
concept into the previous opposition of universality and being but
rather distinguishes it [or divides it] according to the connections
peculiar to the concept, and (3) thought sublates the form-determinations and at the same time posits the identity of the differences;—
formal reason, syllogizing understanding. (§467, my tr.)

We start with "recollected representations," which I have maintained to be abstract universals, each isolated from all others.
Through thought these representations are "processed" or "transformed" [verarbeitet] into genera, kinds, laws, and forces. What
does this mean exactly? Three questions arise: (a) How are they
transformed, what happens to them in this transformation? (b)
what exactly is it they are transformed or worked up into? (c) What
is the common element of genera, laws, and so forth which makes
this transformation one process rather than many?
We have seen that the recollected representations are generalizations of a range of sophisticated capacities of spirit, the capacities to
call up certain images and words. They are generalized in the sense
that the particular idiosyncrasies of individuals have been discounted. In other terms, the representations are unities within
certain activities and potentialities of individual subjective spirits.
The recollected representations that are thoughts, however, are
unities of such activities and potentialities within subjective spirit
in general, that is, intersubjectively and objectively. The capacities
of spirit embodied in thought are not all entirely separated from
one another. They exhibit certain interconnections, although spirit
has not yet become aware of these interconnections. There are
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patterns of cooccurrence, or permissible association, for instance,
and the transformation undergone in understanding is our coming
to awareness of these patterns in consciousness. As we then seek to
explain and, more important, to justify these patterns, the associations are no longer mere instances of a pattern but become examples of explicit rule following. This appears first in the imposition of
structured connections on the formerly discrete units in thought.
One such structure is the partial ordering of genus and species.
Thought now sees all its objects as essentially participating in such
ordering structures. This is the first step in the overcoming of the
atomism of the standpoint of abstract, formal thought, but it is only
the first step, and the relations focused on tend to be highly abstract
and are thought of as affecting the relata only minimally.
We have already before us most of the material for answering our
second question, namely, what kind of thing the representations
are transformed into. Today we think of genera and kinds as very
different from laws and forces, categorically different. But Hegel
did not think this, for he focused on their common character as
modally laden relations of a one over a many. The one, the genus,
kind, law, necessitates certain characteristics in the manifold that
falls under it. The application of one of these concepts necessitates
applying certain other concepts, and thus these concepts can be
seen as structuring the conceptual realm, unifying our concepts into
a coherent scheme. Concepts are no longer merely contingently
associated with each other; they are now seen as modally related.
This systematization and unification of our concepts are the activity
of the concept of a concept in one of its manifestations, the essential
activity of spirit.

Judgments
From the systematic classification of concepts by the understanding it is not far to progress to their explicitly asserted interconnection in a judgment, although Hegel would complain that many
philosophers before him misunderstood the nature of such assertion. Judgment in Hegel's eyes is not merely the assertion of a
relation between two independent and indifferent things; this is
precisely the view of the nature of judgment which must be overcome, which is mired too deeply in the theory of the abstract
universal.
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Hegel emphasizes that judgment is a kind of distinguishing by
playing on the etymological structure of the German Urteil—"original or primordial division or partition."1 Hegel does not believe that
judgmental structure applies only to certain subjective acts of mind:
The judgment is usually taken in a subjective sense as an operation
and a form occurring merely in self-conscious thought. This distinction, however, is not present in Logic, and judgment is taken in the
quite universal signification that all things are a judgment. That is to
say, they are individuals, which are a universality or inner nature in
themselves—a universal that is individualized. Their universality and
individuality are distinguished, but the one is at the same time identical with the other. (El §167, my tr.)

The self-individualization of the concrete universal is a judgment.
Since it is the very nature of the concrete universal to have its being
in individual existents, it is of the essence of the concrete universal
to develop itself in judgments. Individuals possess judgmental
structure in that they realize a universal. There are no bare particulars in the world. Indeed, individuals always realize a multitude of
universals, so there is no such thing as a purely simple thing in the
world. Not only are individuals complex, but even their complexity
is complex, with different aspects contributing to the complex in
different ways. Thus a plant may be of a particular kind, say a rose,
and its being both plant and rose is one kind of complexity. The
plant may also have certain parts, such as roots, flowers, and
leaves, and this is another sort of complexity. The flowers may be of
a certain color, say red, and this is still another sort of complexity.
The individual realizes different universals, but not all of the universals it realizes are equal. Some are essentially abstract, others are
concrete; the judgments through which the individual and the
universal are distinguished in each case are different. Hegel's theory of judgment is a theory of the different ways the individual and
the universal are distinguished and unified.
It is easy to forget that according to Hegel judgment is as much a
feature or structure of objective reality as of the subjective. Individi. This approach seems to have come from Fichte and Holderlin. J. G. Fichte,
SSmtliche Werke, vol. i, pp. 102-3, an(* F. Holderlin, "Urtheil und Seyn," in Mnterialien zu Schellings Philosophischen Anfangen, ed. M. Frank und G. Kurz, pp. 108-9.
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uals and universals are essentially related in both realms. To forget
that everything objective is a judgment is to fall into the metaphysical error of believing in bare particulars, platonic universals, and so
forth. To separate the subjective concept from the judgmental contexts in which it can occur is to fall into the theory of the abstract
universal, which renders all judgmental structure arbitrary.2
There is no room here for a treatment of Hegel's full theory of
judgment as it appears in his Logics, but its outlines emerge relatively easily from what we have said already. We have already
noted that judgment can be viewed as the unfolding of the necessary complexity of a concrete universal, and that even this complexity is complex. Hegel's theory of judgment is an attempt to regiment
the kinds of complexity in the individualization of a concrete universal, ranking them in accordance with their ability to express the
original structural unity of the concept.
There are two different contrasts involved in Hegel's ranking of
judgments. First, not everything prepositional qualifies as a judgment, for Hegel distinguishes between judgments and propositions:
A judgment [Urteil] is however distinguished from a proposition
[Safe], The latter contains a statement about the subject, which does
not stand to it in any universal relationship but expresses some single
action, or some state, or the like. Thus "Caesar was born at Rome in
such and such a year, waged war in Gaul for ten years, crossed the
Rubicon, etc." are propositions but not judgments. Again it is absurd
to say that such statements as "I slept well last night" or "Present
arms!" may be turned into the forms of a judgment. "A carriage is
passing by" would be a judgment, and a subjective one at best, only if
it were doubtful whether the passing object was a carriage or whether
it and not rather the point of observation was in motion:—in short,
only if it were desired to specify a representation which was still short
of appropriate specification. (EL §167)

Hegel says something similar about the distinction in the Wissenschaft der Logik, adding that a judgment "requires that the predicate
2. The empiricists are particularly subject to this danger. Although they all leave
some room for trivial knowledge or relations of ideas, any nonanalytic judgment
tends to be conceived by them as a mere association of ideas, which, as Kant saw,
dooms their attempt to understand human knowledge or human mental activity.
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be related to the subject as one concept determination to another,
and therefore as a universal to a particular or individual" (SL, p. 626;
WdL, vol. 2, p. 267). He adds that there is "something of a judgment
in a proposition" when the fact expressed by the proposition is
placed in doubt (repeating here a remark in the Encyclopedia) and the
proposition is "asserted on the strength of some reason or other."
It seems that this distinction is one of degree, not kind [see also
SL, p. 683; WdL, vol. 2, p. 330], although perhaps Hegel thought
that there was some break dividing the sentences into genuinely
different kinds. Whether a sentence is a judgment or a proposition
is not solely dependent on its grammatical form but also on the job it
performs in its context. A mere statement of contingent fact is only a
proposition; an attempt to theorize or explain is a judgment. Some
sentences appear more naturally in theorizing contexts and carry
with them, as it were, a lot of theoretical machinery because of their
content; these are most clearly judgments, better realizations of
judgment per se. And statements that might easily be immediate
statements of fact, made in a context in which they are results of
inferences, approximate judgments because of their theoretical content. The raising of a representation to thought and the raising of a
proposition to a judgment are quite similar in nature, I believe.
Although informed with the grammatical structures of thinking,
propositions are at the level of representation and share with that
level the concern with individuality per se; yet, because they use the
grammatical structure of judgment (by using the copula), they give
evidence of the presence even in representation of the power of the
Concept. Insofar as the representer has gone beyond the occurrence
of mere lists of names within its mind—and without seeing through
to the inner connection of the particular things it represents to itself
still wants to assert the existence of a particularly close tie or bond
between them—it uses the grammatical structure of the judgment.
The awareness that there are associations of representations and
then that some are of a different sort from others is already the first
step toward thought, and widely different strata all find some
accommodation, more or less adequate to the level of the content, in
the grammatical forms of judgment.
Hegel also draws a distinction between truth, or adequacy to the
Idea, and correctness. A judgment is correct when it is an idealization of what is exemplified in a particular individual thing or state of
affairs.
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Truth, on the contrary, lies in the coincidence of the object with itself,
that is, with its concept. That a person is sick, or that someone has
committed a theft, may certainly be correct. But the content is untrue.
A sick body is not in harmony with the concept of body, and there is a
want of congruity between theft and the concept of human conduct.
These instances may show that an immediate judgment, in which an
abstract quality is predicated of an immediately individual thing, however correct it may be, cannot contain truth. The subject and predicate
of it do not stand to each other in the relation of reality and concept.
(§ELi/2, Zusatz)

A judgment is true according to Hegel, we may say, when it is an
idealization of the concept. He would find our use of "true" in the
phrase "a true friend" a perfect illustration of his intent.
At the lowest end of the judgmental spectrum we find qualitative
judgments, by which Hegel means judgments in which some abstract universal is predicated of an individual:
To say "This rose is red" involves (in virtue of the copula "is") the
coincidence of subject and predicate. The rose however is a concrete
thing, and so is not red only; it has an odour, a specific form, and
many other features not implied in the predicate red. The predicate on
its part is an abstract universal, and does not apply to the rose alone.
There are other flowers and other objects which are red too. The
subject and predicate in the immediate judgment touch as it were,
only in a single point, but do not cover each other. (§172, Zusatz)

Hegel admits that such simple judgments may be correct; he does
not consider them true. But insofar as in the judgmental form the
universal and the individual are, though sundered, still connected,
we have not simply "dissolved . . . the concept into the previous
opposition of universality and being" (§467). The articulation of the
concept in accordance with its own natural internal structure increases as we progress through the ranked forms of judgment.
According to Hegel, the judgmental relation, through its development, starts to approach a consequence relation, for we unfold a
concept by seeing what follows from its use and from what other
concepts it follows. Concepts are determined by their logical relations with other concepts, so the self-determining of a concept in
judgment must take place through the specification of such logical
relations. But although some logical relation is stated in the judg-
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ment, it is not supported within the judgment but simply given by or
in the judgment. To this extent the relation given in a judgment is
external and appears as a merely given necessity. These modes of
relation are what is expressed in the copula. Hegel says that the
copula expresses the identity of the subject and the predicate, but
this is misleading to us, for he means not numerical identity but
identity within the concept; the subject and the predicate are themselves but moments of one (self-identical) concept. The development of the judgment is not only from correctness-incorrectness to
truth but also from the copula as the merely implicit identity of
subject and predicate to the explicit identity of the two in a unifying
third. Identity statements are not Hegel's ideal judgments; correct,
justified attributions of essences are.
Unity in a third is a necessary condition for the judgment's being
an "objective connectedness." In his attempt to answer Hume
within the limits of an atomistic psychology, Kant developed the
analytic-synthetic distinction to isolate the problem of combination,
for this is where Hume's focus also lay. Analytic judgments were
uninteresting to Kant in general because there was no new combination; the predicate was supposedly already contained in the subject.
But Hegel considers the separation as important as the combination, perhaps even more so.
Kant focused on the need for a third thing X to ground the
combination of representations in a true, objective synthetic judgment. Hegel seizes this insight and generalizes it, maintaining that
the copula is the representative for an implicit third that grounds
both the combination and the separation in any judgment. According to Kant, in any a priori synthetic judgment the third that
grounds the combination is the transcendental unity of apperception. Hegel reinterprets the transcendental unity of apperception as
his Concept, and therefore a judgment is, according to Hegel,
something in which the concepts are combined and separated "in
virtue of the necessary unity" of the Concept (to paraphrase Kant;
Critique of Pure Reason, 6142). A judgment combines concepts according to the structure of the Concept, the concrete universal, and,
to the extent to which the judgment adequately reflects that structure, it is true. Hegel goes further than Kant by insisting that all
judgments be combinations grounded in a third thing. Those that
are not, such as "A lion is a lion," are not really judgments (§173).
Take, for example, what Hegel calls judgments of necessity (§177),
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such as "Man is an animal," which might well be thought analytic.
Hegel would point out that man and animal are not immediately
and emptily identical, but rather that man is a mammal and mammals are animals, and that neither of these two links is an immediate link itself. The concept of man may in some sense contain that of
animal, but only mediately, because men are mammals. The concept of mammal not only ties the other two together but also separates them, for not all animals are mammals.
Every judgment leaves itself open to question, as do all things
that appear merely given, and this question is answered by showing that the judgment is grounded. This ground is a third thing that
mediates the relation of the subject and the predicate. Only in the
ultimate stage of judgment is this third thing made explicit, but it is
implicitly present throughout. Abstractly taken, this third is the
Concept itself, as we have seen, but according to its own nature this
must particularize itself and appear as a determinate unifying concept: "What has been really made explicit is the oneness of subject
and predicate, is the concept itself, filling up the empty 'is' of the
copula. While its constituent elements are at the same time distinguished as subject and predicate, the concept is put as their unity,
as the connection which serves to intermediate them: in short, as
the syllogism" (§180, Wallace tr., adapted). Ideally, two concepts
are objectively linked in a judgment, according to Hegel, not when
one is contained in another, but when both are moments of a third;
this is the structure we should expect to find in philosophical propositions. Two concepts are objectively linked in a judgment when
they are brought to unity in a third concept.
According to Hegel's notion of judgmental connection, any judgment implies a whole systematic network of concepts behind it and
supporting it; full knowledge of a concept is a knowledge of all its
conceptual relations.
The final level of judgment Hegel calls the judgment of the concept, a judgment in which the individual is assessed relative to its
kind. The highest form within this level Hegel calls the apodictic
judgment, although it is certainly not what was normally so called.
In it the ground or reason for the assessment is also made explicit.3
3. Perhaps he calls it apodictic because "apodictic" literally means "shown" or
"demonstrated."
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Thus "This rose, as fulfilling criteria (X, Y, Z), is beautiful" would
count as such a judgment. "All things are a genus (their determination and end) in an individual actuality of a particular constitution.
And they are finite, because the particular in them may and also
may not conform to the universal" (§179). This apodictic judgment
is the highest form of judgment, for it is the fullest realization of the
judgmental structure implicit in the concept. The three moments of
the concept, individuality, particularity, and universality, are all
explicitly stated in their relations to one another. The apodictic
judgment can be both correct and true, for it gets to the very heart of
the matter, articulating the very essence of the thing.
Hegel believes it fully possible, indeed necessary, that in general
things do not ideally embody their essences or concepts. Thus,
when confronted with the booming, buzzing confusion and complexity of nature, he does not infer that the order characterized by
our theorizing activity is merely imposed from without, or that the
recalcitrant examples that do not fit our theoretical categories are
always indications of a failure in our theory. At some point he is
willing to assign the fault to nature itself; it is the "impotence" of
nature that it cannot adequately embody the Concept and is prey to
contingency. Thus each individual thing, although a realization of
some concept or other, and thus determined through the activity of
the concept, is also subject to an indeterminate range of other
external influences and thus is not determined solely by its concept.
Only in pure thought does a concept determine itself alone, and in
pure thought a concept is an ideal.
This seems a very peculiar doctrine, for we immediately want to
say that the last thing an inquirer has a right to do is toss off
troublesome cases as bad or untrue simply because they do not fit a
theory. But there is more to Hegel's move than blunder. It is precisely this doctrine of the imperfection of nature that allows Hegel
to maintain the ideal of a rational system of the world without
falling into the trap of thinking that therefore every aspect of the
world (including Krug's pen) should be a priori deducible on the
basis of purely a priori rational considerations.
When confronted with the extreme and recalcitrant confusion in
nature, there seem to be several possible attitudes we can take, (a)
There is no order in nature; all is chaos. This seems unacceptable,
for then nothing is understandable, especially the fact that we do
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understand much about nature, (b) There is no order in nature; an
order is imputed to nature by us. But then, Hegel would argue, our
"knowledge" of nature is only appearance, and not knowledge; this
is too Kantian a solution for Hegel and smacks of the thing-in-itself.
(c) There is a complete order in nature, but it is deeply hidden. This
still does not account for our present knowledge of nature, and it
allows the deduction of Krug's pen if we ever gain knowledge of the
order of nature. Finally, (d) there is an order in nature, but order
only imperfectly realized. Thus we can have real knowledge of
nature, yet certainly we cannot deduce Krug's pen. "Perfection"
here has teleological underpinnings, and if we rid our concept of
nature of all vestiges of teleology, this alternative becomes senseless
to us (as it probably has).
From another point of view we can note that, if one has a very
good theory about some range of phenomena, one often throws
away or otherwise dismisses some conflicting or recalcitrant data as
spurious. Hegel is, in effect, elevating such a pragmatic methodological maxim into a constitutive principle, for he is ready to
accept the possibility that in the long run the ideal theory could be
developed and yet not account for everything natural, that a classification scheme could be ideal, for instance, even though there were
anomalies. Hegel wants us to take the fact that there will always be
a discrepancy between theory and nature as a necessary truth, and
he attributes the shortcoming to nature, not to theory. It is the mark
of nature and the natural to be less than ideal.
Is there not a danger in this Hegelian view? It seems all too easy to
relax one's scientific vigilance. At what point in our investigation of
nature are we justified in claiming that further attempts at a new
theory are neither necessary nor sensible—not merely for economic
or pragmatic reasons but for intrinsic theoretical reasons? Perhaps
Hegel would reply that the natural (and social?) sciences could not
reach such a point, and that this is itself an example of a bad infinite,
a going on endlessly. This response would make sense within his
system, for one of the imperfections of nature is that the true
infinity of the concept, the infinite return into self, is never fully
realized in nature. There we find only bad infinites. It would, then,
be fully appropriate that the sciences of nature be subject themselves to infinite progression toward adequacy.
It is crucial to remember that the sciences of nature are not the
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highest forms of knowledge for Hegel. The highest forms of knowledge, religion and philosophy, are in principle and in fact perfectable, and it is from the point of view of philosophy, not science, that
we evaluate nature as imperfect. This position still diverges widely
from philosophical beliefs held today, and again it is Hegel's acceptance of a teleological worldview that is the foundation of the difference. Empirical science is not, however, dispensable according to
Hegel. Empirical science tries to build a theory of the world from the
bottom up and is doomed to be caught in the infinite detail and
complexity of nature. Philosophy constructs a theory of the whole
from the top down, but it can never reach the individual per se. The
complete enquirer must follow both paths.
Whatever we think of the doctrine of the necessarily imperfect
realization of concepts in nature, its counterpoint is played by the
doctrine of the possibility of perfect "realization" of concepts in
mind—the doctrine of the self-determination of the concept in
thought. Natural things are imperfect because what they are does
not depend on or is not explainable solely on the basis of their
concept. Men are different because they have different heritages,
live in different environments; these differences are all indifferent
to the concept of man and account for the contingent variation in
men and the impossibility of a perfect exemplar of the species. But a
concept in a subjectivity is in a slightly different position from the
concept as realized in nature. A concept is realized in nature by an
individual that simultaneously realizes an infinite number of other
concepts, even if ultimately subordinated to the most essential
concept. Some of the concepts may not be compatible with the
others, thus forcing change and ultimately finiteness and destruction on the thing.
In mind each concept is individualized abstractly. It is the great
contribution of the abstractive powers of representation and understanding to thus isolate the individuality of concepts. Working with
these "given" concepts as material, intelligence as pure thought is
the activity of reconstituting the purely conceptual links and relations between them. Since they are purely conceptual and determined by the concepts themselves, the relations discovered (or
reconstructed) in thought are modalized.
Since in pure thought concepts appear in their abstract individuality rather than their concrete and complex individuality, they
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need no longer be involved in contingent, arbitrary relations, as
they are often in nature or in Vorstellung. Pure thought perceives
only those relations between concepts which are intrinsically involved in the concepts.4 Thus removed from the imperfection and
recalcitrance of nature and representation, the concepts are realized
as ideals. We have realized the true concept of man when we know
what the ideal man is.

Inferences
The mediated relation of one concept to another is a syllogism
according to Hegel, and just as a concept has its "truth" in judgment, so does judgment have its "truth" in the syllogism, which
makes explicit what is the implicit nature of the judgment. We turn
to the role of the syllogism, of formal inference, in Hegel's theory of
mental activity.
As much as Hegel may have disliked the traditional Aristotelian
logic, he was still mightily under its sway in his consideration of the
formal aspect of thought, and this is particularly evident in his
discussion of the syllogism. It seems that what Hegel really has in
mind is a general theory of our forms of inference; the German
schlufl can as well mean "inference" pure and simple as "syllogism," and under this rubric Hegel discusses inductive and analogical reasoning as well as the deductive, three-termed syllogism.
Working within the confines of the rather narrow understanding of
formal logic available at the time, Hegel constructs an interpretation
of the significance of inference and a rank ordering of kinds of
syllogisms which we must find quite strained. Yet it is masterfully
woven into his philosophical system and reflects the structures and
themes dominant in the system in a rather natural way.
What Hegel would have to say in reaction to the richness of
contemporary logic—not just the logic of Russell and Whitehead's
Principia Mathematica but also modal logics, many-valued logics,
logics of relevance and entailment, intuitionistic logic, paraconsistent logics—we shall never know. Hegel's mind was certainly keen
4. When we talk here of an intrinsic relation between concepts we do not have in
mind the Leibnizian ideal of analysis into simple natures. The picture that seems to
me best to capture Hegel's vision here is rather that of a set of nodes in a net, each of
which is identified solely by its relations to the other nodes.
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enough for him to have realized that these developments would
motivate a fundamental rethinking of much of his system. Perhaps
the most significant difference between the logic that Hegel knew
and contemporary logic is that, whereas Aristotelian logic is
through and through a logic of terms, the fundamental level of
virtually every branch of contemporary logic is propositional. Today
terms are always introduced in a more complex logic on a propositional base. What Hegel would have thought of this change we can
only guess. Would he take our systems as expressing more adequately the relations between concept, judgment, and inference, or
less? But such speculation is not to the point here; rather, by pointing out this difference we can bring to the fore a feature of Hegel's
interpretation of the syllogism that might otherwise confuse us. We
think of inferential relations as obtaining between propositions (or
sentences, or statements, or what have you). Due to his confinement to a logic of terms, Hegel thinks of the inferential relation as
obtaining at the basic level between terms, as being a more complex
connection between terms than the judgmental relation. The term is
the all important piece in the logical puzzle, and finding the right
term, the right concept, is like finding the passkey that will unlock
the nature of the world by permitting inferential access from every
part of it to the whole in terms of which it can be understood.
The syllogism is, then, seen by Hegel as an interrelation of concepts. In judgment in general we also find an interrelation of concepts, but this is, Hegel claims, quite a rigid relation, each term of
the judgment seemingly independent in its own right of the other
and possessed of certain formal characteristics that distinguished it
unfailingly from the other term. Thus one term, say the subject, is
formally determined as a universal or a particular, and therefore as
formally of a distinct kind from the first. In the syllogism, however,
"thought sublates the determination of form and at the same time
posits the identity of differences" (§467). This is best exemplified by
the middle term of a syllogism, which occupies (standardly) both
the subject and the predicate positions in different premises. The
form determinations of the concepts are sublated still further in that
the premises in which the middle term occurs can also be premises
or conclusions in further syllogisms, where the former middle term
has become an extreme, that is, a major or minor term.
In the syllogism, the full systematicity of our conceptual net
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comes to the fore explicitly, and the lesson Hegel draws from his
understanding of syllogistic is about the nature of concepts. Concepts are individual, differentiated among themselves, excluding
one another; they are particulars, that is, specifications of a higher
universal; and they are universals, having species and ultimately
individuals under them. These are the moments of the Concept,
and in the syllogism they are all brought to a unity, the unity of the
Concept. A concept starts its unfolding in judgment but completes
it and shows its true structure in syllogisms.
The syllogism has been taken comformably to the distinctions which it
contains; and the general result of the course of their evolution has
been to show that these differences work out their own abolition and
destroy the concept's outwardness to its own self. And, as we see, in
the first place, i) each of the moments has proved itself the systematic
whole of these elements, in short a whole syllogism,—they are consequently implicitly identical. In the second place 2) the negation of their
distinctions and of the mediation of one through another constitutes
independency [Fursichsein]; so that it is one and the same universal
which is in these forms, and which is in this way also explicitly put as
their identity. In this ideality of its moments, the syllogistic process
may be described as essentially involving the negation of the characters through which its course runs, as being a mediative process
through the suspension of mediation,—as coupling the subject not
with another, but with a suspended other, in one word, with itself.
(EL §192, Wallace tr.)

The syllogism shows that every concept is implicitly a system of
conceptual relations; the concept comes to its truth in the syllogism.
In the syllogism, in our abilities to infer, we idealize most adequately the complex structures exemplified in the world: "Everything is a syllogism. Everything is a concept, the existence of which
is the differentiation of its members or functions, so that the universal nature of the concept gives itself external reality by means
of particularity, and thereby, and as negative reflection-into-self,
makes itself an individual. Or, conversely; the actual thing is an
individual, which by means of particularity rises to universality and
makes itself identical with itself" (EL §181, Wallace tr., adapted).
In the syllogism, concepts are brought to an articulated unity. But
the unity given in any one syllogism presupposes other such uni-
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ties. This sequence of pro-syllogisms could go on and on, but Hegel
would call such an infinite progression a bad infinite (not a vicious
regress, which it clearly is not). Reason refuses to remain content
with the bad infinite and conceives instead the true infinite, the
totality of conditions which is itself unconditioned. There must be,
according to reason, an overarching unity, for reason, the great
unifier, is self-reflective. The ideal lying behind the syllogism, then,
is that of the articulated totality, the ultimate unity of all things in
one system. This, the totality of conditions, is the unconditioned,
the absolute. Here, obviously, Hegel joins battle with Kant. Kant
saw that reason, the syllogizing faculty, has an innate urge to push
onward to the unconditioned, the totality of conditions. But, he
claimed, since such a totality can never possibly be given to our
sense experience, and since knowledge is possible only through the
conjoining of sense experience and thought, we can never claim
knowledge of the totality of conditions. Kant is willing to grant
the idea of the unconditioned totality of conditions (of which he
thought there were three subspecies) a regulative role in the use of
our reason.
The status of the unconditioned, together with the problem of the
thing-in-itself, forms the major point of contention between Hegel
and Kant, but the issues in this debate are so complex that we
cannot hope to do them justice here. Kant, following his empiricist
bent, rejects all ontological claims of the Ideas of reason because the
Ideas transcend possible experience; Hegel, with his opposing rationalist bent, considers their transcendence of possible subjective
experience to be a strength ontologically. Perhaps the most straightforward way to state the disagreement is as follows. As regulative
principles, the Kantian Ideas are maxims for action, prescriptions,
oughts. But they are not constitutive, and they represent ideals that
can never be fulfilled, maxims that prescribe an impossible task.
But, as Kant himself so strikingly pointed out, ought implies can.
Kant seems stuck with a dilemma, an internal inconsistency, one
that he escapes by saying that what is commanded is striving for the
ideal, not achieving it. But this seems hollow to Hegel, like telling a
midget to strive for a professional basketball career. According to
Hegel such infinite striving is simply empty; an end without end is
no end at all. Hegel's proposed solution is clear: ought does imply
can, and the Ideas of reason (which Hegel unifies in his own one
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Idea) as the in principle achievable task or object of rational thought
are not merely regulative, they are what is in and for itself, what is
real.
For Hegel, to think is to transcend sensation toward universality
and necessity. The fact that through reason we pose ourselves an
object that transcends all possible sense experience shows that here
we have finally freed ourselves from the immediacy of sensation—
finally begun to think purely: "The rise of thought beyond the world
of sense, its passage from the finite to the infinite, the leap into the
super-sensible which it takes when it snaps asunder the chain of
sense, all this transition is thought and nothing but thought. Say
there must be no such passage, and you say there is to be no
thinking" (EL §50, Wallace tr.). This does not mean that Hegel
thinks we can achieve the ideal scientific theory of natural phenomena; for reasons we have already discussed, the theory of
nature is open to infinite refinement on Hegel's view. But philosophy studies thought itself, the universal and necessary structure of
the world, and furthermore comprehends the ideal of thought,
which is knowledge of the absolute, the unconditioned, itself none
other than thought. Hegel's system, as has been noted before,
seems to pull itself up by its own bootstraps. But since thought is not
itself an item in our sensory experience, it is necessary to transcend
sense experience if thought is to comprehend itself, if it is to be
thought at all.
There is another way we can put this dispute. C. D. Broad suggests that there are two fundamental principles in Kant's discussion
of the proofs for the existence of God, the Ideal of Pure Reason.5
First, if anything exists, something must exist in its own right; or,
not everything derives its existence from something else. This principle has found acceptance among philosophers since Parmenides.
Second, it is not possible that the existence of anything should be a
necessary consequence of its nature or definition. Kant's resolution
of the conflict is to make both principles regulative (although, as
Broad points out, he need only have made one regulative). Hegel
rejects that solution and instead accepts the first principle and
denies the second outright. His reason for doing so is that, whereas
the second holds of natures and definitions abstractly conceived,
5. C. D. Broad, Kant: An Introduction, pp. 298-300.
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that is, conceived as abstract universals, it is simply false of the
concrete universal (see SL, pp. 705-8; WdL, vol. 2, pp. 353~57).6
The Nature of Thinking Activity

I have discussed the first list given in §467 in some detail, so the
discussion of the second list can be shorter. As I have said, the
second list focuses on the activity of theoretical spirit. It is thus a
more adequate description of the actuality of thinking, yet we have
covered most of the ground already in our extensive discussion of
the first list.
Intelligence cognizes as thinking. Indeed, a) if the understanding
explains the singular from its own universalities (the categories), it is
called self-comprehending; b) if the understanding explains it [the
singular] as a universal (genus, kind) in a judgment, then the content
appears in this form as given, c) However, in a syllogism the understanding determines the content from itself in that it sublates the
distinction of forms. The last immediacy that remains attached to
formal thinking disappears with the insight into necessity. (§467, my
tr.)

What first strikes our attention is that Hegel consistently uses
the word "explain" (erklaren) to describe the activity involved in
thought. Hegel adopts a rather Aristotelian view of explanation,
recognizing different "why" questions in answer to which explanations can be given. But he gives pride of place to ideological explanation, for it is a form of explanation grounded in the concept of the
thing explained; it alone relies on intrinsic necessities. The philosophical theory of the world is a teleological theory, and only such a
theory, according to Hegel, could count as a philosophical explanation of the nature of the world.7
Some parts of this second list seem confusing. If the understanding tries to get at something's concept, to explain the singular thing
6. Applied to the ontological argument, though, Hegel's position begs the question, for he has not demonstrated the correctness of his theory of the concrete
universal.

7. See deVries, "The Dialectic of Teleology," Proceedings, Hegel Society of America, 1980.
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by means of "its own [the understanding's] universalities (the categories)," what is it doing, and why does this count as "comprehending itself"? First, Hegel seems to reserve the term "categories"
for the concepts of the objective logic, Being and Essence, so he is
here talking of explaining something in terms of its qualities, quantities, relations, and so forth. This certainly seems straightforward
enough; but how does this result in understanding's comprehending itself? We have already seen that Hegel's theory is a version of
the macrocosm-microcosm view; intelligence has reconstructed the
world within itself, and understanding any part of the world, it is
also in part understanding its own activity in reconstruction. The
categories are generic rules by which it operates, and knowing how
to apply them is a form of understanding, just as knowing how to
use the tools properly is a form of understanding construction
work. And, of course, the categories are themselves the product of
intelligence; to understand them, understanding must understand
itself in its product. The formulation Hegel gives the last part of this
paragraph in the 1827 edition of the Encyclopedia bears this out: "In
that it comprehends, intelligence has the determinedness which in
its sensation is at first sight an immediate material, in itself as
simply its own. In the insight into the necessity of the content first
given to thought itself, the course of its own activity is, for intelligence, identical with the implicit being of the determinedness of
the content, intelligence being for itself as determining" (PSS, vol.
3, pp. 221-23).
This passage also brings out the important fact that Hegel believes that, in thinking, the activity of the mind is "identical" with
the "implicit being" of the determinateness [an sich seyenden Bestimmtseyn] of what is thought about. Hegel takes it to be the case that
the structure of thought is the structure of the world. All things are
judgments; all things are syllogisms, according to Hegel. The structural relations discernible in the activity of thought are the same as
the ontological structures of the world. There is, however, no argument here for this position; such an "argument" is the burden of the
Logik and of the system as a whole.
In §467 Hegel encapsulates a vision of the nature of man's theoretical activity. We begin with a confrontation with the individual
facts and entities of the world, yet this is not a mute acceptance, for
they have been raised to exemplars of the universal, they belong to
kinds. This point is made explicit in the second stage of thought,
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judgment. The content of thought still appears to be given here,
insofar as we are still making explicit the interconnections between
the universals, which universals appear otherwise independent of
each other. An example of this kind of approach might be taking
"mass" to be an independent concept that can enter into different
theories, such as the Newtonian or Einsteinian, without being intrinsically affected in any way.
This point of view is superseded at the highest level of thought,
where our awareness of the importance of the inferential connections among our concepts is explicit. Even the universals through
which we first grasped the individual facts and entitites are now
seen to be specifications of the one universal activity of thinking.
Thought is to this extent a closed system, adapting itself to itself,
giving itself its own structure. By dealing thus only with itself,
building within itself a pure system of relations, thought has transcended all particular content and all immediacy, achieving "insight into necessity."
This final stage is not, one must realize, a form of a special
science; it is not an empirical scientific theory of an aspect of nature,
nor of nature as a whole. It is the unitary, philosophical theory of
how things in the broadest sense hang together. A scientific theory,
which must have some particular subject matter, never achieves
this exalted status, for it always depends on some form of given,
something that spirit merely finds before it. Only in the theory that
unifies not only the particular phenomena of nature but also religious, ethical, and aesthetic phenomena and, perhaps most important, philosophical theorizing itself into one complete picture of
the world-whole is all particular content transcended. By transcending all particular content, philosophical theorizing is left with
only the universal content: thought. Philosophy, like the absolute,
thinks thought. The goal of pure thought is the comprehensive
knowledge of itself, of the conceptual articulation of the world, of
which it is itself an aspect and of which it is the goal. Its method is
pure inference, taking everything offered to it and following out all
its consequences (where deductive inferences are the most trivial
and least important form of reaching consequences).
The universal is known here as self-particularizing and as collecting
itself together from the particularization into singularity—or, which is
the same—as the particular reduced from its independence to being a
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moment of the concept. Accordingly, the universal is no longer external to the content here, but is rather the veritable form that produces
the content out of itself—the self-developing concept of the subjectmatter [Sache]. Thinking, therefore, has at this point no other content
than itself, than its own determinations, which constitute the immanent content of the form. Thinking seeks and finds in the object
[Gegenstand] only itself. The object is therefore distinguished from
thinking only in that it has the form of being, of subsisting for itself.
Thus thinking stands here in a perfectly free relationship to the object
[Objekt]. (§467, Zusatz, my tr.)

The goal of thought is the construction of a completely self-contained, self-explanatory conceptual system, one identical with the
conceptual articulation of the world itself. The explanations that
this system will afford, however, are not deductive arguments in
which a particular event, property, or object is shown to be necessary; they are teleological, interpretive "makings sense of" particular aspects of the world. Philosophy will never allow us to predict
the course of the world or its individual events, but it should enable
us to understand in retrospect how it all hangs together. Through
philosophy we gain a vision of the whole through which the individual parts make sense. But this vision metaphor must be handled
gingerly, for the perceiver is normally distinct from the perceived.
The "vision" of the whole gained through philosophy can only be
achieved by identifying with that whole; our "vision" is better
called a re-creation: "In this thinking that is identical to its object
[Gegenstand] intelligence achieves its completion, its goal, for it is
then in fact what, in its immediacy, it was only supposed to be—
self-knowing truth, self-recognizing reason. This mutual self-penetration of thinking subjectivity and objective reason is the result of
the development of theoretical spirit through the stages of intuition
and representation that precede pure thinking" (§467, Zusatz, my
tr.).

THE TRANSITION TO PRACTICAL SPIRIT
Although the internal re-creation of the structure of the whole is
the culmination of theoretical spirit, it is of course not the final end
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to the story, for theoretical spirit develops into practical spirit,
which transition is the topic of §468: "Intelligence, knowing itself to
be the determinant of the content, which is determined as its own
no less than as being, is will." Concepts are ideals, and the theorizing activity of spirit produces knowledge of ideals. In particular,
spirit's self-knowledge is a knowledge of its own ideal nature. Intrinsic to the notion of an ideal, however, is that it is a goal to be
pursued, and the knowledge of its ideal which results from spirit's
theoretical activity necessarily culminates in practical activity.
Pure thinking is, to begin with, a disinterested (unbefangenes) activity
in which it is absorbed in the object. But this action necessarily also
becomes objective to itself. Since objective cognition is absolutely at
home with itself in the object, it must recognize that its determinations
are determinations of the object, and that, conversely, the objectively
valid determinations immediately present in the object are its determinations. By this recollection, this withdrawal into itself of intelligence,
the latter becomes will. (§468, Zusatz, Miller tr.)

It is part of our nature to be knowers, and we therefore strive to
achieve the ideal theory of the world. But we are not, and could not
be, only knowers. The task of the lower levels of theoretical spirit is
to idealize that which is realized in the world; as it progresses and
develops, spirit develops its content from within itself through its
theorizing. There is a certain amount of practical activity here, of
course—creating words, making judgments and inferences. Hegel
does not intend us to think that theoretical and practical activity can
be divorced from one another; the relation between them is only
that levels of practical activity conceptually presuppose levels of
theoretical activity. In fact, however, they cannot be disjoined.
When Hegel turns to the analysis of practical spirit, he has to
backtrack quite a bit, to a conception of "practical feeling." In
actuality the theoretical and the practical are simultaneous aspects
of the activity of spirit, but as we all know, exposition is always
linear, even if the subject matter is not.
In emerging into the sphere of practical spirit, spirit testifies to its
freedom and its self-certainty. It is now sure of itself as the moving
power of the world, sure that its own products must be realized in
the world. To the extent that nature does not exemplify the ideals of
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spirit, nature falls short, and spirit must undertake to work its will
on nature. This process is itself subject to a complex dialectical
progression, but that lies beyond the bounds of this essay.
CONCLUSION
Hegel maintains that, in thinking, concepts are active within me,
and I am their vehicle, as it were. These are one and the same
concepts that are active in the world, and they constitute the true
substance of the world. The problem of a divorce between my
concepts and the natures of things as they are in themselves therefore does not arise. But although the problem of a thing-in-itself
may not arise for Hegel, it would be more than naive to think that
no other problems arise.
The notion of a creative, self-structuring activity is awesome,
fascinating, and powerful—but also quite hard for us to accept. It is
hard to tell, of course, whether we fully understand Hegel's concept of spirit and reject it because of lingering suspicions about its
coherence, or whether we have not yet succeeded in comprehending the concept—a concept, supposedly, in which comprehension
breeds credence. Neither our suspicions nor our lack of insight can
count as a refutation of such a notion, but the notion is so vague that
more exacting criticism of it is equally elusive. We do know that selfreflection often generates paradoxes in otherwise straightforward
matters, especially where all-inclusive self-reflective totalities are
concerned. The set-theoretical paradoxes are the best examples of
this. But how would one even begin to construct an argument that
Hegel's notion of a self-reflective totality, the Absolute, is as barren
as the notion of the set of all sets? One tends to avoid self-reflective
totalities whenever possible, because of their extreme complexity,
yet, in Hegel's defense, it is not clear that we can avoid them
altogether. We certainly cannot rule out limited self-reflection—it is
too obviously a feature of the world we live in and of our own being.
Someone of naturalistic bent might easily point out that there
seems to be no particular problem involved in one part of the world
"mapping" another part, even if it is an element of what is mapped.
There need only be restrictions on the detail of the map. I have
much sympathy with such an approach, but working out the de-
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tails, we also know, is an extremely difficult task. Hegel did not
adopt such an approach for a reason the strength of which I am still
uncertain. The world as he saw it was too obviously teleological.
Standard physical theory tells us that the world ought to run
down, approaching a random distribution of energy. Organic and
mental phenomena seem to gainsay this result (remember that
Hegel wrote well before Darwin). Explaining organic and mental
phenomena on the basis of the principles adequate for the explanation of the inorganic, material world did not look feasible. The only
alternative, if the world was not to be bifurcated into alien realms,
was to explain the material, inorganic, and mechanical somehow on
the basis of the teleological principles used in the explanation of the
organic and the mental. This is the route Hegel took. But the attempt to fit the material and mechanical into an organic framework,
when it concerns the world-whole, raises its own problems, for
there are major disanalogies between the world-whole and organisms or minds. Organisms and minds have environments with
which they interact causally, for instance. Even if we accept the idea
that organisms and minds,are..to be^explained through teleological
principles, an idea Hegel never doubted, deep puzzles arise when
we try to apply these principles, as vague as most of them are, to the
world-whole. As we learn more about what kind of thing teleology
is, we may well find that Hegel's route looks even less plausible.
But even if most of us find it hard today to accept Hegel's notion
of the Absolute and much of the attendant metaphysics that accompanies it, his system is still worth our attention. I have often been
asked what profit there is in studying Hegel's philosophy of mind,
and the subtext of the question is whether there are insights there
that would transform current philosophy of mind, insights unrepresented in the current debate. Perhaps regrettably, the answer
must be that there is nothing strikingly new in Hegel's philosophy
of mind. Fifty years ago, however, the question would have been
answered with a resounding yes! Against the atomism and reductionism of the positivists, Hegel would have been a welcome antidote. As it happened, Hegel's own primary inspiration in philosophical psychology, Aristotle, provided much of the inspiration to
those who battled positivism within the Anglo-American tradition.
But positivism was not simply overthrown in a movement to restore
past philosophical glories; its own adherents rigorously investi-
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gated its assumptions and its arguments, and its own internal
dialectic gradually led to a repudiation of the atomism and reductionism characteristic of positivist thought. Hegel has little new to
offer us because, after much hard work, we have finally caught up
with him.
The purely historical interest in comprehending a great philosophy for its own sake is quite sufficient justification for reading
Hegel, particularly when there are interesting resonances with current work in the field. Surely we understand our own assumptions
better by seeing them employed or rejected by others, particularly
those who have been major figures in our own history. An ahistorical philosophy is an unreflective philosophy—and that is a contradiction in terms.
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